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Abstract 
This investigation rearticulates the Hegelian-Marxist theory of alienation in the light of Derrida' s 
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. It aims to demonstrate in what way Derridian 
deconstruction can itself be said to be a critique of alienation. In so doing, it argues that the 
acceptance of Derrida's deconstructive concepts does not necessarily entail the acceptance of his 
interpretations of Hegel and Marx. 
Derrida is shown to be a representative of a tendency in contemporary thought that is 
thought to have long since discredited the concept of alienation. He determines the 
characteristics of alienation as constitutive and those of de-alienation as involving the 
metaphysical myth of the plenitude and identity of presence and 'the proper'. The guiding 
question of the investigation is whether the notion of de-alienation necessarily depends on such 
'metaphysical' conceptions. 
It is argued in the first chapter that notions of de-alienation to be found in German 
Idealism and its derivatives largely involve a concept of 'determinability' that is closer to 
Derrida's de constructive concept of differance than to presence. There then follows a detailed 
discussion of Hegel's conceptions of alienation and de-alienation, where it is argued, in contrast 
to Derrida' s interpretation, that the latter is not the return of the logos to itself in its full presence, 
but is rather the actuality of infinity whereby the exclusionary identity of present determinacy 
transcends itself. The following chapter on Marx argues that Marxian de-alienation does not 
involve, as Derrida claims, the 'exorcism' of the 'spectrality' of the commodity form through the 
establishment of the fullness of presence, but rather involves the reabsorption of humanity's 
generic determinability into the life of the individual. 
The last two chapters involve a reassessment of the implications of Heideggerian and 
post-Heideggerian (Derridian) deconstruction with regard to its relationship to alienation. It is 
argued that Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics, despite claiming to be antithetical to the 
German Idealist tradition, is actually a critique of ontological alienation. It is then argued that 
Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence is itself a critique of alienation, in that 
presence is itself the givenness of an objectified phenomenality. 
The investigation involves both the claim that the conceptions of de-alienation to be 
found in, among others, the works of Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger involve manifestations of 
differance rather than presence and the claim that the deconstruction of presence opens up the 
conceptual possibility of a genuine de-alienation. 
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Introduction: Derrida and Alienation 
The purpose of this investigation is to reassess and reinterpret the Hegelian-Marxist 
conceptions of alienation and de-alienation in the light of Derrida' s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence and the proper. In so doing, the aim is to propose and outline an 
alternative interpretation of the relation between Derridian deconstruction and the theory 
of alienation to that which has hitherto been propounded by Derrida himself, his 
contemporaries, and his commentators. 
The notion of alienation, along with the concepts of 'essence' and 'origin' which 
are purported to underpin it, has been long since discredited in anti-humanist currents of 
contemporary thought, particularly those associated with or deriving from French 
structuralism. The features of alienation have been determined there as constitutive of 
the human subject, rendering de-alienation impossible. Regarded as something eternal 
and insurmountable, alienation becomes a useless concept. 
While Derrida is a representative of such currents of thought, it could be argued 
that he does not address and is unconcerned with the theme of alienation. It is certainly 
the case that the word rarely appears in his writings. Nevertheless, one of the aims of this 
investigation is to demonstrate that the impetus of deconstruction is the unmasking and 
debunking of any notion of an unalienated condition that can be shown to be dependent 
on a metaphysics of presence and the proper. What is in contention is the question of 
whether the unalienated condition is necessarily dependent on such 'metaphysical' 
conceptions. 
Inalienable Alienation 
Derrida's thought emerged in the 1960s within a wider theoretical context in which the 
critique of the concept of alienation was in the air. The idea of alienation to be found in 
the early Marx was held to involve the loss of something original and essential that 
could be regained in the future, entailing the belief in a lost and retrievable human 
'essence', a belief that was identified with 'humanism'. Despite their diversity, Derrida 
and a number of his contemporaries reacted against 'humanism' as they saw it, and put 
forward non-humanist ideas loosely influenced by structuralism. The idea of a human 
'essence' or authentic humanity became untenable in a theoretical universe of 
synchronic structures, differential relations, and discourse, in which the so-called human 
subject is but an effect and a function. 
6 
For example, Althusser's structuralist interpretation of Marxism starts from a 
critique of the early Marx's concept of alienation. He characterises the concept of 
alienation to be found in the early Marx, Feuerbach, and Hegel, as a 'myth of origins', a 
concept that presupposes the simple unity of an originary human essence. Alienation is 
an 'organic' concept dependent on the notion of an outgrowth from the unified 
simplicity of an originary essence, a concept that has no place in the anti-organic science 
of complex structurality. Althusser writes: '[O]rganic categories ... cannot survive ... 
particularly those categories that "cash" the theme of an original simple unity, that is, the 
"fission" of the simple whole, alienation'. I 
Foucault is another example of a contemporary of Derrida who pitches his 
discourse against modern humanism. In his book, The Order of Things, Hegel, Marx, 
and the concept of alienation are all inextricably bound up with the anthropocentric 
episteme, the latter referring to the structural configuration of knowledge in the historical 
period of modernity. This episteme is centred on the notion of 'man' and his alienation. 
Foucault writes: '[T]he whole of modern thought is imbued with the necessity ... of 
ending man's alienation by reconciling him with his own essence'. 2 Foucault identifies 
in Hegel and Marx, and in 'modern' thinking in general, the organic temporality of the 
loss of the plenitude of the origin and the promise of its eventual return. 3 For him, the 
concept of alienation and its attendant 'organic' concepts will disappear when the 
'modern' anthropocentric episteme is replaced by a different structural configuration of 
knowledge. 
Derrida's thought emerged from a context where the French structuralist critique 
of the traditional concept of alienation held sway. This concept was identified with, and 
reduced to, an anthropocentric humanism, which itself was reduced to having an 
ultimate reference to the notion of a simple human essence. The concept of alienation 
was believed to be dependent on an organic temporality, a temporality based on the 
expressive development of a single unifying principle, manifesting itself in the retreat 
and promise of return of the origin. The ultimate reference to the simplicity of an 
essence was dismissed as a 'myth of origins' . 
As with his contemporaries, Derrida postulates the constitutive permanence of 
alienation as opposed to the 'myth of origins'. An unalienated condition implies the 
originary simplicity of an essence, fully present to itself in the proprietary wholeness of 
an identity. This condition is a myth, because it is already marked by the trace of the 
other, always already alienated from the fullness of self-presence. In his later work, 
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Monolingualism of the Other, he writes: 'This abiding "alienation" [alienation a 
demeure] appears, like "lack," to be constitutive. But it is neither a lack nor an 
alienation; it lacks nothing that precedes or follows it, it alienates no ipseity, no property, 
and no self... [This is a] structure of alienation without alienation, ... [an] inalienable 
alienation,.4 If alienation is constitutive there is no alienation, no making alien, because 
everything is always already alien. 
For Derrida, the notions of origin, essence, and of what is proper to humanity, 
belong to 'metaphysics'. They are fundamental myths that govern the way we think. 
Derrida identifies metaphysics as logocentrism and onto-theology, the determination of 
being on the ultimate basis of a central governing principle, the presence to itself of the 
Word [logos] as manifested in the voice. While it is impossible simply to escape these 
fundamental myths, they can be undermined through a form of immanent critique called 
deconstruction. This involves analysing a text in order to make manifest the hierarchical 
binary oppositions underpinning it, and to demonstrate how they are undermined by the 
infinitising polysemy of the operations of writing that they are constituted through, but 
which they have to suppress. 
The notion of writing is important for Derrida, because it is traditionally seen as a 
derivative and alienated representation of speech, of the full presence of meaning in the 
voice. In his early work, Of Grammatology (1967), he describes the determination of 
writing by the metaphysical tradition in the following way: '[Writing] is a mediation and 
the departure of the logos from itself. Without writing the latter would remain in itself. 
Writing is the dissimulation of the natural, primary, and immediate presence of sense to 
the soul within the logos.,5 Within this definition, writing is identical to what Hegel calls 
'En tauJ3erung , (translated as 'alienation' or 'externalisation'). Derrida himself states the 
identity of writing and EntauJ3erung (alienation as exteriorisation) in Hegel when he 
writes: 'Writing is ... that exteriorization, the contrary of the interiorizing memory, of the 
Erinnerung,.6 For Derrida, this derivative and alienated character of writing applies to 
meaning in general, which can never attain the fullness and monovalence of presence. 
Speech thus becomes merely a moment or a function of a generalised writing, an arche-
writing, or an originary writing, which amounts to an originary non-originariness. 
For Derrida, the fundamental metaphysical motif is that of presence, and he 
develops his notions of a generalised writing and dijferance to demonstrate the 
impossibility of its ever being achieved. Dijferance, spelt with an 'a'. is a neologism 
which. in French, combines the meanings of difference, differing, and deferral. 
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Something can only be determined by its opposition to or difference from what it is not. 
The infinite chain of referrals that this sets off defers the presence of meaning. 
Something is never present in itself, it is always pervaded by the trace of what it is not; it 
is nothing more than a moment in an economy of traces. The trace is Derrida's term for 
what is neither present nor absent. The process of differentiation infinitely defers the 
reference to something present. 
The myth of origins is the effacement of the originary non-originariness. The 
latter implies a generalised artificiality and inauthenticity, irreducible to any ultimate 
reference to the originariness of a natural authenticity. In Of Grammat%gy, Derrida 
casts Rousseau as a privileged example of the metaphysics of presence and the myth of 
origins. Rousseau decries the artificiality of civilisation, claiming it corrupted the 
original natural innocence of humanity. He regards writing as an artificial aberration, a 
secondary distortion and corruption of the fullness and immediate presence of meaning 
in the voice. Writing is thus a 'supplement', an artificial prosthetic addition to 
something, external to its proper nature. However, Derrida argues, using evidence from 
Rousseau's own text marginalised from its main argument, that the original always 
already had the characteristic of prosthetic supplementarity, the voice already having the 
characteristics attributed to writing. The supplement, an addition to something that is 
apparently alien to its true nature, finds itself at the heart of that something, at the heart 
of its true essential nature, of what is proper and authentic to the self-presence of its own 
identity, thus problematising the very notions of identity, the essential, and the proper. 
For Derrida, the proper is inseparable from presence, and both are fundamental to 
his definition of metaphysics. His critique of metaphysics is thus a critique of the present 
and the proper. In order to elaborate further the implications of his critique of de-
alienation it is necessary to investigate his treatment of these two concepts. 
The Present 
The metaphysics of presence is Derrida's term for the determination of the meaning of 
being as presence, that is, in terms of entities that are present. This is also his definition 
of metaphysics as such. 7 He derives this insight from Heidegger, who maintained that 
metaphysics as the determination of being in terms of what is, in terms of the present, is 
precisely the oblivion of the difference between presence and the present, and thus, more 
fundamentally, between being and entities, which is an oblivion of being as such.8 
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Despite the word's connotations of living concretion, presence, as the ultimate 
basis of metaphysics, as the constantly reiterated ultimate target of deconstruction, takes 
on the aspect of the emptiest of abstractions. While, as Derrida points out, the concept 
named by the Latin derived word for him involves an assimilation of various Greek and 
German words (ousia, parousia, Gegenwartigheit, Anwesenheit, etc.),9 we will here 
concentrate on the determinations and associations that the single word presence 
(,presence') is subjected to in Derrida's writings, with particular focus on the first part of 
Of Grammatology. The word rarely appears there without being qualified and identified 
with other words. 
One such qualification is the notion of fullness, or plenitude. For example, 
Derrida describes metaphysics as the 'subordination of the trace to the full presence 
summed up in the logos'. 10 There are also references to a writing that 'exiles us far 
from ... the full presence of the signified in its truth', II and 'a full speech that was fully 
present' .12 Is fullness intrinsic to presence, or is full presence a type of presence? Can 
there be a presence that is not full? Presence is defined as 'the trace of the erasure of the 
trace. ' 13 It may be the erasure of the trace, but it is still a trace, a trace that hides its 
trace like nature. The neither present nor absent trace is the basis of presence, but 
presence effaces its basis. The concept of presence is of something that does not contain 
the trace of the other within itself, a something that is therefore full, fully itself. Derrida 
conceives the word 'presence' in terms of fullness. Presence is intrinsically full, but is 
fullness necessarily present? Fullness could be absent, but in this case absent would be 
conceived in terms of presence, a presence that is elsewhere, 'an absence, that is an other 
presence'. 14 Presence is thus identified with fullness and vice versa; it is fullness that is 
the target of deconstruction. 
Derrida also qualifies the notion of presence with the notion of simplicity. For 
example, he refers to 'deconstructing the simplicity of presence', 15 and he defines the 
trace as 'that which does not let itself be summed up in the simplicity of a present.' 16 
Presence and simplicity are identified; the present is simple and the simple is present. As 
presence is fullness, simplicity is fullness too. Complexity involves gaps, a lack of 
fullness. Simplicity can have no gaps and no lack. It does not contain any trace of the 
other within itself; it is fully itself and thus absolute and pure. Fullness is absolute and 
absolute is simple. Derrida writes of 'the plenitude of a present and an absolute 
presence' 17 and 'the concept of the simple absolute' .18 
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Presence as the basis of metaphysics involves the closure of an absolute identity, 
an identity uncontaminated by the trace of the other. Presence is a closure, a walling-in. 
Derrida claims that any thought founded on the logos is 'walled-in within presence.' 19 
He maintains that retention and protention, both characteristics of the trace, 'sever the 
present. .. from its self-identity'. 20 The present in its presence is always an identity, and 
identity is always present. Presence and identity are identical. 
Derrida describes the concepts of 'essence' and 'substance' as 
'subdeterminations' of being that depend on the 'general form' ofpresence.21 Essence is 
presence in that it effaces differance and the trace. Derrida defines differance in its 
opposition to essence as presence: 'There is no essence of differance; it (is) ... that which 
threatens the authority of the as such in general, of the presence of the thing itself in its 
essence.,22 Essence as the true nature of something, as what something is 'as such', 
involves a fullness and identity that excludes any trace of what it is not. 
Derrida also equates presence with substance, in that the latter excludes the trace. 
He writes: '[T]hat which accommodates nonbeingness, cannot participate in presence, in 
substance, in beingness itself (ousia).'23 Pure writing, writing that is not chained to the 
logocentrism of the phoneme and thus to the metaphysics of presence, undermines the 
notion of substance. Derrida writes: '[Pure writing] menaces substantiality, that other 
metaphysical name of presence and of ousia. First in the form of the substantive. 
Nonphonetic writing breaks the noun apart. It describes relations and not appellations. 
The noun and the word, those unities of breath and concept, are effaced within pure 
writing. ,24 Substance is the opposite of relation. Difference is a relation and presence is 
the absence of relation. Derrida quotes Saussure's statement that 'language is a form and 
not a substance', and claims that this is based on Saussure's dictum that 'in language 
there are only differences'. 25 Whether substance is material, for example the phonic or 
graphic substance of expression, or immaterial, for example the meaning expressed, its 
essence lies in its non-relationality. Writing is constituted not by the graphic substance, 
but by the relationality between the graphemes, a relationality that amounts to a process 
of differentiation, a process that Derrida calls 'spacing'. Relationality as spacing is non-
substantial and non-present. Derrida writes: 'Arche-writing as spacing cannot occur as 
such within the phenomenological experience of a presence . ... No intuition can be 
realized in the place where "the 'whites' indeed take on an importance" (Preface to Coup 
de des) [Mallarme]. ,26 
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Derrida places the notions of consciousness and subjectivity finnly within the 
field of presence. He refers to 'the self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, 
subjectivity'.27 Consciousness and subjectivity are particular modalities of the 
metaphysics of presence, and they took hold through the Cartesian revolution in 
philosophy. Presence here becomes internalised as self-presence, which is identified 
with subjectivity. Derrida writes that, after Descartes, 'the detennination of absolute 
presence is constituted as self-presence, as subjectivity.,28 According to Derrida, 
subjectivity can only be thought in tenns of presence and substance; the subject is self-
present substantiality. He writes: '[T]he category of the subject... however it is 
modified, however it is endowed with consciousness or unconsciousness, it will refer, by 
the entire thread of its history, to the substantiality of a presence unperturbed by 
accidents, or to the identity of the selfsame [Ie propre] in the presence of self-
relationship. ,29 
However, it IS by no means certain that in the history of philosophy 
consciousness and sUbjectivity have always been conceived in tenns of substantiality. 
Descartes' detennination of the human mind as a 'thing that thinks,3D involves the 
substantiality of thinghood. Derrida regards the Cartesian subject in substantial tenns: 
'Ideality and substantiality relate to themselves in the element of the res cogitans,.31 
However, Kant's inflection of the Cartesian subject in his conception of the 
'transcendental unity of apperception' amounts to a desubstantialisation of that subject. 
The subject of the 'I think' that must accompany all representations is transcendental 
and not empirical, a logical postulate and not a substantial being. Furthennore, Kant's 
'noumenal' subject of moral action is unpresentable and non-phenomenalisable. It is 
thus insubstantial, as Kant places the notion of substance finnly in the phenomenal 
realm. For Kant, as for Derrida, substance and phenomenal presence are inextricably 
bound up. However, for Kant, the subject cannot be present, in contrast with Derrida' s 
portrayal of the traditional philosophical conception of the subject as a self-present 
substantiality. 
In the ensuing chapters of this investigation we will demonstrate the importance 
of an insubstantial conception of subjectivity to the development of the post-Kantian 
notion of alienation. Examples of such insubstantiality will include Hegel's notion of 
'subject' as opposed to 'substance', of the subject as a disjuncture in the self-identity of 
substance, and Feuerbach's notion of the universality of the subject as an indetenninate 
detenninable substitutability. 
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As we have seen, Derrida, in Of Grammatology, identifies the metaphysical 
concept of presence with fullness, simplicity, and identity. He even reduces to presence 
the notion of 'infinite subjectivity'. However, does not infinity undennine presence? 
Infinity by definition cannot be defined or determined in tenns of fullness and identity, 
which can only be finite. Infinity is a non-full, or rather unfulfillable, non-identity. Yet 
Derrida claims: 'The logos can be infinite and self-present' .32 This contradicts Derrida's 
detennination of presence as a 'walled-in' identity. The relationship between Derrida's 
thought and Hegel's distinction between the 'true' and 'spurious' infinities will be 
explored in the second chapter. 
Derrida identifies presence with the fullness of life as the forgetting of death. He 
describes differance as 'the nonpresence of the other inscribed within the sense of the 
present, [and] the relationship with death as the concrete structure of the living 
present.,33 The myth of the fullness of presence is thus the myth of the fullness of life, 
devoid of any relationship with death. Derrida describes his notion of the trace in tenns 
of a relationship with death: '[T]he trace is the opening of. .. the enigmatic relationship 
of the living to its other' .34 The erasure of the trace in the fullness of presence is the 
erasure of death. Conversely, Derrida also uses the word death to refer to the reified 
stasis of the fullness of life itself when he refers to 'being as presence, as parousia, as 
life without differance: another name for death'. 35 Derrida regards the fullness of life as 
a dangerous myth which he identifies with evil in his later writings, precisely because it 
involves the forgetting of death. In Spectres of Marx, he refers to 'absolute evil (which 
is, is it not, absolute life, fully present life, the one that does not know death and does not 
want to hear about it)' .36 
Derrida often detennines presence in tenns of being a fonn, referring to the 'fonn 
of presence' .37 He asserts that concepts such as essence, substance, consciousness, and 
subjectivity, are subdetenninations of the 'general fonn' of presence.38 He goes further 
than this, though, claiming that fonn as such is nothing other than presence itself. He 
writes: 'Fonn is presence itself. Fonnality is whatever aspect of the thing in general 
presents itself, lets itself be seen, gives itself to be thought. ,39 Presence is also identified 
with fonn when Derrida claims that metaphysics assigns to being 'the closure of 
presence, the fonn-of-presence, presence-in-fonn, fonn-presence. ,40 The unfonned or 
the amorphous are the non-present. 
However, as we have seen, Derrida refers approvingly to Saussure's assertion 
that in language there are only differences, arguing that this is the basis of Saussure' s 
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view that 'language is a form and not a substance'. Differance is here linked to a certain 
understanding of form. Its opposition to substance implies that it involves a form of 
formalism, one that is different from form as presence. This indicates that it is only a 
certain conception of form that is reducible to the concept of presence. In fact, the later 
Derrida uses the word 'formality' to refer to non-presence as indeterminacy. He 
describes deconstructive thinking itself in terms of formality: 'In its pure formality, in 
the indetermination that it requires, one may find yet another essential affinity between it 
and a certain messianic spirit. ,41 
Pure form as the absence of determinate content is conceived by Derrida as the 
basis of a messianic, eschatological opening to the future. He writes: 'Apparently 
"formalist," this indifference to the content has perhaps the value of giving one to think 
the necessarily pure and purely necessary form of the future as such, in its being-
necessarily-promised, prescribed, assigned, enjoined, in the necessarily formal necessity 
of its possibility' .42 Here, the term 'future' does not refer, as it usually does, to a future 
present, but precisely to a lack within the present itself that disables it from being 
walled-in within the identity of the closure of its plenitude. 
According to Derrida, time has traditionally been conceived on the basis of the 
present, as a spatial movement between presences. Derrida's conception of the future is 
a conception of time on the basis of non-presence. However, for the early Derrida, the 
notion of time is irredeemably soiled with the present. He writes: 'Time is that which is 
thought on the basis of Being as presence, and if something ... is to be thought beyond 
the determination of Being as presence, it cannot be a question of something that still 
could be called time. ,43 
Despite this, Derrida makes a suggestive reference to the possibility of a 
'delinearized temporality' that would involve a 'pluri-dimensionality' that would not be 
contained within the field of the present.44 Linearity, time as a succession of presents, is 
the form of the organic temporality that Derrida, in OfGrammatology, calls 'history'. He 
writes: '[H]istory has no doubt always been associated with a linear scheme of the 
unfolding of presence, where the line relates the final presence to the originary presence 
according to the straight line or the circle. ,45 As we have seen, this linear 'history' of the 
loss and return of full presence describes the historicity of the concept of alienation as 
characterised by Derrida and his contemporaries. 
Derrida identifies presence with fullness, simplicity, identity, closure, essence, 
substance, and form. He identifies presence as the basis of consciousness, subjectivity, 
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the fullness of life, and linear temporality. What Derrida means by the term 'presence' is 
the fullness and closure of identity; identity without any trace of the other, any opening 
to non-identity. 
The Proper 
Derrida identifies 'the proper' with presence and identity. He claims that the notion of 
the subject involves 'the identity of the selfsame [Ie propre] in the presence of self-
relationship. ,46 Presence is identical to the proper: "'[P]resence" (the proximate 
[proche], the own [propre] .. . ),.47 He describes the erasure of the trace as being in 'the 
form of presence. In the form of the proper. ,48 The proper is identical to identity: 
'[I]ntegrity ... itself, in its pure original self-identity, in its property,.49 
The word 'alienation' principally refers to the loss of the proper, to ex-
propriation. This can be a reference to the transference of property in the narrow sense of 
legally owned possessions, as in much of its pre-Hegelian usage, for example, in 
eighteenth century political economy. It is also a reference to the loss of property in the 
wider and more fundamental sense of what is proper to the nature of something. The 
proper is the root of propriety, of the correct as in the appropriate. It ultimately entails 
the uncontaminated cleanliness of pure identity, uncontaminated by the other, by 
alienness. Alienation is expropriation; whatever particular loss is referred to, it is always 
the loss of something that belonged, that was at home, that had a place in the field of the 
proprietary totality of an identity. 
Derrida himself defines alienation as expropriation. In Spectres of Marx, he 
describes the trace in the form of 'spectrality' as involving an 'expropriation or 
alienation'. He equates alienation as expropriation with his notion of supplementarity, 
referring to a 'supplementary dimension, one more simulacrum, alienation, or 
.. ,50 
expropnatlOn. 
In his early essay, 'La Parole Soufflee' in Writing and Difference, Derrida uses 
the word alienation to refer to an expropriation that he regards as originary and 
fundamental. He writes of an 'original alienation' that is not merely the loss of 'one of 
our innate attributes, but of our innateness itself, of the innateness proper to our being 
itself .51 He claims that the metaphysics of the proper, in this case a metaphysical lapse 
in the writings of Artaud, involves a conception of a primordial purity of identity that 
amounts to the belief in 'a place where property would not yet be theft. ,52 Derrida 
criticises such a belief and argues that property is always already stolen, and thus that the 
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proper IS always already expropriated. The later Derrida, particularly in Spectres of 
Marx, uses the term 'ex-appropriation' to name the condition of being always already 
expropriated. Whereas the traditional term 'expropriation' implies the loss of the proper, 
the term 'ex-appropriation' is intended to imply that there was never anything proper in 
the first place. 
Derrida regards all relationality, that is, difference and articulation, as involving 
expropriation. He writes: '[S]tructure is always a structure of expropriation.'53 Here, 
'structure' refers to differentiation and articulation, to relationality as such. It involves 
expropriation, because it renders impossible any ultimate reference to the proper as the 
substantiality of a pure identity that by definition eludes all relationality, all 
contamination by otherness. 
For Derrida, the proper is the basis of the self-proximity of subjectivity. He 
writes: 'Proper is the name of the subject close to himself - who is what he is ... the 
unity of the proper as the nonpollution of the subject absolutely close to himself .54 The 
proper is the basis of Derrida's concept of proximity because of an etymological 
association; he writes that 'proprius [close] is attached to proper'. 55 Derrida claims that 
'the metaphysics of a proper subjectivity' did not exist before 'the Latin era of 
philosophy' .56 The notion of a proper subjectivity is a subjectivised inflection of the 
metaphysics of presence, one that did not occur to the pre-Roman Greeks. 
The word 'alienation' also has Latin origins, and one of the meanings it had in 
the Latin era, and has had since, is madness as the loss of one's proper mind. According 
to Derrida, madness, as determined in the metaphysical tradition, involves a fundamental 
expropriation, and is thus a concept dependent on the metaphysics of the proper, on the 
notion of a pre-alienated, pre-expropriated state. He writes: 'The concepts of madness, 
alienation, or inalienation irreducibly belong to the history of metaphysics. Or, more 
narrowly: they belong to the epoch of metaphysics that determines Being as the life of a 
proper subjectivity. ,57 
Regarding human nature, one's essential property is that one's own proper 
innateness is always already stolen, expropriated, alienated: 'By definition, I have been 
robbed of my possessions, my worth, my value. ,58 Derrida endorses Artaud's 
establishment of 'the proper departure from that which is proper to oneself (the 
alienation of alienation) as the condition for the phenomenon of the proper' .59 The 
phenomenon of the proper is thus merely that improper phenomenon which effaces its 
own improper nature, just as presence is the trace that hides its tracelike nature. 
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Derrida defines the word 'proper' in a particular way, and what he says about it 
depends on this definition. In Spectres of Marx, Derrida writes, explicating Marx: 'One 
must analyze the proper of property and how the general property (Eigentum) of money 
neutralizes, disincarnates, deprives of its difference all personal property 
(Eigentumlichkeit).'60 Derrida here translates Eigentumlichkeit as 'property', but it is 
usually translated as 'peculiarity', as it is in the quotation from Marx that follows in the 
same passage from Spectres of Marx. Peculiarity suggests uniqueness and singularity. Is 
it therefore the case that the deconstruction of the proper is also a deconstruction of the 
singular? 
As will be discussed in the first chapter, Max Stirner, in his book, The Unique 
and Its Own [Der Einzige und sein Eigentum], conceptualises the singular in terms of 
the proper and vice versa. Derrida claims that Stirner's thought involves 'the 
reappropriation of a living and unique body. The living body, the "mine", "my 
property,,,.61 Therefore, according to Derrida, Stimerian singularity is embroiled in the 
metaphysics of the proper. However, Derrida's understanding of the proper is different 
to Stirner's. For Derrida, the proper is identified with identity and presence, and refers to 
what is proper to the nature of something; thus the proper is the essence, or at least the 
notion of essence amounts to a form of the proper. In contrast, Stirner radically detaches 
his concept of the proper, of ownness [Eigenheit] , from the notion of essence. Essence 
cannot be identified with the radical ownness of the unique individual, because it refers 
to the universally applicable attributes of something, and not to its irreplaceable 
singularity. The proper is not the sum of the individual's attributes, or properties 
[Eigenschaften], despite the etymological connection. For Stimer, the notion of essence 
is itself an alienation of the individual's irreducible ownness, an expropriation of its 
ownmost singularity. Ownness, the proper, the peculiar and thus the particular, 
conceived radically and thus not on the basis of specificity as the classification of types, 
a specificity still chained to the general, refers to a singularity fundamentally opposed to 
the notion of essence, essence being the name of the formation of defining attributes that 
can be applied generally. 
Stimerian ownness [Eigenheit] prefigures, in a certain way, Heideggerian 
authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. There is a concern with the proper, in various forms, 
throughout Heidegger's writings. The accuracy of Derrida's critique of the Heideggerian 
proper will be discussed in the fourth chapter. 
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Although Derrida equates singularity with the proper in his interpretation of 
Stirner, a notion of singularity detached from the proper is a prevalent theme of many of 
his later writings. In Derrida's writings there are two conceptions of singularity, one 
dependent on the proper and the other radically detached from it. In Of Grammatology, 
singularity is one of the targets of deconstruction; it is impossible because of an 
originary iterability. Derrida writes: 
A signifier is from the very beginning the possibility of its own repetition ... It is 
the condition of its ideality, what identifies it as a signifier, and makes it function 
as such, relating it to a signified which, for the same reasons, could never be a 
"unique and singular reality." From the moment the sign appears, that is to say 
from the very beginning, there is no chance of encountering anywhere the purity 
of "reality," "unicity," "singularity.,,62 
From the beginning there can be no singularity. In 'La Parole Soufflee', Derrida refers to 
Artaud's notion of the unique as that which 'eludes discourse and always will elude it' .63 
Language universalises and so cannot apprehend the unique. Here, Derrida objects to the 
notion of an irreducible singularity that cannot be spoken of, and he wants to submit it to 
deconstruction. He writes: '[W]hen we appear to regret a silence or defeat before the 
unique, it is because we believe in the necessity of reducing the unique, of analyzing it 
and decomposing it by shattering it even further.,64 To assert that there can be no 
irreducible singularity uncolonised by discourse is to assert that discourse, in its 
restricted economy of the selfsame [Ie propre] , IS all-powerful, extending its 
universalising tentacles everywhere. Derrida is doing this to the extent to which he 
asserts that we are always already in the realm of discourse, of the sign, and that there is 
'no chance of encountering' an uncolonised, unappropriated outside. 
However, to make such an assertion is to be guilty of linguisticism, which 
Derrida himself identifies with logocentrism, the target of deconstruction. Derridian 
deconstruction is not a form of linguisticism. Derrida says, in an interview with 
Maurizio Ferraris, that, for him, deconstruction 'was a putting into question of the 
authority of linguistics, of logocentrism. ,65 There is a tension in Derrida's early work 
between a concern with radical alterity and a concern with the impossibility of 
apprehending an absolute outside. This tension is what is behind linguisticist 
misunderstandings of Derrida' s work in the anglophone world. He laments the 
linguisticist reception of his work: 'Deconstruction was inscribed in the "linguistic tum", 
when it was in fact a protest against linguistics! .. , The paradox is that, eyen though I 
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proposed to deconstruct the hegemony of linguistics, my work is often presented as a 
linguisticism. ,66 
Derrida's notion of dif/firance undermines discourse, insofar as discourse 
constitutes a restricted economy of the selfsame [Ie propre] , closed-off and walled-in 
from radical otherness. It names the instigation of a 'general economy', a paradoxical 
open-system, paradoxical because it undermines systematicity. The 'general economy" 
opens 'itself to nonmeaning', 67 nonmeaning being the only possible discursive form of 
the radical alterity of irreducible singularity. For Derrida, singularity cannot be 
apprehended in an absolute outside of discourse, it can only come about through a 
dislocation within the functioning of discourse itself. Deconstruction involves a rigorous 
dislocation of the operativity of discourse, disabling the closure of self-identity, and 
preventing meaning from functioning properly. Identity is always already universalised; 
it is meaningfulness itself, and its meaningfulness consists in it applicability to all cases 
with the same defining qualities. Non-identity, the dislocation of identity, is singular; it 
cannot be applied to cases of the same dislocation of the same identity, because then it 
would simply be another identity and not a non-identity at all. The unique eludes 
discourse within discourse, troubling its colonising universality. Thus the unique is not 
lost and neutralised in an absolute outside; it intervenes, and is the name of intervention 
itself. A true event, a radical intervention, an occurrence that is not merely an effect of 
the calculable and predictable functioning of the systematic machine of the restricted 
economy of discourse, involves the absolute surprise of an irruption of irreducible 
incalculable singularity through a dislocation of systemic operativity. 
Singularity is explicitly thematised in Derrida's later writings. In Spectres of 
Marx, he argues that singularity is always the singularity of the other and can only come 
about through the disjunction of systematicity. He writes: 'The lack of a system is not a 
fault. .. On the contrary, heterogeneity opens things up, lets itself be opened up by the 
very effraction of that which unfurls, comes, and remains to come - singularly from the 
other. There would be neither injunction nor promise without this disjunction. ,68 The 
disjunction allows the intrusion of the unassimilable singularity of the radically other 
within the identity of the present. This intrusion of a singularity that is always radically 
other is the true event, the irruptive event that liberates the 'now' from the present. 
Although differance is the infinite deferral of the present, it is the disjuncti\'e condition 
of the 'now'. Derrida writes: 'In the incoercible differance the here-now unfurls. 
Without lateness, without delay, but without presence, it is the precipitation of an 
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absolute singularity, singular because differing, precisely [justement], and always other, 
binding itself to the form of the instant. .. No differance without alterity, no alterity 
without singularity, no singularity without here-now. ,69 
Derrida describes singularity as 'an-economic', 70 meaning that it cannot occur 
within the confines of a restricted economy which by its nature reduces everything to the 
calculability of universal equivalence. The proper, as in property and ownership, 
operates within such a restricted economy and similarly reduces singularity. Singularity 
is incalculable; the unique is uncountable; it is not even the number one, despite the 
etymological connection. Derrida says, in an interview published in A Taste for the 
Secret: 'That which defies anticipation, reappropriation, calculation - any form of pre-
determination - is singularity.' 71 In Derridian terms, singularity defies the proper. 
Derrida's understanding of the proper in terms of presence and identity means 
that the proper is opposed to the singularity of radical otherness. Thus alienation as 
expropriation is the condition of singularity, and not its loss. This conclusion is entirely 
dependent on an acceptance of Derrida's definition of 'the proper', as well as his 
inclusion of, within this same definition, the standard translation of this word into 
German and all the words etymologically connected to it, as they occur in the writings of 
not only Stirner, but also Marx and Heidegger. The question of the validity or necessity 
of such an acceptance will be one of the guiding threads of this investigation. 
The Human 
Derrida conceives the personal on the basis of singularity, and thinghood on the basis of 
generality. He refers to the 'singular "who'" and 'the general "what''' , 72 and 'the 
irreducibility of who to what,.73 If 'who' signifies the singularity of radical alterity, and 
'what' signifies an entity in the form of the substantial identity of presence, then 
deconstruction becomes a critique of reification. Reification, as understood by Lukacs, is 
a condition of alienation where the proper singularity of humans is reduced to thinghood 
in the form of universal equivalence. The word 'who' refers to a unique person, whose 
singularity cannot be reduced to the general category of the human. What if the human, 
the 'proper' of humanity, the human 'essence', were simply defined as irreducibly 
singular alterity itself? If the essence is singularity then the essence is to not ha\'e an 
essence. As language can only refer to singularity in the form of paradox, there is 
nothing wrong with defining an essence as singularity, provided that the paradoxical 
nature of the statement is made clear. Derrida is issuing an ethical injunction to radically 
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redefine the 'who'. The self must itself become an other in order to relate properl y to the 
'who' of the other, to its irreducible singularity. Self-othering engenders the 'singularity 
of an an-economic ex-position to others.'74 The 'who' must always be other; the same 
could be said for the human. 
Derrida himself does this when he explicates, endorses, and radicalises Kojeye' s 
VIew that the humanity of humanity is a pure form, undetermined, and not to be 
confused with any content, any particular determination. Derrida writes: 'There where 
man, a certain determined concept of man, is finished, there the pure humanity of man, 
of the other man and of man as other begins or has finally the chance of heralding itself 
- of promising itself.'75 Here, Derrida is advocating the universal as the undetermined. 
This is the opposite of the essence as the universalisation of particularity, the source of 
all false universalisms. 
However it is defined, even if it is paradoxically defined in terms of irreducible 
singularity, the word 'human' is an answer to the question 'what?', not 'who?'. The 
answer to the question 'who?' is the meaningless of a proper name, meaningless 
precisely because it refers to irreducible singularity. The human is that strange 
paradoxical being whose truest nature is the loss of its nature, who, when residing in its 
proper element, is always other, other to all elements, property, residing, and to itself. As 
Derrida writes, in his early essay, 'The Ends of Man', playing on the twin meanings of 
the word 'end' as 'goal' and 'death', 'Man ... is his proper end, that is, the end of his 
proper.'76 
The Ensuing Investigation 
Derrida's work arose out of a theoretical context where the concept of alienation was 
rejected on the basis of its supposed dependence on a humanist essentialism, a myth of 
origins, and an organic temporality. Derrida's writings themselves articulate a rejection 
of the concept of alienation in similar terms, but particularly on the basis of its supposed 
dependence on the notion of a lost and regainable unalienated condition that takes the 
form of a metaphysics of presence and the proper. Presence is false, because it is in 
reality a trace that hides its tracelike form. Presence is described as the basis of identity, 
plenitude, simplicity, substance, and essence, which are in tum described as the bases of 
all notions of consciousness and subjectivity. However, consciousness and subjectivity 
can be and have been formulated in non-substantial terms. Derrida also defines the 
proper on the basis of presence, identity, and essence. Alienation is expropriation, and 
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this makes any notion of de-alienation or reappropriation dependent on a metaphysics of 
the proper. Derrida argues, in his earlier and later work respectively. that concepts of the 
unique in Artaud and Stirner are similarly dependent on the metaphysics of the proper. 
Despite this, Derrida develops his own concept of irreducible singularity on the basis of 
absolute alterity, a state by definition devoid of the proper. He even bases a notion of a 
universal humanity on an essential un-essential indeterminacy and the irreducible 
singularity of the always other human. 
If, as in Derrida's case, all conceptualisations of the proper, as well as closely 
associated notions, are understood in terms of the metaphysics of presence, identity, and 
essence, then any notions of de-alienation as reappropriation are deconstructible. If the 
proper were conceived alternatively in terms of irreducible singularity itself, as it is in 
the writings of Stirner, then alienation, as expropriation and as the divestment of 
singularity, would itself be deconstructible, but de-alienation would then be an an-
economic ex-position to singular alterity, the undeconstructible itself. 
Hence, the guiding question of the ensuing investigation IS whether the 
conceptualisation of de-alienation necessarily depends on the 'metaphysical' 
conceptions of presence and the proper, and thus whether an alternative articulation of 
the notion of de-alienation is plausible. With this question in mind, the investigation will 
take the form of detailed critical analyses and discussions of the works of Hegel, Marx, 
and Heidegger, focusing on the way in which their ideas relate to de-alienation and 
Derridian deconstruction. Hegel will be discussed both because a conception of 
alienation is central to his work and because Derrida' s notion of differance is intimately 
bound up with Hegelian concepts and is put forward as a response to them. Marx will be 
considered because a conception of alienation is central to his critique of capitalism, and 
because his understanding of the overcoming of alienation is explicitly criticised by 
Derrida for being embroiled in the metaphysics of presence. Heidegger will be 
considered because he is of crucial importance to Derrida, who sees himself as 
continuing the Heideggerian project of a critique of metaphysics, and because, it will be 
argued, Heidegger's writings constitute a critical response to the phenomena of 
alienation and reification. 
Preceding the discussions of those three major thinkers, the first chapter will 
consider indicative examples from the history of the concept of alienation and concepts 
closely related to it. The concept's fall-redemption structure, as it manifests itself in a 
variety of philosophical forms over history, will be looked at with regard to Derrida's 
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characterisation of onto-theology, logocentrism, and the 'myth of origins' in terms of the 
departure and return of the logos to itself. However, the main emphasis will be on the 
vicissitudes of the concept in pre- and post-Hegelian German 'idealist' philosophy, for 
example Schiller, the Romantics, Schelling, Feuerbach, and Stirner, with a view to 
ascertaining the extent to which such philosophy is restricted to or transcends the model 
of the historicity of logocentrism as the loss and return of the fullness of presence. 
Following this, there will be an investigation into the role of alienation in Hegel's 
philosophy. The similarities and differences between Hegelian dialectic and Derridian 
deconstruction will be considered, as will Derrida's critique of Hegel's system as an 
exclusionary totality. Of particular importance will be the question of whether Derrida is 
right in describing Hegel's notion of the overcoming of alienation in 'absolute knowing' 
in terms of the 'parousia' of metaphysical presence. Interpretations of Hegelianism in 
terms of an expressivist organic development of the logos will be submitted to critical 
scrutiny. The importance of Hegel's distinction between subject and substance will be 
discussed, with particular regard to the way in which his conception of the 'subject' 
affects his understanding of de-alienation, as well as the way in which it contrasts with 
Derrida's characterisation of the notion of 'subject' in terms of a metaphysics of 
presence and substance. Hegel's understanding of de-alienation also involves a certain 
concept of infinity, and this will be discussed with regard to its relation to both Derridian 
differance and to the notion of an all-inclusive presence. 
The third chapter will involve a discussion of Marx's concept of alienation and 
its relation to Derrida' s critique of metaphysics. The accuracy of Derrida' s claim that the 
Marxian conception of de-alienation involves a desire to 'exorcise' the 'spectrality' and 
tracelike differential nature of exchange value and the commodity form will be 
investigated. The difference between Marx and Hegel will be analysed regarding the 
relationship between the concepts of alienation and objectification. Marx asserts that 
alienation is merely one type of objectification, while, according to Marx, Hegel equates 
the two concepts. The supposed dependency of Marx's concepts on notions of human 
nature and appropriation will be looked at in the light of Derrida' s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence and the proper. Marx's notion of unalienated 'free activity' will 
be analysed in its relation to Derrida's distinction between a 'restricted economy' of 
'work' and the 'general economy' that exceeds it. 
While the first three chapters will involve a reinterpretation, on the basis of 
Derrida's critical ideas, of the traditional conception of alienation to be found in the 
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works of Hegel, Marx, and others, the last two chapters will involve a reinterpretation of 
the implications of Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian (Derridian) deconstruction on 
the basis of the rethought conception of alienation itself. The fourth chapter will argue 
that Heidegger's writings are a response to the phenomenon of alienation, and are a 
deepening of the critique of the latter and of reification, Heidegger regarding 'alienation' 
as rooted in the abandonment of Being that manifests itself as 'homelessness'. The 
relationship between Heidegger and Derrida, as well the connections and distinctions 
between their respective deconstructive critiques of metaphysics, will be discussed as it 
relates to this theme. There will be discussions ofHeidegger's treatment of the themes of 
objectification and finitude, which will be compared and contrasted with the relevant 
Marxian and Hegelian conceptions. The investigation will then deal with Heidegger's 
notions of appropriation and authenticity, and the nexus of concepts summed up by 
Derrida's term 'the proper'. 
The final chapter will involve a rethinking of both Derridian deconstruction and 
the notion of alienation on the basis of the preceding discussions. The relationship 
between deconstruction and conceptions of praxis and the political will be discussed. As 
will the question of the extent to which the notion of de-alienation necessarily entails a 
suppression of alterity, of alienness, which will be addressed by analysing the 
relationship between Derrida, Levinas, and the concept of alienation. 
This investigation as a whole will strive to demonstrate the way III which 
Derrida's work can shed light on the nature, philosophical underpinnings, and 
implications of the concept of alienation, as well as to demonstrate the significance of 
alienation to understanding Derrida's work and its own implications. What is in question 
is whether taking on board Derrida' s critique of the metaphysics of presence necessarily 
involves an acceptance of his rejection of the concept of alienation, and if not, what kind 
of reinterpretation of the traditional conception of alienation would be demanded by 
such a critique. The aim is to rethink, through thorough analyses of the relevant texts in 
the light of Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence, the Hegelian-Marxist 
notion of the overcoming of alienation. The results of these analyses will then be the 
basis for a reassessment of the nature and implications of deconstructive thought itself. 
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Chapter 1 
Alienation and Presence: A Historical Sketch 
Having established the relevance and importance of the concept of alienation to an 
understanding of Derrida's critique of metaphysics and the implications of this critique, 
it is now necessary to clarify the nature and implications of the concept itself in order to 
ascertain whether alienation is necessarily dependent on the metaphysics of presence. 
This will involve a brief overview of the thinkers whose writings provide pertinent 
contributions to the theme of alienation, followed by an exposition of the concept. its 
aspects, parameters, and associations. 
Origins 
As we have seen, Derrida and his contemporaries regarded the concept of alienation as 
involving the 'myth of origins'. The notion of the loss of an original state of harmony 
and unity, and the promise of its future return, has religious origins which are most 
clearly represented by the story of the 'fall of man'. Adam and Eve were expelled from 
the paradise of the Garden of Eden, because they ate the forbidden fruit that gave them 
knowledge of good and evil and which thus destroyed their natural innocence and 
immediacy. Judeo-Christian redemption is a return to the divine on the basis of the very 
freedom and responsibility that came about through the fall, and thus is not a return to a 
state of prelapsarian ignorance. Derrida observes the fall motif at work in traditional 
conceptions of writing as a lapse from and corruption of the natural immediacy of 
speech. He writes: 
The epoch of the logos ... debases writing considered as mediation of mediation 
and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning .... [T]he very idea of the sign ... 
[retains] the reference to a signified able to "take place" in its intelligibility, 
before its "fall," before any expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible here 
below .... [T]he intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward the word and 
the face of God. I 
The historicity of logocentrism, the externalisation of the logos from itself and its 
eventual return to itself, obeys a lapsarian logic. 
The concept of alienation itself involves this fall-redemption structure. In the 
New Testament, Saint Paul uses the word 'ape1lotriomenoi' (translated as 'alienated') to 
refer to a separation from God, the state of haying 'fallen from grace,.2 For example, in 
his 'Letter to the Ephesians', he writes regarding the unbelieyers: '[T]hey are darkened 
in their understanding, alienated [alrytMOrpZWj.1.£vOZ [apellotri6menoi]] from the life of 
God,.3 For Saint Paul, the terms 'apellotriomenoi' and 'apokatallaxe [mroKaraAi.a~l1]' 
(translated as 'might reconcile') refer to the state of fallenness (from grace) and the 
possibility of redemption respectively.4 
In the history of philosophy itself, the fall-redemption model is first used. 
independently of any Biblical influence, by the pre-Socratic philosopher, Empedocles. 
He put forward a cyclical theory of history where humanity falls from a harmonious 
'Golden Age' into disharmonious times, and where history develops towards the Golden 
Age's eventual, but temporary, re-establishment. However, what is of interest here is the 
function of the fall-redemption model in an onto-theological metaphysics of presence. 
and Heidegger and Derrida, in their guise as historians of the latter, claim that such a 
metaphysics does not arise until the inception of what they call 'Platonism'. 5 Plato's 
philosophy contrasts the transitory empirical world with the unchanging realm of the 
ideal forms, the latter being the fundamental reality. But it is not until the rise of so-
called 'neo-Platonism' that a redemptive metaphysics is systematically developed. 
Plotinus, the principal neo-Platonist, claims that all of being derives from a 
permanent primordial unity that he calls 'the One'. The circles of being emanate from 
the One, the outermost circle being the external material world, characterised by 
transitoriness, difference, and fragmentation. The One can be apprehended by the human 
mind, but the mind must detach itself from its worldly material concerns in order to do 
this. Plotinus claims, in The Enneads, that people have forgotten their connection to the 
One, their origin in the divine unity; they have thus forgotten their own true nature by 
being fixated with ephemeral material things which are intrinsically alien to them. 
Plotinus's purpose is to recall people back to their origins in divine unity. He writes: 
The souls ... no longer discern ... the divinity of their own nature; ... all their awe 
and admiration is for the alien, and, clinging to this, they have broken apart[;] '" 
their regard for the mundane and their disregard of themselves bring about their 
utter ignoring of the divine. . .. A double discipline must be applied if human 
beings in this pass are to be reclaimed, and brought back to their origins, lifted 
6 
once more towards the supreme and One and first. 
This early model of alienation and reconciliation involves an extreme rejection of the 
material world, a denial of the possibility that it might have any value or connection to 
the true nature of humanity, which is characterised in purely spiritual or intellectual 
terms. Later conceptions of alienation do not share this view of human nature. but some 
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of the aspects of those conceptions, such as loss of the origin and dis-integration, are 
already discernible. 
Augustine, influenced by neo-Platonism, similarly sees a choice between 
focusing on God as the unified centre of being and immersing himself in the 
fragmentation and multiplicity of the world. Neo-Platonist metaphysics also enabled him 
to see evil as separation and alienation from God, rather than as something that exists in 
itself.7 In his book, The City of God, he uses the word 'alienatio' (translated as 
'alienation') to refer to such separation. For example, he writes: '[S]ince the soul... 
cannot ... be without life of some kind, its utmost death is alienation [alienatio] from the 
life of God'. 8 
The neo-Platonist model of alienation is, in Derridian terms, metaphysical and 
logocentric; it is a thinking of difference that refers back (and forwards) to the orginary 
immutable eternal presence of the One. It is onto-theological, in that it equates God with 
being qua being, conceiving of being as such as being a mode of being, the fundamental 
one. It is thus a prime case of the metaphysics of presence as described by Derrida in the 
following way: 'The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the 
logos ... [is] required by an onto-theology determining the archaeological and 
eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without difference'. 9 
The understanding of difference and multiplicity in terms of being a fall and alienation 
from the unity and full presence of the logos is, for Derrida, definitive of logocentric 
metaphysics as such. 
Despite this, Derrida regards some elements of Plotinus' s 'mysticism' as 
exceeding what he calls the 'closure of metaphysics', particularly Plotinus's notion of 
the 'trace [ixvoc;;- [ikhnos]]'. Derrida quotes as an epigraph to his essay, 'Form and 
Meaning',10 Plotinus's following statement: 'Form is the trace of the formless [To yhp 
ixvoc;;- TOV aj1oprpov j10prp~ [To gar ikhnos tou amorphou morpheJ]' . II As we have seen in 
the introduction, according to Derrida, 'form' is one of the aspects of the metaphysical 
concept of presence. As the Plotinian One is indeterminate and formless it is not a case 
of presence as form. Derrida, in a footnote to his essay, 'Ousia and Gramme', claims that 
Plotinus's statement effectively means that 'presence... [is] the trace of nonpresence' . I ~ 
Derrida argues that Plotinus's work is an example of metaphysics exceeding itself in its 
own text. He writes: 'An irreducible rupture and excess can always be produced within 
an era, at a certain point of its text (for example, in the "Platonic" fabric of 
"Plotinism").' 13 According to Derrida, Plotinus' s text can be read as undermining the 
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very logocentric Platonism that it presents. Whichever way it is read as regards the 
metaphysics of presence, it still involves a fall-redemption narrative of the loss and 
return of an originary union with the oneness that is at the foundation of being. 
The Corruption of Nature 
A secularised concept of alienation was developed during the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment. In the writings of the Scottish political economists the term 'alienation' 
is used to refer to the transfer of property, a usage derived from one of its principal 
meanings in Latin. While the use of the word was restricted to this narrow meaning. it 
was clear that a society based on the activity of alienation, of selling and exchange, had 
lost the direct and unmediated relationship to its means of life that a more primitive 
society would have had. James Steuart writes: 'For as long as the earth nourishes 
directly those who are upon her surface, as long as she delivers her fruits into the very 
hand of him who consumes them, there is no alienation, no occasion for money'. 14 
Similarly, Rousseau uses the term 'alhiner' (translated as 'to alienate') to refer to 
the transfer of property. He writes: 'To alienate [aliener] is to give or to sell.' 15 
However, the term is used only to demonstrate the inalienability of the right of freedom 
and of the sovereignty of the 'general will' of the people. He regards freedom as 
essential to being human; the alienation of freedom is the alienation of human nature. 
Inalienability means that something cannot be alienated, but, because it is here referring 
to the sphere of the right and just, it really means that something must not be alienated -
it has the status of a moral imperative. Rousseau claims that people do not alienate their 
freedom in order to enter into the social contract; they give up their 'natural liberty' in 
order to gain 'civil liberty', a legally guaranteed freedom through property laws. 16 His 
notion of the social contract is put forward as a way of regaining the essential freedom of 
humanity within the realm of developed civilisation, a freedom that had been curtailed 
by the loss of the primitive 'state of nature' . 
Rousseau argues that humanity in its original natural state was free from war and 
exploitation. Rousseau saw in the development of civilisation the corruption of 
humanity's original natural innocence. This viewpoint has clear parallels with the story 
of the 'fall of man', here 'civilisation' taking the place of 'knowledge of good and evil'. 
For Rousseau, a return to prelapsearian innocence, based on pre-civilisational ignorance, 
is not possible. A society based on the social contract and civil liberty is the nearest that 
civilised humanity can get to the original freedom and innocence. 
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Inequality, hierarchy, property and exploitation were all effects of the artificial 
mediations of civilisation imposed on natural humanity. Rousseau claims that 
civilisation introduces 'from outside' all the vices of 'man' that are 'foreign to his 
. . ,17 Th 
constitutIOn. e stated purpose of the second part of Rousseau's Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality is to 'collect and consider the different accidents which may have 
improved the human understanding while depraving the species, and made man wicked 
while making him sociable' .18 Society involves the depravation of 'the species·, the 
corruption of human nature. Rousseau's first example of the 'accidents' that led to the 
development of civilisation is the institution of property, an unnecessary artificial 
imposition upon humanity that is blamed for the worst crimes of civilisation, such as 
wars and murders. He implies that this institution should not have been accepted: 'The 
first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying "This is 
mine", and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil 
society.' He adds: '[Y]ou are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong 
to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.' 19 The accidental and imposed nature of the 
institution of property indicates its unnaturalness, its artificiality. Thus, for Rousseau, 
property is not proper to humanity, but is a product of humanity'S alienation from its 
natural condition. 
As we have discussed in the introductory chapter, Rousseau's view that writing is 
a primary corruption of human nature, alienating humanity from the immediacy and self-
presence of the voice, causes Derrida to regard him as a pivotal figure in the history of 
logocentrism.2o Derrida claims that Rousseau's writings, while arguing that civilisation 
and writing are corruptions of nature and speech, inadvertently demonstrate that there 
only ever existed the corrupt artificiality of writing. Derrida writes: '[W]e have read, in 
the text, that the absolute present, Nature ... [has] never existed; that what opens meaning 
and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence. ,21 Nature and presence 
have always already been corrupted, and can themselves be shown to bear the 
characteristics of artifice and differance. 
Reintegration through the Aesthetic 
In response to humanity's corruption and alienation, Rousseau advocates not only a 
political system based on the social contract, but also a moral education that would tum 
a person into a mature and responsible citizen, relatively immune from the corruption 
and artificiality of civilisation. However, a mere moral education was found by later 
thinkers to be inadequate to the task of rescuing humanity from increasing 
fragmentation. A more effective form of education would be one that addresses the 
whole person, not just her reason or her conscience. Education as cultivation of the 
whole person was known as Bildung. Goethe was a pioneer of the novel of education, or 
Bildungsroman, which addresses the question of character formation through 
experience. The main character has to progress from the immaturity of one-sidedness 
and isolation to the maturity of a harmonised character and engagement with the world. 
Goethe was opposed to the increasing social fragmentation of his age and the attendant 
increasing fragmentation of the human character into its specific faculties. Notions of 
wholeness and totality were crucial to him. He writes: 'All that man undertakes to 
perform ... must proceed from all his powers united; everything isolated is worthless.' 22 
Schiller was similarly concerned with overcoming fragmentation, advocating an 
aesthetic education as one that would address the whole person. He operates with the 
familiar model of fall and redemption; fall from harmony through knowledge and return 
to harmony through knowledge: '[A ]ny people caught up in the process of civilisation ... 
must fall away from nature by the abuse of reason before they can return to her by the 
use of reason'. 23 However, it is not the primitive state of nature that is the focus of his 
discourse, but the civilisation of ancient Greece. The Greeks had a 'natural humanity' 
and a 'wholeness of being', in contrast to the fragmentariness of modem humanity. In 
his essay On Naive and Sentimental Poetry he argues that this originary natural 
wholeness should be regained: '[O]ur culture should lead us along the path of reason and 
freedom back to nature.' 24 
In his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller provides a critique of 
the fragmentariness of modem humanity, and puts forward a notion of the aesthetic that 
would overcome it. He argues that the development of civilisation has destroyed the 
wholeness of being that could be discerned in the ancient Greeks, a destruction that has 
been largely effected through the division of labour. The separate development of the 
human faculties, the full development of only one faculty in each person, leads to the 
stultification of humanity, the reduction of the human being to a particular function. 
People are reduced to 'developing but one part of their potentialities, while of the rest, as 
in stunted growths, only vestigial traces remain. ,25 Modem society and the modem 
human being cease to be organically unified wholes; living relations are reified into 
mechanical ones. Schiller describes modem society as 'an ingenious clockwork in 
which, out of the piecing together of innumerable but lifeless parts, a mechanical kind of 
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collective life ensued. ,26 The fragmentation of the individual is intrinsically bound up 
with the fragmentation of society, and Schiller sees this divisiveness as dehumanising; 
the human is reduced to a specific function, to being a cog in the social machine: 
Everlastingly chained to a single little fragment of the whole, man himself 
develops into nothing but a fragment; everlastingly in his ear the monotonous 
sound of the wheel that he turns, he never develops the harmony of his being, and 
instead of putting the stamp of humanity upon his own nature, he becomes 
nothing more than the imprint of his occupation or of his specialized 
knowledge.27 
This de-totalisation causes an alienated relationship between the individual and society: 
'[T]he concrete life of the individual is destroyed in order that the abstract idea of the 
whole may drag out its sorry existence, and the state remains forever a stranger to its 
citizens since at no point does it ever make contact with their feeling. ,28 
Despite his negative attitude to this fragmentation, Schiller concedes that it has 
been essential for human progress, for the development of civilisation. He claims that 
the human species as a whole has benefitted from this, but individual people have not. 
The point is not to reverse that progress and development, but to use it to reach a higher 
level where the lost wholeness is regained; not through nostalgic primitivism, but within 
the state of developed civilisation itself. Schiller's stated aim is 'to restore by means of a 
higher art the totality of our nature that the arts themselves have destroyed. ,29 
The aim of the re-totalisation of human nature is to be achieved through the 
aesthetic. The aesthetic can synthesise reason and the senses, and overcome any abstract 
one-sidedness. Schiller identifies two opposing forces at work within humanity, the 
'sensuous drive' and the 'formal drive'. The former restricts humanity to its physical 
aspect, to the sensual world, the world of time and change. To be confined to the realm 
of sensation, to the flow of time and change, is to be confined to the 'limitations of the 
present.,30 This confinement to the present involves self-alienation, a suspension of the 
personality: 'For this condition of self-loss under the dominion of feeling linguistic use 
has the very appropriate expression: to be beside oneself, i.e., to be outside of one's own 
self.,31 In contrast, the other drive, the 'formal drive', restricts humanity to its rational 
aspect, to a realm of unchangeable timeless truths. This is a realm of universally 
applicable ideas, not restricted to the particularity of the present moment, where people 
are no longer 'individuals', but are' species', or universal beings. 32 A confinement to the 
realm of form and reason would involve a loss of the personality through a negation of 
the possibility of its becoming manifest in the particularity of the world. 
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A union of these two opposing forces Schiller calls the' Spieltrieb' (translated as 
the 'play drive'). This involves reconciling change with identity, sensual life with 
rational form. The 'living form' that is the object of the 'play drive' is synonymous with 
beauty, or the aesthetic quality of things. The play drive overcomes the abstract one-
sidedness of the other two drives, and instigates the concrete wholeness of the human 
being. It is only through aesthetic play that human nature is fully realised, or as Schiller 
puts it, '[MJan only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and 
he is only fully a human being when he plays. ,33 
The aesthetic relates to totality, because it is not bound to the one-sidedness of 
determination. It can relate to the whole person without constituting a determinate object 
for any particular aspect of that person. Schiller writes: 'A thing ... can relate to the 
totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any single one of 
them: that is its aesthetic character. ,34 The sensuous and the rational are two opposing 
and exclusive determinations of humanity. When they are combined, and thus act 
simultaneously, they cease to be particular determinations, and the person enters a state 
of what Schiller terms 'Bestimmbarkeit' (translated as 'determinability'). 
Determinability is a kind of productive indeterminacy, a freedom from detennination 
that differs from indetermination in that it involves a limitless abundance rather than 
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mere emptmess. 
This definition of the aesthetic as the 'free disposition' of limitless 
determinability, which is necessary for the full flourishing of human nature, puts into 
question the idea that totality, or wholeness, constitutes an overarching detennination 
that subsumes difference under an exclusionary identity. Derridian difj'firance is itself 
determinability in that it makes possible and undennines any particular detennination. 
The opposition between determinacy and detenninability is similar to Derrida's 
opposition between identity and the endless process of identification. The latter 
opposition is made explicit in A Taste for the Secret, where Derrida advocates 
identification as against identity. For examples, he advocates a political situation where 
'there is no identity. There is identification'. 36 Similarly, in Monolingualism of the 
Other, he advocates an 'autobiographical anamnesis [that] presupposes identification. 
And precisely not identity. No, an identity is never given, received, or attained; only the 
interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic process of identification endures. ,37 
Identification, dijJerance, and determinability involve a ceaselessly productive and 
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destructive process that both makes possible and undermines identity, difference, and 
determinacy. 
For Schiller, aesthetic play is intrinsically linked to human freedom, because it 
both humanises the world and is an activity free from external ends. Aesthetic 
contemplation domesticates nature, turning things into objects subjected to the human 
eye. Objectification qua domestication is necessary for human freedom qua power over 
nature. Schiller writes: 'That which hitherto merely dominated him as force, now stands 
before his eyes as object. Whatsoever is object for him has no power over him; for in 
order to be object at all, it must be subjected to the power that is his.,38 Aesthetic play 
involves an interest and delight in superficial appearance, or semblance, rather than in 
reality; but in this case it is not the semblance of something real, but pure semblance 
itself. This is semblance as semblance, not semblance masquerading as reality. 'Reality' 
is alien to humanity, whereas semblance is the work of humanity, its self-expression; 
humanity is at home in a world of semblance, a world of its own dominion: 'Since all 
actual existence derives from nature considered as alien force, whereas all semblance 
originates in man considered as perceiving subject, he is only availing himself of the 
undisputed rights of ownership when he reclaims semblance from substance, and deals 
with it according to laws of his own. ,39 This celebration of a semblance not anchored in 
reality resembles Derrida's 'affirmation of the play of a world ... of signs ... without 
truth, and without origin' .40 However, there is one key difference; Derridian semblance 
does not 'originate in man considered as perceiving subject'. 
Schiller describes aesthetic playas a kind of 'free activity', an activity which is 
an end in itself, which has no other purpose than itself, which is not appropriated as a 
means to any other end. It derives from playas such, which is facilitated by a superfluity 
of energy, beyond all necessity, that can be joyfully squandered. 41 This notion of play 
prefigures Derrida's notion of the play of differance as that which resists appropriation 
for any other purpose than itself, a nonproductive expenditure of energy that resists 
appropriation that would render it productive, a 'general economy' of 'sovereign' and 
free nonproductive playas opposed to a 'restricted economy' of productive work and 
dialectical reappropriation. Derrida describes such playas an 'affirmation [that] 
surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the seminal adventure of the trace. ,.+2 In 
its genetic indetermination and seminal adventurousness, Derridian differance is another 
name for the productive indeterminacy of Schillerian determinability. 
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Nostalgia for the Unity of Being 
A lament over the irretrievable loss of an originary plenitude pervades the writings of the 
Romantics. Holderlin' s work involves the most acute thematisation of this loss and 
yearning. Humanity'S separation from nature through self-consciousness, reason, 
language, and culture is experienced as the loss of an orginary oneness with nature and 
being. Holderlin expresses this explicitly in the unpublished penultimate preface to 
Hyperion: '[W]e have been dislocated from nature, and what appears to have once been 
one is now at odds with itself. ,43 The lost unity cannot be regained, but it is 
paradoxically present to humanity in the very form of its loss, a loss which is manifested 
in the aesthetics of tragedy.44 In his essay, 'Being Judgement Possibility', he argues that 
the unity of being cannot appear to consciousness as knowledge and reason, as the very 
nature of the latter is to separate through judgement. The best that philosophical 
knowledge can do is assert the identity of subject and object. But identity is not the same 
as unity; it is dependent on reflection and judgement [Urteil], and therefore merely 
constitutes the manifestation of a primordial separation [Ur- Teilung]. Unity means that 
no separation can take place without doing violence to what is to be separated, and this 
is not the case with identity. The unity of being cannot be apprehended by knowledge 
based on judgement, but only by intellectual intuition.45 H61derlin describes genuinely 
tragic poetry as 'founded on an intellectual intuition which cannot be any other one than 
that unity with everything living' .46 
The writings of Novalis also involve the notion of the loss of an originary unity. 
In his poetry there is the figure of 'the stranger', someone who bears the memory of a 
lost golden age and hopes for its return. He characterises philosophy itself in terms of a 
nostalgic longing: 'Philosophy is really homesickness, the urge to be at home 
everywhere in the world. ,47 The theme of homesickness also appears in his comments 
about childhood. Childhood is a time of naive immediacy that is always already lost in 
any state of conscious reflection, a golden age48 that is still present in the memory of its 
loss. He writes: 'All fairy tales are only dreams of that home that is everywhere and 
nowhere. The higher powers in us that once, as genius, executed our will, are now muses 
that refreshen us with sweet memories during this dreary journey. ,49 What he means by 
'genius' here is a naive openness to the external world, uninhibited by self-
conSCIOusness: '[T]he genius ... is not involved in his representation and consequentl y 
the representation is not embroiled in him, but his observation chimes in free accord 
with the thing observed' .50 The notion of childhood as an idyllic time of naiye 
, ..... 
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communion with nature that is corrupted and lost through adult consciousness and self-
reflection, which reappears weakly in the form of nostalgic remembrance, is a recurrent 
theme in the poetry of Wordsworth, an English contemporary of the early German 
Romantics, for example, in his poem, 'Ode: Intimations of Immortality from 
Recollections of Early Childhood.' Childhood is another form of the prelapsarian state. 
In his Fichte Studies, Novalis argues that consciousness is founded upon a 
primordial intuition of being that by its very nature it cannot apprehend. As with 
H61derlin, the undivided oneness of being cannot be known, because it is in the very 
nature of knowledge to divide through predication. Consciousness is grounded on 
unknowable being, because self-consciousness depends on a subject recognising an 
object as itself, which it would not be able to do if it did not already have an awareness 
of itself. This awareness, being prior to the differentiation between subject and object, is 
not in the register of consciousness qua knowledge, but rather of intuition, or what 
Nova1is refers to as 'feeling.' Subjectification involves alienation from being, or the 
experience of being as loss. Novalis writes: 'I am not insofar as I posit myself, but rather 
insofar as I suspend [aufhebe] myself. 51 The naive feeling of immediacy and oneness 
with nature and being, the experience of the child and the genius, the return to the 
'homeland' of the golden age, would involve the suspension of the ego. 
The inability of knowledge to apprehend being leads philosophy to become an 
unending task that can never achieve its goal. The self-consciousness of this inherent 
separation, irretrievable loss and the attendant philosophical scepticism takes on a more 
positive light in Schlegel's concept of irony, as opposed to the pathos of homesickness. 
Schlegelian transcendental irony, or what he calls 'the irony of irony' ,52 involves an 
infinite regress of reflection which can never come to a stop at a basis of direct, non-
ironic meaning. Schlegel celebrates such irony, linking it to freedom and the overcoming 
of anyone-sided narrow-mindedness: 'Irony is the clear consciousness of eternal agility, 
of an infinitely teeming chaos. ,53 
Derrida similarly regards representation as involving an infinite chain of 
references, without the ultimate basis of an origin or a goal. He writes: 'In [the] play of 
representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. There are things like reflecting 
pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other. but no longer a source, a 
spring. ,54 Derrida' s affirmation of the infinite play of differance resembles more the 
celebration of the infinite play of irony than any lament about the irretrievable loss of 
being. 
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Knowledge as Alienation 
Schelling's philosophy provides a more systematic expression of the Romantic concern 
with the retrieval of the primordial immediacy of being, an immediacy lost through 
consciousness and knowledge. He writes that the modem age is particularly 'alienated 
from that primordial feeling' .55 Philosophy is conceived in terms of the fall-redemption 
model; a fall into freedom, and redemption through that very freedom. Knowledge 
destroys the originary unity between mind and nature, humanity and being, by setting up 
the distinction between subject and object. For Schelling, the aim of philosophy is to 
regain that primordial state of unity, to overcome the distinction between subject and 
object, and thus to overcome knowledge through knowledge, philosophy through 
philosophy. The aim of philosophy is its own destruction. Schelling says: ' [Philosophy] 
proceeds from that original divorce to unite once more, through freedom, what was 
originally and necessarily united in the human mind ... so it works in this respect for its 
own destruction. ,56 
As with H6lderlin, for Schelling, the only way the mind can apprehend the unity 
of being is through intellectual intuition. Knowledge cannot do this, because, by its very 
nature, it separates through reflection, judgement, and the subject-object distinction, 
involving an estrangement between the freedom of the mind and the necessity of nature. 
Intuition is a form of awareness that does not separate itself from what it is intuiting, that 
does not tum it into an object. Mind and nature are united in intuition: 'In intuition the 
two are not to be distinguishable at all; there must be neither before nor after, but 
absolute simultaneity and reciprocity between them. ,57 As the intuition cannot be 
apprehended by knowledge based on judgement and reflection, Schelling associates it 
with the aesthetic imagination. He writes: '[T]he philosophy of mere reflection ... sets 
out only to separate... whereas the pure intuition, or rather the creative imagination, 
long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to 
discover that Nature speaks to us the more intelligibly the less we think of her in a 
merely reflective way. ,58 The aesthetic is the union of consciousness and nature, it 
completes philosophy's task of apprehending the originary unity of being, and thus 'the 
philosophy of art is the true organon of philosophy. ,59 
The absolute cannot be the absolute if it is posited as an object opposed to a 
subject, thus it can only be apprehended through a non-objectifying form of 
consciousness. Likewise, this form of consciousness cannot be that of a subject opposed 
to an object. The subject has to abandon itself in order to apprehend the absolute. This 
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apprehension is a form of 'knowledge' without a subject or an object; it is thus not really 
knowledge at all, but could be more accurately described as a suspension of knowledge. 
Schelling calls this form of non-reflective consciouness 'WeiJ3heit' (translated as 
'wisdom') or 'Denken' (translated as 'thought'). He writes: 'Thought [Denken] means 
abandoning knowledge [Wissen]. ,60 He equates wisdom with 'eternal freedom'. or the 
absolute. 61 Eternal freedom is described in terms of being a productive indeterminacy, 
resembling Schillerian determinability: 'This freedom ... is not mere independence from 
external determination. It is precisely the freedom to adopt a form. ,62 It is characterised 
as pure 'ability' and pure 'will', pure because ability and will are free of any object or 
intention which would restrict them; they are thus in a state of pure 'indifference'. 63 
Despite the willful indifference and indeterminacy of pure will, wisdom qua eternal 
freedom is practical and active thinking, borne along by its productive determinability, 
thus 'belonging to life and action',64 as opposed to mere contemplative reflection. 
The intellectual intuition is renamed 'Ekstase' (translated as 'ecstasy,)65 III 
Schelling's later work. The subject needs to stand outside itself, to abandon itself, in 
order to apprehend the necessarily non-objectified absolute. The self needs to alienate 
itself from itself in order to reconcile itself with its true basis in eternal freedom. The 
separation of freedom and nature through the objectification of nature is referred to as 
'the guilt of man', and therefore as the legacy of the fall. This separation is phrased in 
terms of an alienation (estrangement) that can be overcome: 'Freedom estranged 
[entfremdete] from itself is nature, nature withdrawn back into itself is freedom. ,66 
The realm of the logos, of knowledge as the separation of mind from nature, of 
the self-presence of the subject of this knowledge, of the enclosure of metaphysics as the 
elision of fundamental difference in the name of the full presence of meaning, is the 
locus of alienation. The overcoming of alienation would involve the abandonment of the 
subject, of the logocentric enclosure of metaphysics, of meaning, knowledge and 
discourse, in order to apprehend, through a mystical un-knowledge, the unity of being, 
the absolute, the non-objectifiable absolute subject, which is itself nothing other than 
eternal freedom, the freedom of productive indeterminacy, or determinability, which, as 
we have seen, prefigures Derridian difJerance. 
Knowledge as Reconciliation 
For Hegel, the overcoming of alienation is not, as in Schelling's system, the oyercoming 
of philosophy; it is philosophy's full realisation. The absolute is not a radical alterity to 
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knowledge, but is immanent within knowledge. Hegel dismisses the notion of a 
primordial immediacy apprehended through intellectual intuition as an empty 
abstraction. The only way the absolute can manifest itself with concrete content is 
through the philosophical comprehension of the limits of all the forms of consciousness 
that attempted to grasp it. 
Whereas for Schelling knowledge is the locus of alienation, because it separates 
the unity of being into subject and object, for Hegel knowledge is the locus of de-
alienation which can itself ultimately overcome that separation. He writes: 'The I is at 
home in the world, when it knows it, and still more when it has conceived it. ,67 Absolute 
knowing is an unlimited form of consciousness, because it involves an awareness of the 
limited and one-sided nature of all forms of consciousness, of their inherent inability to 
grasp the absolute. The absolute thus manifests itself negatively, which it must do, 
because the positive is by definition that which is limited and therefore not absolute. The 
self-recognition of the constitutive limits of all forms of consciousness enables their 
overcoming, and absolute knowing is the philosophical comprehension of these self-
negations and supersessions as a rational teleological progress, a progress whose result is 
absolute knowing itself, the overcoming of all limitation, an overcoming which knows 
itself as such. Subject and object are unified in the experience of absolute knowing, 
where all so-called externality is recognised as spirit's externalisation [Entauj3erung] , as 
an expression of itself. The unity of absolute knowing is a unity full of content, a unity 
that contains all difference within itself, as opposed to the emptiness of abstract 
immediacy. 
In Hegel's system all isolated particularity is ultimately overcome through the 
contradictions inherent in it. When he says, 'The True is the whole' ,68 he means that the 
ultimate truth is the negative totality engendered by the dissolution of all isolated 
particularity. To see reality in terms of the isolated particularity of petrified facts 
unrelated to the wider totality is to be restricted to the analytical form of knowledge 
known as the understanding. This is a mechanistic form of knowledge which Hegel 
associates with a mechanistic reduction of humanity through the division of labour. This 
reduction involves alienation as reification and de-totalisation. Hegel writes, regarding 
the division of labour: '[T]his labor... is partitioned in itself and becomes a single 
laboring; and this single laboring becomes for this very reason more mechanical. 
because variety is excluded from it and so it becomes ... more foreign to [the living] 
whole. . . . [T]he labor here is wholly quantitative without variety... something 
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absolutely external, a thing' .69 While alienation and reconciliation are structural to 
Hegel's system, being necessary for the constitution and development of consciousness, 
speculative philosophy is put forward as a counter to the mechanistic reification of 
consciousness and life. 
Derrida's notion of difJerance, of the trace of the other in the constitution of the 
selfsame, resembles Hegel's understanding of the self-othering involved in self-positing. 
Hegel writes: 'Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within 
itself - not an original or immediate unity as such - is the True. ,70 However, Derrida 
claims that difJerance resists the Hegelian sublation [AzdhebungJ, the affirmatiye 
negation by which the self reappropriates itself at a higher level. 71 Derrida regards 
absolute knowing as the final arrival of the parousia of presence, that is, as a 
metaphysical mystification. 72 But, for Hegel, the absolute does not present itself in any 
figure, and is itself the dissolution of all figuration. Hegel sees the dissolution of all 
isolated particularity through the movement of differentiation as the negative 
manifestation of the absolute, whereas Derrida sees it as merely the infinite undermining 
of meaning. 
The Projection of the Human Essence 
The post-Hegelian conception of alienation IS initially developed in Feuerbach's 
philosophy of religion. The term 'entfremdet' (,alienated') is here used to refer to the 
projection of the human essence onto something external and non-human. The argument 
put forward in Feuerbach's book, The Essence of Christianity, is that the notion of God 
amounts to nothing more than the characteristics of human nature attributed to an 
imaginary non-human, or divine, being, and not to humanity itself. He writes: '[The J 
differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with 
his own nature.' 73 Thus the essence of humanity is not recognised as the property of 
humanity, as humanity's own, but as belonging to an other, an alien entity; in this way 
the human essence is alienated. He writes: '[RJeligion alienates our own nature from us, 
d . , 74 an represents It as not ours . 
For Feuerbach, it is human nature to have consciousness, and consciousness is, in 
its very nature, unlimited, infinite and universal. What distinguishes humans from 
animals is the ability to have an awareness that goes beyond immediate individuality. an 
awareness that is consciousness as opposed to mere instinct, that can apprehend the 
essential, that is, universal and ideal, nature of things. A human is therefore a being that 
can conceive of its own general, universal, and essential nature - its genus [Gattung]. :-ill 
individual can recognise her own limits, but this recognition can only come about 
through an awareness of the unlimited, and the unlimited is nothing other than the nature 
of this individual's own universalised essence, her 'genus' [Gattung] , that is. humanity 
itself. Religious thought projects the unlimited onto an external imaginary being - God, 
whereas in reality the unlimited lies in humanity itself. He writes: '[I]f thou thinkest the 
infinite, thou perceivest and affirmest the infinitude of the power of thought; if thou 
feelest the infinite, thou feelest and affirmest the infinitude of the power of feeling.' 75 
Feuerbach criticises the negativity and mediatedness of the Hegelian dialectic. 
He writes: 'Hegelian philosophy has estranged [entfremdet] the human being from its 
very self. It of course re-identifies what it separates, but only in a manner which is itself 
in tum separable and intermediate. Hegelian philosophy lacks immediate unity, 
immediate certainty, immediate truth. ,76 Feuerbach asserts that nature is where essence 
and existence are one, whereas humanity qua consciousness is where they are 
distingished. Nature is the primordial reality, and is thus the foundation of humanity. For 
philosophy to be genuinely objective it must be grounded in intuition and not conceptual 
thinking. Thinking must be suspended for the object to assert its primacy. He says: 
'True, objective thought, the true and objective philosophy, is generated only from 
thinking's negation, from being determined by an object. .. The intuition yields simply 
the essence immediately identical with existence.' 77 Alienation qua separation of essence 
and existence is reduced to being a mere epistemological error, but one constitutive of 
conceptual consciousness. 
As we have seen, the notion of essence depends on the metaphysics of presence 
and is undermined by Derrida's notion of differance which 'threatens the authority of the 
as such in general, of the presence of the thing itself in its essence.'78 Feuerbachian 
materialism would seem to be still in the thrall of the Platonic ideal, of logocentrism, 
insofar as it involves a notion of the universalising nature of human consciousness as the 
ability to perceive the essence of things, their ideal and universal nature. However, 
Feuerbach maintains that it is only within consciousness that essence and existence are 
separated whereas in reality, in nature, they are one. 79 To say that essence and existence 
are one in reality is to abolish their distinction in reality. Their distinction is constitutive 
of consciousness, and is thus the way consciousness organises its interpretation and 
understanding of the world. Feuerbach's essentialism is a mere epistemological, or e\"en 
rhetorical, essentialism. 
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Furthermore, Feuerbach's understanding of the human essence is not so clearly 
reducible to the notion of presence. The human essence is the generic, universalising 
nature of consciousness, the ability to see beyond all isolated immediacy. This ability is 
not the effect of any self-present substantiality; it is precisely the effect of emptiness and 
indeterminacy. Consciousness can be generic and universal because it is nothing in 
itself. A human being is free to assume any subject position, to be anyone, and this 
universality is the result of his insubstantiality. Feuerbach writes: 'Man is himself at 
once I and thou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this reason, that to him 
his species [Gattung], his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is an object 
of thought.' 80 The emptiness that is the basis of universality is put forward as the 
freedom to adopt any determination, resembling Schillerian and Schellingian 
determinability. He writes: '[T]he pantheistic essence, which speculative philosophers or 
much more theologians have separated from the human being and objectified as an 
abstract essence, is nothing else but its own essence undetermined, but capable of 
infinite determinations. ,81 Emptiness and indeterminacy are the basis of the free 
determinability of universality. 
Singularity and Authenticity 
According to Stimer, Feuerbach's notion of the human essence is merely another way in 
which the individual is alienated. In his book, The Unique and Its Own [Der Einzige und 
sein Eigentum], Stimer argues that Feuerbach, in returning the human essence from its 
religious projection to humanity itself, merely reproduces the religious division of the 
individual into an essential and unessential self. The generic human essence, or 'Man', is 
just as alien to the individual as God. The individual is unique and irreducible, and its 
identification with anything other than itself involves its alienation. All eternal, 
metaphysical ideals, such as God, truth, human nature, are alien to the ownness 
[Eigenheit] of the individual, to its peculiarity. Such ideals, along with any external 
determining forces, are referred to as 'sacred [Heiligen]'. The unalienated being is the 
genuine egoist at one with her ownness, to whom nothing is sacred. He writes: 
'Alienness [Fremdheit] is a criterion of the "sacred". In everything sacred there lies 
something "uncanny", that is strange, such as we are not quite familiar and at home in. 
What is sacred to me is not my own'. 82 What is 'my own' is described in instrumental 
terms as that which is 'in my power or what I control. ,83 The genuine egoist, to be 
authentically her own, must master herself, 'instead of being mastered ... by anything 
else (God, man, authority, law, state, church), .84 
To be authentically its own the unique individual must not be reduced to any of 
its mere qualities. Qualities, such as humanity, are not what the individual is, but what it 
has. There is no essence to the unique individual, nothing beyond the naked fact of its 
existence. Its mortality is what distinguishes it, the possibility and imminent ine\,itability 
of its loss of existence, its death. Only the unique individual dies; humanity, 'man', the 
human essence does not: 'Ludwig dies, but the king remains; 1 die, but my spirit, man, 
remains. ,85 The terror of the French revolution is characterised in terms of the eternal 
abstraction, 'man', and its fatal effect on unique mortal individuals, 'men': 'Because the 
revolutionary priests or schoolmasters served man, they cut off the heads of men .. 86 
The ownness of the unique individual is defined negatively in terms of its refusal 
to attach itself to any external determinations, to believe in the sanctity of anything: 
'[D]oubt, which in practice becomes a buffeting, is what is most man's own,.87 The 
unique individual has no essence, and so is a free nothingness, a productive 
indeterminacy or determinability a la Schiller et al. Stirner writes: 'I am not nothing in 
the sense of emptiness, but 1 am the creative nothing [schopferische Nichts], the nothing 
out of which 1 myself as creator create everything'. 88 He also writes regarding such 
'creativity': '[O]wnness is the creator of everything, as genius (a definite ownness), 
which is always originality, has for a long time already been looked upon as the creator 
of new productions' .89 
Stirner's writings appear to be radically anti-metaphysical and anti-essentialist. 
His notion of ownness [Eigenheit] as the irreducible singularity of mortal individuals 
prefigures Heidegger's account of authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. However, the 
insubstantiality of ownness would not necessarily free it from Derridian accusations of 
complicity in the metaphysics of presence, because Derrida's critique of Heidegger 
involves associating the proper [Eigentlich] with the present. Stirner writes: 'I am not, 
like freedom, extant only in the future and in hopes, but even as the most abject of slaves 
1 t ,90 am - presen . 
Production and Commodification 
For Marx, alienation is the manifestation of the mode of production of capitalist society. 
Therefore its overcoming would involve a radical change of that society. Communism is 
put forward as being the overcoming of alienation, the 'reintegration and return of man 
to himself .91 
Alienation involves a loss of the control, mastery, and self-determination of 
human activity to an external, alien and hostile force. Properly human activity is 
characterised as productive activity, or labour. The product of labour is its 
objectification, but this object is taken away, expropriated by the alien force. The free 
productive activity of human self-realisation is distorted by the relations of production 
necessitated by a society which has its basis in the commodity. The commodification of 
the object of production affects the worker in a number of ways. She is alienated from 
the product of her labour, which becomes an alien object exercising power over her. A 
world of commodities comes about, produced by the workers, but confronting them as 
something foreign, not their own. The worker is also alienated from herself, from her 
own activity, which, instead of being what it naturally should be, that is, the free 
development of her 'physical and mental energy', becomes something external that is 
not her own, a deadening mechanical chore in which she feels outside herself,92 an 
activity that is a mere means to an external end. As a result of this, the worker is 
alienated from her universal nature, her generic-being [Gattungswesen]. This 
Feuerbachian notion involves the understanding that humanity is, by its very nature, 
unlimited, universal, and therefore free, that is, free from the restricted determinacy of 
isolated particularity. The 'free, conscious activity' 93 that is humanity's generic-
character, an activity that is an end in itself, is alienated, and distorted into a mere means 
to the subsistence of the isolated individual. The worker is thus atomised and thereby 
alienated from other people. 
Fragmentation and detotalisation are the effects of the stringent division of labour 
necessitated by commodity based society. The human being is alienated from its free and 
comprehensive nature by being reduced to a particular function. The worker becomes 
commodified and reified, a thing for sale, with a particular function. Society is atomised, 
as the general social purpose of labour is lost and replaced by a functional 
'homogeneous human labour,94 that produces the alien realm of commodities that 
governs and controls the producers. This realm of commodities mystifies the social 
character of labour, in the form of the ideological distortion of reified consciousness: 
'[A] definite social relation between men ... assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of 
a relation between things. ,95 The alienation of the worker from her products, her 
comprehensive nature, and the social whole, causes in her consciousness an ideological 
misrecognition of the truly social basis of commodity society, a misrecognition that 
ultimately serves the reproduction of that society. 
As we have seen, despite the fact that Derridian dijferance supposedly precludes 
any reference to a human essence, the notion of humanity's generic universality is based 
on indeterminacy, and not substance. However, the idea of overcoming the ghostly 
insubstantiality of the commodity form through the abolition of the mode of production 
it depends on is viewed by Derrida as an attempt at 'exorcism', the casting out of 
spectrality, dijferance, the trace, in favour of de-alienation as the return of full 
presence.96 
Reification 
Marx's analysis of commodities provides the basis of Lukacs's exposition of the 
phenomenon of reification [Verdinglichung]. Reification is the reduction of what is 
properly a living human relation into an ossified thing. It refers to the dehumanisation 
caused by the commodification of all aspects of life. In a market economy the activity of 
humanity is commodified, and thus people are estranged or alienated from it: '[A] man's 
activity becomes estranged from himself, it turns into a commodity which, subject to the 
non-human objectivity of the natural laws of society, must go its way independently of 
man just like any consumer article. ,97 The increasing division of labour into specialised 
operations means that the worker has no contact with the final product and that the work 
itself loses all qualitative and human characteristics, becoming a mere mechanical 
repetition. Such work dehumanises the worker into being a mere fragment of himself, a 
functional cog in a machine, the empty repetitiveness of the work measured in purely 
quantitative temporal terms where time itself loses its qualitative and variable nature. 
Lukacs writes: '[Time] freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled 
with quantifiable "things" (the reified, mechanically objectified "performance" of the 
worker, wholly separated from his total human personality): in short, it becomes 
space. ,98 This mechanised form of work also atomises the workers, isolating them from 
each other and the social whole. While society is more unified than ever before, subject 
to a unified economic process, individual people experience this as increased 
atomisation, because the mechanisation of production separates people into different 
functions, breaking all human and communal bonds, replacing these with mere 
functional connections within the social machine. 
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Commodification effaces the qualitative nature of things in general, submitting 
them to pure quantitative calculability. Rational calculability destroys the authentic 
immediacy of substantiality. Lukacs writes: 'This rational objectification conceals above 
all the immediate - qualitative and material - character of things as things. When use-
values appear universally as commodities they acquire a new objectivity ... which 
destroys their original and authentic substantiality. ,99 In this way the commodity society 
alienates humanity from nature. 
The standpoint of the proletariat, of the workers as a class, when it can shed the 
reifying mystifications of bourgeois ideology, is oriented towards the social totality, and 
is not stuck in the isolated immediacy of empiricism. Seeing things in terms of isolated 
particularity is a product of the atomisation of people through the mechanisation of 
production. This is a false consciousness, because the reality of commodity society is 
that everything is ultimately interrelated. Capitalist society is a totality that hides itself 
from the consciousness of its subjects, who, in the thrall of reified ideology, experience 
their lives in the form of isolated particularity. If things are seen in terms of totality, the 
immediacy of empirical consciousness will be overcome, and the awareness of 
mediation will expose their inherent interconnectedness. loo This will enable the 
overcoming of reification: 'Reification... can be overcome only by constant and 
constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretel}/ 
relating to the concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by 
becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions for the total 
development.,lol It is necessary to engage in areas of struggle with a consciousness of 
how they relate to the social totality. 
Overcoming reification in this way involves an overcommg of humanity's 
alienation from the movement of time. Social praxis requires the present to be seen as a 
becoming, as a mediation between past and future, and not as the 'immediacy slipping 
away,102 of empiricist reified consciousness. If either the past or the future are 
considered in the form of being external to their mutual mediation they become reified 
into existences that are alien to the human being, who in this case can only be a mere 
contemplator. The present as becoming is 'the focus of decision and of the birth of the 
new.,103 De-alienation in this case involves taking control over the historical process. 
This entails people seeing the movement of time itself as their own. Lukacs writes: 'i'.1an 
must be able to comprehend the present as a becoming ... by seeing in it the tendencies 
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out of whose dialectical opposition he can make the future. Only when he does this will 
the present be a process of becoming, that belongs to him.' 104 
As we have seen, Derrida dismisses the idea that the immediacy and qualitative 
authentic substantiality of things could be reawakened with the abolition of commodity 
society as a manifestation of the metaphysics of presence. However, Lukacs's notion of 
authentic temporality involves an understanding of the present, not as immediacy, but as 
the mediation of the past and future through which humanity becomes part of a 
conscious and active becoming. Similarly, Derrida claims that the deconstruction of the 
present partly involves accounting for the 'dialectic' of 'protention' and 'retention' 
within it.
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Derrida writes: '[W]hat is anticipated in protention does not sever the 
present any less from its self-identity than does that which is retained in the trace. But if 
anticipation were privileged, the irreducibility of the always-already-there and the 
fundamental passivity that is called time would risk effacement.' 106 What Derrida is 
suggesting here is that the deconstruction of the self-identity of the present overcomes 
the reified givenness of the already-there and thus leads to the replacement of the 
contemplative passivity of 'time' by the activity and praxis of what Lukacs calls 
'becoming'. To this extent deconstruction is a form of the critique of reification. The 
active process of social change does not only not depend on a metaphysical notion of 
presence, it is itself furthered by the dissolution of the latter. The relationship between 
deconstruction and praxis will be discussed in more detail in the fifth chapter. 
Derridian differance undermines all determinacy and the positivity of isolated 
particularity, overcoming the immediacy and self-presence of the objects of empiricist 
and positivist analytical consciousness, and thus the reified experience of atomisation, 
by bringing to light the otherness that haunts any determined identity. However, it resists 
the dialectical reappropriation of this undermining, a reappropriation involving the 
positive consequence of an awareness of the broader picture, of the social totality, that 
would harness the dissolution of any isolated particularity in order to comprehend its 
mediation through the totality. For Derrida, the dissolution of identity does not have the 
Hegelian consequence that 'the True is the whole', but that all truth-claims should be 
replaced by the play of active interpretation. Such play would be dismissed by Lukacs as 
a form of subjectivism, as the individual player experiences the dissolution of reified 
identity in social isolation, as with Rorty's 'private ironism', and in this way the 
experience itself remains reified. This argument is the basis of Hegel's critique of the 
subjectivism of the play of Romantic irony, as well as Lukacs's O\VI1 critique of the 
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subjectivism of many of the features of modernist literature which portray the reified 
experience of the isolated individual as if it is a permanent metaphysical predicament of 
the human condition and not the concrete manifestation of a particular social formation. 
Aspects of Alienation 
Various manifestations of the concept of alienation and associated concepts within the 
history of philosophy have been discussed. The aspects of alienation that can be drawn 
from this discussion must now be recounted in order to clarify the concept's nature, 
associations, and contradictory interpretations. 
We began with the myth of the fall, a fall from the grace of primordial harmony 
into knowledge and responsibility, a separation from nature and God that was necessary 
for human freedom. The redemption of humanity and the return of paradise must be 
through the will and choice of humanity, through the very freedom and responsibility 
that originally constituted the loss of paradise. The fall-redemption motif can be found in 
the writings of thinkers as diverse as Rousseau, Schiller, Schelling, Hegel and Marx, but 
it refers to different ideas in the writings of each thinker. For example, redemption for 
Hegel is the philosophical comprehension of the dissolution of all one-sidedness, 
whereas for Schelling it is the overcoming of philosophy itself through a mystical 
'wisdom' that reunites humanity with nature. The fall tends to be a fall from a state of 
immediacy, whether it be the immediacy of Rousseau's primitive man or Schiller's 
'naive' ancient Greeks. 
Prevalent in many accounts of alienation is the wish to regain an immediacy lost 
through the development of consciousness and knowledge. This is clear in Rousseau, 
Schiller, the notions of the lost golden age and lost unity of being in the Romantics and 
Schelling, the reawakening of the immediacy of things through the freeing of use-value 
from the mediacy of exchange-value in Marx and Lukacs. However, immediacy is not 
always given such importance in theories of alienation. Hegel dismisses what he calls 
the 'indeterminate immediate' as an empty abstraction, exactly the opposite of the 
substantial concretion usually associated with immediacy. Marx may be opposed to the 
mediations of commodification, but he regards mere immediacy as the state in which 
animals live, human nature being constituted by conscious activity, where the person 
distinguishes himself from his life activity and thus is not immediately at one with it.
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Istvan Meszaros argues that in Marx there is no ultimate reference to immediacy, to an 
identity of subject and object, which he dismisses as mysticism. Instead of this there is 
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what he calls the 'first order mediation' of unalienated conscious productive acti\'itv 
. , 
which constitutes human nature, upon which is imposed the 'second order mediations', 
such as exchange value and division of labour, which constitute alienation. lo8 Howeyer, 
for Schelling, a primordial immediacy, prior to the subject-object distinction, is no mere 
empty abstraction or descent to an animalistic vitalism; it is the locus of eternal freedom 
itself, the indeterminacy of immediacy as free determinability. For Lukacs, while 
immediacy is the form of the unalienated qualitative authenticity of things, it is also the 
form of the alienated consciousness of a false atomism which can be overcome through a 
consciousness of mediation. 
The concept of alienation implies the loss of the true nature of something, of its 
essence, such that its actual existence is divorced from its real nature. Alienation appears 
to depend on essentialism, the idea that there is a true nature to things; but what this 
nature is differs widely across the range of thinkers in question. For example, for 
Plotinus, it is a purely spiritual and intellectual oneness with divine permanence that is 
corrupted by a fixation with the ephemera of the external material world, whereas, for 
the likes of Rousseau it is a oneness with nature corrupted by civilisation and intellectual 
knowledge. The notion of essence is a metaphysical concept to the extent that it refers to 
the ideal and universal nature of something. Derrida's notion of differance opposes the 
substantiality and presence of any notion of essence. However, essence merely refers to 
the definition of something, therefore it can signify anything. For Feuerbach and Marx, 
the human is a generic-being, meaning that the human essence is consciousness as the 
ability to universalise, an unlimitedness free from the restrictions of immediate isolated 
particularity, a universality that is only possible because of the emptiness, the lack of 
determinacy and substantiality, of the human being. 
While essence refers to the properties of an entity without which it would not be 
what it is, it does not refer to its particular singularity, what is fundamentally its own , 
because the same properties can be applied to other entities of the same type. Therefore 
the essence of something is its universalised ideal, not the thing itself in its irreducible 
singularity. Essence refers to an entity's properties [EigenschaftenJ, that is, to the entity 
in the form of generality, not to the entity itself in its singular existence, its ownness 
[EigenheitJ. For Stirner, an entity's alienation is not alienation from its true nature, as it 
tends to be for other theorists of alienation, but alienation from its own uniterable being. 
Stirner regards the notion of the human essence as just another way in which the unique 
individual is alienated from itself. 
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Stirner's unalienated unique individual is a 'creative nothing', not externally 
determined, without any substance or essence that would entail a loss of its ownness, and 
is therefore free, that is, in a state of indetenninacy qua free detenninability. This brings 
us to the question of the relationship between alienation and freedom. The loss of one's 
own true nature through external detenninations is a loss of one's freedom. The idea that 
alienation entails a loss of freedom has many widely differing manifestations. 
Rousseau's primitive man has not yet lost his natural liberty through the chains of 
civilisation. For Schiller, a person is only free when she is a whole, and wholeness is 
characterised by freedom from any particular detennination, and thus as a state of free 
detenninability. Free detenninability is also the main characteristic of Schelling's pre-
conceptual 'eternal freedom'. For Marx, free unalienated productive activity is free 
because it is an end in itself, not a means to anything else, such as mere physical 
subsistence, and it is not in the grip of an external hostile appropriating force. It may be 
argued that the idea of de-alienation as a return to freedom does not quite fit in with the 
usual content of the fall-redemption model in which freedom is regarded as an effect of 
the fall itself. Alienation from primordial immediacy is necessary for the existence and 
development of consciousness, of the mind, which is associated with freedom as 
opposed to the necessity of nature. However, for Hegel and Schelling, there are different 
types, or levels, of freedom. A one-sided and therefore restricted freedom, that is, a 
freedom opposed to necessity, is not true freedom. True freedom is the overcoming of 
the opposition between freedom and necessity, mind and nature, subject and object. 
However, this overcoming can itself take on a myriad of different fonns, for example, 
Hegel's absolute knowing or Schelling's 'unknowable' absolute subject as eternal 
freedom. 
The notion of de-alienation as a return to a state of freedom can manifest itself in 
opposing forms, depending on radically different interpretations of what freedom is. A 
major difference is whether de-alienation involves a oneness with being through a 
suspension of the subject, or an affirmation of the subject's own controlling mastery. 
Schiller's aesthetic de-alienation involves sharpening the subject-object distinction 
through the objectification of nature, where nature is domesticated into an object for a 
perceiving subject, an objectification that involves subjecting nature to the subject's 
power and dominion. Similarly, Marx's unalienated condition involves experiencing the 
world as humanity'S own creation. 109 Stirner's state of unalienated ownness invol\'es the 
self's mastery over itself and others, whether people or things, reducing them to 
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instruments of utility. Conversely, Novalis and Schelling regard the subject-object 
distinction as the locus of alienation, and therefore de-alienation as the overcoming of 
this through the suspension of the subject, which enables the primordial oneness of being 
to manifest itself. 
Many theories of alienation involve the notion that the loss of freedom and 
autonomy of the person involves a reifying dehumanisation, the reduction of the human 
being to an object or a thing. In the writings of Schiller, Hegel, Marx, and Lukacs, this is 
connected to the fragmentation caused by the division of labour necessitated by the 
capitalist form of production, which reduces the human being to a particular function, a 
cog in a machine, usually involving dead and repetitive work. Reification is also 
demonstrated in Hegel's notion of the 'understanding' [VerstandJ, or analytical reason, 
as a way of thinking restricted to the form of the static isolated particularity of mere 
facts. It can be found in Marx's idea that the commodification of all aspects of life leads 
to the ideological misrecognition that human relations are relations between things. 
Reification is usually said to involve a fixation with the petrified stasis of isolated 
particularity, a fragmentation of living wholeness into lifeless parts. De-totalisation is a 
major aspect of many theories of alienation. Schiller's understanding of the aesthetic is 
that it restores to humanity its wholeness, a wholeness of personality undermined by the 
fragmentary nature of modem society and the modem individual. Hegel's notion of 
absolute knowing as the overcoming of alienation involves the idea that 'the True is the 
whole', as opposed to the alienated atomised one-sidedness of consciousness trapped in 
the realm of the 'understanding'. Marx's notion of the alienation of humanity's 'generic-
being', of its wholeness of character occasioned by its universality in the form of 
freedom from specific determination, entails the atomisation of the individual human 
from her fellow humans, from the social whole. Lukacs's account ofreification involves 
the atomisation of individuals, and the reduction of consciousness to the empirical 
immediacy of isolated particularity that is unable to recognise the reality of 
interrelatedness that constitutes the mechanised social totality of commodity based 
society. 
At first it seems that alienation is simply a clear manifestation of Derrida' s 
metaphysics of presence, an interpretation of difference in terms of a lost and ultimately 
regainable origin in a state of full presence devoid of difference. This initial vie\\'point 
on the matter is supported by a number of the ideas that have been discussed. Rousseau's 
myth of origins, the primitive immediacy of presence corrupted by the artificiality of 
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civilisation and writing, IS explicitly addressed in those terms in Derrida' s Of 
Grammatology. It could be argued that Schillerian and Lukacsian notions of the 
wholeness of personality, not to mention the Marxian 'return of man to himself. are a 
manifestation of self-presence. Derrida regards Hegel's de-alienated 'absolute knowing' 
as the 'parousia' of full and infinite presence. 
However, in many accounts of alienation it appears that the present itself is the 
locus of alienation, not of de-alienation. The idea of the unalienated wholeness of 
personality, to be found in the writings of Schiller, Feuerbach, and Marx, is dependent 
on humanity's universality, its indeterminacy as lack of the immediate substantial 
fullness of presence of a specific determination, its free determinability and not its given 
presence. Schelling's unalienated primordial immediacy is not a oneness with nature as 
fullness of presence, but an apprehension of the non-objectifiable absolute subject, 
which is not a substantial presence, but the insubstantial indeterminacy of 'eternal 
freedom', of free determinability. This concept of determinability, prevalent in post-
Kantian conceptions of de-alienation, is closer to the productive indeterminacy of 
Derridian differance than to the determined fullness and fixed exclusionary identity of 
the metaphysical notion of presence. 
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Chapter 2 
Difference and Alienation in Hegel 
Derrida himself speaks of the 'relations of profound affinity with Hegelian discourse') 
that his notion of differance maintains. Yet Hegelianism remains one of the principle 
targets of deconstruction, because it names a system of the ultimate reappropriation of 
difference. Derrida describes Hegel as 'the last philosopher of the book and the first 
thinker ofwriting,.2 This means that Hegel is a thinker of irreducible difference (writing) 
at the same time as being a philosopher of metaphysical closure (the book), 
reappropriating difference in a speculative identity. Derrida emphasises his proximity to 
Hegelian thought only in order to 'operate a kind of infinitesimal and radical 
displacement of it,.3 The nature of this 'displacement' will here be explored with regard 
to its relation to the Hegelian concept of alienation. What is in question here is whether 
the notion of differance has more 'affinity' with Hegel's conception of alienation or his 
conception of the overcoming of alienation. 
The Proximity of Derrida and Hegel 
There are clear similarities between Derrida' s notion of differance and certain Hegelian 
themes. The idea that something is never simply itself, but is always determined through 
what it is not, and the concomitant notion of infinite mediation are at the core of Hegel's 
philosophy. What Derrida objects to in Hegel is the notion of sublation, or Aufhebung. 
The German word Aufhebung combines the meanings of lift up, negate and retain. It 
refers to the moment in the Hegelian dialectic when consciousness is raised to a higher 
level through the process of the mediation of an idea by its other, a process that involves 
the idea's simultaneous negation, retention and supersession. For Derrida, the Aufhebung 
involves the recuperation of the self-presence of meaning through the suppression of 
differance. Differance is conceived as dialectical negativity, which means that it is 
harnessed and put to work in the service of the renewal and reconstitution of the 
positivity and self-presence of meaning. Derrida relates the operation of the Aufhebung 
to self-presence when he defines it in the following way: '[T]o aufheben [is] to deny 
while raising up, while idealizing, while sublimating into an anamnesic interiority 
(Erinnerung), while interning difference in a self-presence.,4 Derrida' s notion of 
differance is defined by its opposition to the Aufhebung: 'If there were a definition of 
d({ferance, it would be precisely the limit, the interruption, the destruction of the 
Hegelian releve [Aujhebung] wherever it operates.,5 He acknowledges the similarity of 
differance to Hegelian negativity, while again proclaiming its detachment from the 
Aujhebung: 'Differance (at a point of almost absolute proximity to HegeL .. ) must sign 
the point at which one breaks with the system of the Aujhebung and with speculative 
dialectics.,6 However, the Aujhebung does not merely bring the movement of the 
concept to rest in self-presence; it reinscribes it into a new dynamic of difference and 
contradiction. This restless temporal process only comes to an end in philosophical 
thinking, what Hegel calls 'absolute knowing'. The Aujhebung could be reinterpreted as 
the reconfiguration of discourse resulting from the undermining of binary oppositions, 
an operation resembling Derridian deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges this when he 
says: 'Aujhebung could be written otherwise. Whence its proximity to all the operations 
conducted against Hegel's dialectical speculation.' 7 However, Hegel's rational 
comprehension of such reconfigurations as a teleological progress is unacceptable to 
Derrida, who sees it as a metaphysical reference to a future presence. 
Alienation in Hegel is, at one stage, a manifestation of mediation, a process 
essential to and constitutive of human consciousness.8 It refers to the self-othering 
involved in self-positing, which is the process of differentiation that constitutes identity; 
if the same is the same only insofar as it is not the other then the same contains the other 
within itself, it is itself at the same time as being other than itself. Hence the proximity 
of Hegelian alienation to the notion of a fundamental difference, or dif.!erance, that 
underlies and undermines the full self-presence of identity. However, as we have seen, 
for Hegel, alienation and difference are characterised as dialectical negativity, they are 
put to work in the service of the reconstitution of identity, sublated to a higher level. 
This higher level is a paradoxical mediated identity, an identity 'for itself, or a self-
conscious identity. Derrida resists this recuperation of identity and strives to free 
differance from dialectical negativity, which would entail detaching alienation from its 
part in the process of the reconstitution of identity, rendering it absolute. In contrast, for 
Hegel, both alienation and its overcoming are necessary for the development of 
conSCIOusness. 
Two of the most suggestive manifestations of alienation in the narrative of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, in terms of their prefiguring of Derridian themes, are the so-
called 'unhappy consciousness' and the realm of 'culture' or 'self-alienated Spirit'. The 
unhappy consciousness arises out of scepticism. Hegel characterises scepticism as self-
contradictory. Through its negative attitude to the external world it confirms itself as a 
60 
simple entity, which paradoxically maintains its stable determinacy by denying 
determinacy in general, while being nothing but the experience of indeterminacy.9 Hegel 
uses the traditional argument against scepticism and relativism, asserting the 
contradictoriness inherent in the statement that nothing is true except the fact that 
nothing is true. He writes regarding scepticism: 'It pronounces an absolute vanishing, 
but the pronouncement is, and this consciousness is the vanishing that is pronounced.'\o 
Derrida's notion of difjfirance can be seen as a form of scepticism, insofar as 
truth and meaning are held to depend on the metaphysics of presence. Hegel includes in 
his description of scepticism a similar idea of difference: '[Determinacy] contains no 
permanent element, and must vanish before thought, because the "different" is just this, 
not to be in possession of itself, but to have its essential being only in an other. Thinking, 
however, is the insight into this nature of the "different", it is the negative essence, as 
simple.' II Sceptical thinking is the consciousness of fundamental difference. This 
consciousness is paradoxical and contradictory, because the difference that constitutes 
the possibility and impossibility of determinacy cannot be represented by a concept, as 
concepts are themselves determinate. It is for this reason that Derrida claims that 
differance is not a concept or a word, a paradox necessitated by the fact that the 
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence can only be done using language and 
concepts that by their nature depend on such a metaphysics. 
While scepticism involves consciousness experiencing itself as internally 
contradictory it is not actually aware of this state. When consciousness becomes aware 
of its contradictory condition it becomes what Hegel calls the unhappy consciousness. 
This form of consciousness is alienated from itself; it is split between the infinite 
changeableness of 'absolute vanishing', or fundamental difference, and the simple 
unchangeable determinacy that it necessarily is, being a consciousness of the 
changeable. Furthermore, being the self-consciousness of this split, or contradiction, it 
paradoxically identifies itself with the changeable, while being aware of its nature as an 
'unchangeable' determinacy, yet also being unable to take this nature 'to be its own.' 12 
Hegel identifies the unhappy consciousness with a religious yearning for an unattainable 
beyond. In not being able to grasp any stable self-presence, it yearns for a transcendent 
presence that is alien to it, and feels itself to be wretched and empty. However, the very 
feeling of alienation from the present being of the 'unchangeable' links consciousness to 
the 'unchangeable', bringing about an awareness of their, albeit negative and alienated, 
unity. Finally, in renouncing itself, consciousness embraces and identifies itself with the 
61 
universal. It regains its self-presence by recognising the unchangeable as intrinsic to its 
own nature, and not as an alien being, and becomes itself the reconciliation of the 
unchangeable universal and the changeable individual, a new form of consciousness that 
Hegel calls 'Reason'. However, the recovery of self-presence merely inscribes 
consciousness into a new set of differential relations. 
Derrida refuses to accept that his own recognition of dif/firance constitutes a 
higher form of consciousness or reason. Furthermore, he does not see the chain of 
referrals to an unattainable beyond as a melancholy and wretched yearning. On the 
contrary, he suggests a Nietzschean affirmation of the endless play of the world, 
liberated from any nostalgia or hope for a lost presence; 13 a 'happy' consciousness not 
envisaged in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This celebratory attitude precludes the use of 
the term alienation, with its unhappy connotations, to describe the self-othering involved 
in dijferance. 
However, this affirmation of dijferance, of the play of changeable surfaces and 
masks, of the constant dissolution and reconfiguration of identities, with no anchor in a 
final self-presence, is described by Hegel as the 'nihilistic game.J4 of 'culture [Bildung]" 
a form of consciousness he terms 'der sich entfremdete Geist' (translated as 'self-
alienated Spirit'). This involves an absolute dissolution of identity and self-presence 
comparable to that of the unhappy consciousness, only this time in the more social realm 
of spirit. Hegel describes self-alienated spirit as a realm where all values are reversible, 
where everything is insubstantial and superficial, and where the individual is alienated 
into an empty universal, whose identity is unstable and constantly shifting, weanng 
many different masks and being nothing but those masks. He writes: 
When the pure "I" beholds itself outside of itself and rent asunder, then 
everything that is called law, good, and right, is at the same time rent asunder and 
is destroyed. All identity dissolves away, for the utmost disparity now occupies 
the scene; what is absolutely essential is now absolutely unessential, being-for-
self is now external to itself: the pure "I" itself is absolutely disrupted. 15 
Self-alienated spirit manifests itself in an ironic, 'clever and witty', 16 discourse. This is 
the product of the 'absolute perversion' of all values. The awareness of the absolute 
vanishing of all determinacy here takes the form of a playful, highly rhetorical and 
stylised use of language, where the play of form is everything and the self-presence of 
content is infinitely deferred, unattainable, and therefore provisional and substitutable. 
At this stage Hegel's portrayal of alienation has clear parallels with the Derridian 
notion of the play of dijferance. 
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Externalisation and Estrangement 
Alienation is an aspect of Hegel's notions of mediation and negativity. Denida regards 
the latter two concepts as involving a harnessing of difference that puts it to work 
towards the re-establishment of identity. Before proceeding further in our inquiry into 
the relationship between alienation and difference, it is necessary to clarify the 
distinctness of Hegel's use of the term, what makes it more specific than 'mediation' and 
'negativity'. The establishment of such clarity requires critical engagement not only with 
Hegel's writings, but also with the arguments put forward on this question by certain of 
his interpreters. 
Lukacs, in his book, The Young Hegel, claims that the mature Hegel's concept of 
alienation is a development from the concept of 'positivity', a concept prevalent in his 
youthful early theological writings. 'Positivity' refers to the stolid thinghood of brute 
objectivity, external and alien to living subjectivity.17 Lukacs writes that 'positivity' is 
an 'alien, dead, "givenness'" .18 Hegel's argument, at this time, is a critique of 'positive 
religion', religion that posits the moral law as something external and given. Lukacs 
argues that in Hegel's first major work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, the concept of 
positivity is replaced by the concept of 'externalisation [Entauj3erung (alienation)],. The 
word 'externalisation' implies that the positivity of dead objectivity is itself the product 
of human activity, that positivity is the reification of living subjectivity through the 
latter's very actualisation. Lukacs writes: 
Hegel came to believe that the positive spheres of modem society were also the 
products of human activity ... Hence they cease to appear as something ready-
made... [I]n the Phenomenology of Mind ... the old concept 'positivity' is 
replaced by the new terms 'externalization' or 'alienation' ... 'Positivity' refers to 
a quality of social formations, objects, things. 'Externalization' is a specific 
mode of human activity as a result of which specific social institutions come into 
being and acquire the objective nature peculiar to them. 19 
The link between positivity and externalisation can be clearly seen in the following 
extract from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, where he describes the realm of abstract 
legal right, which is as stolidly external as the moral law of religious positivity: 
[T]he Spirit whose self is an absolutely discrete unit has its content as an equ~lly 
hard and unyielding reality, and here the world has the character of bemg 
something externaL .. This world is ... an alien reality already present and giyen, 
a reality which has a being of its own and in which it does not recognize itself. 
... But this external world ... is not merely this elemental being confronting the 
self as something contingently given; on the contrary, it is his work ... It obtains 
63 
its existence through self-consciousness's own externalization and separation of 
itself from its essence[.]20 
The term 'externalisation' means that the reified world of 'absolutely discrete' isolated 
static positivities is itself the effect of the self, which is pure negative living activity 
positing itself in actuality. 
It is important to note that Lukacs claims that Hegel replaces the concept of 
'positivity' not only with the concept of 'externalisation', but also with another term: 
"'[P]ositivity" is replaced by the new terms "externalization" or "alienation" 
[Entfremdung]'. There are two German words that Hegel uses that are usually translated 
into English as 'alienation'. These are EntauJ3erung, literally 'externalisation', and 
Entfremdung, literally 'estrangement'. Lukacs writes: 'In themselves there is nothing 
novel about the terms Entausserung and En tfrem dung. They are simply German 
translations of the English word "alienation". This was used in works on economic 
theory to betoken the sale of a commodity, and in works on natural law to refer to the 
loss of an aboriginal freedom' . 21 They may be translations of one English word, but what 
is in question here is whether or not these two terms are used interchangeably, with no 
distinction in meaning, in Hegel's writings. 
Stanley Rosen argues that they have different meanmgs and should not be 
conflated. His claim is that alienation [EntfremdungJ, unlike externalisation, can only be 
a characteristic of consciousness. He explains it thus: '''[EJxternalization'' is the 
transition from the immediate to the mediate, in which the content latent in immediacy is 
rendered explicit. "Alienation [Entfremdung]" takes place only when, or for so long as, 
the explicit content is separated from a source rendered self-conscious by the fact of 
separation.,22 Rosen concedes that Hegel often uses the terms interchangeably, the main 
example of this being the use of the word Entfremdung to refer to what is usually called 
Entauj3erung in the chapter on religion in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where God is 
said to be alienated in His creation and incarnation. Rosen, however, suggests that this 
terminological slippage only occurs, because, in this discussion of religion, the pre-
philosophical language of religious representation is being used. He suggests elsewhere 
that Entfremdung is pre-philosophical and EntauJ3erung is logical. 23 He writes: 
'[E]xtemalization is "alienation" in the pejorative sense, only for so long as spirit has not 
yet completely understood itself. ,24 Thus Entfremdung is a feature of the experience of 
consciousness, whereas EntauJ3erung is a logical term, a term used from the standpoint 
of philosophical comprehension, or absolute knowing. 
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Gillian Rose is another Hegel interpreter who asserts the difference in meanina 
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between Entauj3erung and Entfremdung, but for a different reason to that of Rosen. She 
writes: 'The idea that Hegel equated alienation [Entfremdung] with extemalization in 
general is fundamentally mistaken. Alienated Spirit is a specific determination of spirit 
which does not characterize the modem period.,25 She argues that Hegel's use of the 
tenn Entfremdung is restricted to his discussion of a particular, 'pre-bourgeois', 
historical period.26 
However, it is debatable whether the section of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
entitled 'Self-alienated Spirit' is a description of a form of consciousness that only 
applies to one particular historical period, feudalism. The section itself alludes to the 
eighteenth-century transition from feudal courtly culture to the Enlightenment and 
ultimately the French revolution. But the problem is not the period itself; it is the 
reduction of a fonn of consciousness to a particular historical period. The narrative 
description of the development of fonns of consciousness from sense-certainty to 
absolute knowing is not a social history. Phenomenology, or 'the Science of Knowing in 
the sphere of appearance', is sharply distinguished from history on the last page of the 
book, despite the fact that their combination is advocated.27 The philosophical 
comprehension of fonns of consciousness ordered into a logical narrative should not be 
confused with the contingent occurrences of empirical history. Historical periods are 
referred to in the Phenomenology, but as allusive examples. The forms of consciousness 
are not punctual; they could occur at various times in empirical history. Otherwise, for 
example, the abstract allegory of the 'master-slave dialectic' would have to be seen as a 
particular historical event, or 'scepticism', 'the unhappy consciousness', 'the beautiful 
soul', and 'religion' itself would have to be placed finnly in particular historical epochs. 
The section on 'Self-alienated Spirit' itself begins with a description of the abstract right 
of ancient Rome, before leaping into an extensive portrayal of eighteenth-century 
France. 
The argument that Entfremdung names the conscious experience of Entiiuj3erung 
III Hegel's work is put forward by Lukacs himself in the following way: '[I]n the 
disintegrated consciousness [of self-alienated spirit], whose very essence lies in its self-
knowledge, the subject attains an insight into the objective movement which had brought 
this externalized reality about' .28 Self-alienated spirit is the conscious experience of 
externalisation as estrangement in the social and collective realm of 'Spirit". It is social 
(' spiritual ') estrangement as the conscIOUS realisation of social (' spiritual') 
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externalisation. Lukacs refers to this section in tenns of 'the dawning realization that 
[the] societal world of objects has its foundation in "externalization",.,29 Previous 
descriptions of estrangement, in earlier sections, such as 'the unhappy consciousness', 
are at the level of mere consciousness and self-consciousness, not yet at the le\"el of 
objective social consciousness, or 'Spirit'. 
Both terms, Entfremdung and Entauj3erung, refer to the process of the 
constitution of identity through its own othering. They are often used interchangeably by 
Hegel. Despite this, Rosen's contention that the fonner is a specifically conscious fonn 
of the latter is useful and convincing, as Entfremdung most commonly occurs in Hegel's 
text in this regard. The English word 'alienation' is appropriate as a translation of both 
terms, to compliment the specific words 'externalisation' and 'estrangement'. This is 
largely because 'externalisation' is not itself adequate as a translation of some of the 
uses of 'En tauj3erung , , for example, to refer to the divestment of property. 
'Alienation', in either of its guises, names the process that Hegel calls 
'experience'. (To comply with Rosen's distinction, Entauj3erung describes the nature of 
experience, whereas Entfremdung describes that very nature manifest within 
experience.) 'Experience' is itself the process of self-othering and self-reappropriation 
that occurs throughout Hegel's narrative. Hegel defines it thus: 
Spirit becomes object because it is just this movement of becoming an other to 
itself, i.e. becoming an object to itself, and of suspending this otherness. And 
experience is the name we give to just this movement, in which the immediate, 
the unexperienced, ... becomes alienated [entfremdet] from itself and then returns 
to itself from this alienation [Entfremdung], and is only then revealed for the first 
time in its actuality and truth, just as it then has become a property of 
. I 30 conSCIOusness a so. 
The unexperienced abstract immediacy must become externalised to itself in order to 
manifest itself in actuality. This manifestation is its ex-position, its exposure to 
otherness, its leap out of unrelated immediacy into relationality, the dynamic 
relationality that Hegel calls 'spirit'. The manifest actualisation occurs once the self 
returns to itself from its externalisation. This so-called return is not a return to a new 
configuration of immediacy. It is the reconstitution of the self as 'revealed', as manifest 
in the openness of relationality. This actualisation is an appropriation; it 'has become a 
property of consciousness'. That is to say, the self is a property of consciousness 
precisely because it has separated itself from itself. Thus its externalisation, experienced 
as estrangement, becomes its self-appropriation and actualisation. 
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This appropriation involves a certain de-alienation whereby the abstract 
immediacy is a positivity that is itself revealed to be an externalisation of the subject's 
activity. While alienation (externalisation) initially appears as the ex-position of this 
simple unmediated positivity, the point of de-alienation is not a return to the latter. a re-
position. It is the effectivity [Wirklichkeit] of ex-position, the ex-posited rendered 
manifest and actual [Wirklich] in its very ex-position. 
As Lukacs points out, in Hegel's work, 'positiVity' is an early name for the 
alienated condition. While the reified, unrelated, inanimate lifelessess of the simple 
positive initially appears to be an unalienated condition prior to its alienation 
(externalisation), it is later revealed to be always already an externalised positedness, 
locked in its stasis, that the force of the negative then impels to itself undergo the 
experience of externalisation, only this time the externalisation does not end up locked in 
static positivity; it enters actuality, of which its externalisation is itself the precondition, 
by doubling back on itself and subsisting in its mediatedness, thus subsisting in the open 
mediatedness of conscious relationality, of manifest actuality, whereby it for the first 
time appropriates itself, raises itself to the level of the proper, becomes a property of its 
own consciousness, a self-constitution and appropriation that subsists precisely in this 
very ex-position and self-differentiation. 
Organicism or Critique 
The idea that the immediacy of the simple positive is not an unalienated condition that is 
lost and regained through the work of the dialectic undermines certain interpretations of 
Hegel's system. These traditional interpretations regard Hegelianism as involving an 
organic temporality based on the expressive development of a single unifying principle 
manifesting itself in the retreat and the promise of return of the origin. As we discussed 
in the introduction, this was the interpretation assumed by Derrida's early 
contemporaries, Althusser and Foucault. The organic and the dialectical are equated by a 
more recent commentator, Henry Sussman, who refers to 'the dialectical, organic, and 
consummate fate for the West that Hegel envisioned'. 31 
This is also the interpretation of Hegel's notion of alienation that Lukacs adheres 
to. He writes: '[T]he primal immediacy, the natural, ... is replaced by a system of 
institutions created by man in the course of his own labours... These labours... also 
transform the human subject since they annul his original immediacy, alienating the 
subject from itself. ,32 Lukacs understands Hegel as saying that the original immediacy is 
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lost through the dialectical process and is regained through a philosophical reconciliation 
of subject and object that is the immanent goal of that process. 33 
Such interpretations, ones that involve the notion of the loss and return of an 
original unity through an organic and expressive development, are, of course, suggested 
at certain points in Hegel's work. In The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's 
System of Philosophy, Hegel claims that philosophy arises out of the need for the 
reconstitution of a lost unity, a reconstitution that can be achieved through dialectical 
reason.
34 He writes: '[T]he need of philosophy ... is the attempt to suspend the rigidified 
opposition between subjectivity and objectivity; to comprehend the achieved existence 
of the intellectual and real world as a becoming ... [In this] Reason has united what was 
sundered and it has reduced the absolute dichotomy to a relative one, one that is 
conditioned by the original identity.,35 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel uses organic metaphors to describe the 
development of forms of consciousness. Regarding such forms, he writes: '[T]heir fluid 
nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, 
but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes 
the life of the whole.,36 However, Hegel sharply distinguishes his dialectic from the 
notion of the organic dynamism of an expressive development in the form of natural 
necessity. The organicism of substantial necessity does not take into account the 
negativity of subjectivity. Hegel writes: 
The circle that remains self-enclosed and, like substance, holds its moments 
together, is an immediate relationship, one therefore which has nothing 
astonishing about it. But that an accident as such, detached from what 
circumscribes it, what is bound and is actual only in its context with others, 
should attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom - this is the 
tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure '1,.37 
This contingent 'accident' that breaks free from the necessity of substance appears to 
contradict the non-conflictual mutuality of the organic unity referred to in the previous 
quotation. However, for Hegel, the relationality of the 'organic whole' to which he is 
referring is itself dependent on the dissolution of the isolated fixity of abstract positivity, 
an ex-position rendering fixed thoughts fluid through the negativity and self-ex-position 
of the pure'!' that is their basis. Hegel writes: 
Thoughts become fluid ... when the pure certainty of self abstracts fro~ itself. .. 
by giving up the fixity of its self-positing, by giving. up .not ?nly th~ fiXIty of the 
pure concrete, which the'!, itself is. in contrast WIth Its dIfferentIated content. 
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but als~ th.e fixity of the differentiated moments which, posited in the element of 
pure thmkmg, share the unconditioned nature of the 'I'. Through this mOVement 
the pure thoughts become Notions, and are only now what they are in truth, self-
move~ents, circles, spiritual essences... This movement of pure essences 
constItutes the nature of scientific method in general. Regarded as the 
connectedness of their content it is the necessary expansion of that content into 
an organic whole. 38 
Organic metaphors refer to the way in which Hegel's 'scientific method' observes things 
in their relatedness, i.e. as a system. This method involves regarding the (fluid) nature of 
the object of knowledge as inseparable from the (fluid) nature of the subject; thus the 
subject of knowledge is part of the field of scientific enquiry and not merely an 
untheorised presupposition. This puts Hegel firmly in a post-Kantian paradigm; an 
organicism of the necessity of an expressive development of substance would be pre-
critical. 
Hegel opposes the idea of a progressive expreSSIve development without the 
mediation of negativity. In Glas, Derrida points out that although Hegel uses metaphors 
of organic circularity to describe the development of consciousness, he sharply 
distinguishes the latter from organic development in nature, in the field of substantial 
necessity, because there is no negativity in natural development. Derrida explains: 
'[L ]ife as nature develops by itself without freedom insofar as its self-mobility is finite. 
It does not go out of itself, it does nothing but develop the germ: the quantitative 
increase without interruption, without relation to the outside and the absolute other.,39 In 
the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel writes critically of a 'development. .. 
[that] is only a positive bringing out of [natural] tendencies, <unhindered within itself 
and not passing through negativity,> passing [out of] possibility into actuality and 
activity without being mediated by a negative moment' .40 
One Hegel commentator, Charles Taylor, finds this notion of negativity 
unacceptable. He writes: '[Hegel claims that] determinate reality ... contains its own 
negation ... But "determinate being" is an indispensable concept; anything to be must be 
determinate. If it also contains its own negation, then whatever meets the conditions of 
existence also meets those of its own demise. .,. [It] cannot maintain itself in 
existence. ,41 Taylor, while finding Hegelian negativity 'incredible'. wishes to retain 
what he sees as valuable in Hegel, i.e. the combination of 'expressive' organic unity 
with subjective autonomy.42 However, for Hegel, negativity is the precondition of such a 
combination. The subject acts within substance as the latter's non-identity with itself, as 
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negativity. The expressive development of self-identical substance, bereft of negativity, 
contains no place for subjective autonomy. 
Such a notion of the development of substance as a purely objective process in 
the form of necessity is not only suggestive of a pre-critical dogmatism, but also 
contravenes Hegel's dictum that 'everything turns on grasping and expressing the True. 
not only as Substance, but equally as Subject. ,43 Despite this, Hegel's philosophical 
narrative appears to develop through dialectical logical necessity. Rodolphe Gasche 
regards Hegel's speculative system as 'preprogrammed and repetitive,.44 There is 
certainly a teleological necessity operating in Hegel's narrative, of which Hegel's own 
system is the culmination. Lukacs describes it thus: 'History... reaches its 
consummation, the goal immanent in it, the nature implicitly contained in it from the 
very beginning, only in philosophy, in a post-festum commentary on the path leading up 
to it. ,45 However, while teleological necessity is clearly discernible in Hegel's narrative 
'commentary', this does not entail its immanence in 'history' itself, in the process which 
preceded the 'commentary'. 
According to Zizek, III Hegel's system teleological necessity IS something 
retroactively imposed on contingent events by the philosophical comprehension that is 
their result. Zizek writes: '[W]hen, out of the contingent external conditions, their Result 
takes shape, these conditions are retroactively - from the viewpoint of the final Result 
itself - perceived as its necessary conditions. "Dialectics" is ultimately a teaching on 
how necessity emerges out of contingency: on how a contingent bricolage produces a 
result which "transcodes" its initial conditions into internal necessary moments of its 
self-reproduction.'46 'Bricolage' is a term that refers to a piecing together of elements 
that are not internally related through any unifying expressive principle; it is the opposite 
of organicism. To regard Hegel's system in terms of the teleological necessity of an 
expressive organicism is not only to ignore the negativity of the subject, but also to 
ignore the backward-looking retroactivity of Hegelian necessity. Zizek maintains that, 
for Hegel, necessity is always a 'backwards-necessity', and he backs up this 
interpretation with a reference to Hegel's claim, in the Philosophy of Right, that 
philosophical comprehension only occurs after the event, as a belated backward-
100king:47 'The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are 
h · ,48 gat enng. 
For Zizek, Hegel's dialectical sublation is a retroactive 'transcoding' of the 
preceding element in the development. As an example of this, he discusses the transition 
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from being into essence in Hegel's Science o/Logic. When 'being' passes into 'essence', 
'being' is redefined as 'appearance'. 'Essence' itself is merely this redefinition. Zizek 
writes: 
[I]n the passage of "being" into "essence", the entire domain of "beinG" is 
retroactively determined as that of the "appearance", as the medium in :hich 
"essence" becomes manifest... ("essence" is, as Hegel puts it, "appearance qua 
appearance" - nothing but the principle of the trans-coding of immediate being 
into a "mere appearance": the illusion of Understanding is precisely that 
"essence" is a positive entity beyond the negative movement of the appearance's 
self-sublation).49 
Zizek identifies Hegel's circular 'self-relating of the Notion' with this retroactivity. 
Derrida, at one point, concurs with this interpretation, in that he too relates 
Hegelian Reason with retroactivity. He writes: '[T]he truth of Hegelianism [is] 
conceived only at the end of the course, that philosophical narration be produced in the 
future. ,50 In other words, the teleological necessity that works towards the ultimate result 
of philosophical comprehension is merely a retroactive 'result' of that comprehension 
itself. Derrida also asserts that any reading of Hegel that involves a degree of 
biographical narration is un-Hegelian to the extent to which it avoids the circularity of 
the living unity of Hegel's discourse. A reading of Hegel using biographical narration is 
locked in the analytical divisiveness of the Understanding [Verstandj, as opposed to the 
living unity of the circular retroactivity of Hegelian Reason [Vernunft]. Derrida writes: 
[O]ne applies a dissociating and formal analysis, the viewpoint of the 
understanding in a narration that risks missing the living unity of the discourse; 
how does one distinguish philosophically a before from an after, if the circularity 
of the movement makes the beginning the end of the end? And reciprocally? The 
Hegelian tree is also turned over; the old Hegel is the young Hegel's father only 
in order to have been his son, his great-grandson.51 
Hegel's circular retroactivity belies the idea that his is a philosophy of origins. In Glas, 
Derrida relates it to his own critique of origins. The manner of this 'relation' is, of 
course, one of 'proximity' and 'infinitesimal displacement', taking the form of a 
polygraphically parallel positioning of the following quotation about himself with the 
above extract about Hegel on the tri-columnar page in question. He writes: '[E]verything 
is always attacked de dos,jrom the back, written, described from behind. A tergo. I am 
already [deja: also, D.J.] (dead) signifies that I am behind [derriere]. Absolutely behind, 
the Derriere that will have never been seen from the front the Deja that nothing will 
have preceded, which therefore conceived and gave birth to itself .52 The Derridian 
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critique of origins is based on the logic of the 'always already'; there is no origin from 
which we are alienated, we are always already alienated. This is parallel to the Hegelian 
notion that the origin is derived from the end result of the process that it is itself the 
inception of. The auto-productive 'Deja' (that 'gives birth to itself) has no origin, no 
positive given from which it derives; its 'inception', its constant self-conception, is the 
irruption of the pure negativity of the subject as decision, not origin. 
Despite appearances to the contrary, there is no 'origin' in Hegel's system. There 
is no given source, positive and present, from which the Hegelian exposition emanates 
through its externalisation. Hegel's is a philosophy without any presupposition 
[Voraussetzung (pre-ex-position)]. There is no originary foundation that precedes the 
exposition [Aussetzung]. In Hegel's system of circular retroactivity, the 'beginning' that 
is at the same time the 'end' is not an 'origin'; it is not even a beginning if a beginning 
must be something given. It is thus a decision, an irreducibly contingent irruption of 
subjective negativity within the objective positivity of the given. Charles Taylor writes 
of the Hegelian 'beginning' in these terms: '[B]ecause everything that is flows by 
rational necessity out of the first "decision", we cannot really say that Geist is faced with 
any givens. ,53 Jean-Luc Nancy agrees that the Hegelian 'decision' involves no given 
origin: '[E]very beginning in decision is not a beginning: it is an upsurge in the course of 
the given, a rupture, nothing that could be posited as such. ,54 
That the 'beginning' rests on a 'decision' is explained in Hegel's introduction to 
his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. He writes: 
With regard to the beginning that philosophy has to make ... what we have here is 
the free act of thinking putting itself at the standpoint where it is for its own self, 
producing its own object for itself .. Within the Science this standpoint, which in 
this first act appears as immediate, must make itself into the result ... in which it 
reaches its beginning again and returns into itself. In this way, philosophy shows 
itself as a circle that goes back into itself... so that the beginning only has a 
relation to the subject who takes the decision to philosophise, but not to the 
science as such. - Or, to put the same thing another way, the concept of the 
Science and therefore the first concept - which, since it is the first one, contains 
the severance that thinking is object for an (as it were external) philosophising 
subject - must be grasped by the Science itself. This is even its u~ique purpose, 
deed, and goal: to arrive at the Concept of its concept and so to arrIVe at Its return 
[into itself] and contentment.55 
The science has no beginning or end, but it is founded on an extra-scientific decision to 
philosophise, to make thinking the object of thought. The science, to be complete, must 
account for this particular founding decision, must include within itself its own meta-
scientific principle, must theorise, within its own operation, the basis, the conditions of 
possibility of its operativity. It comprehends its non-scientific beginning within itself as 
an end, a result, through a retroactive reconfiguring, or 'transcoding', of its contingent 
starting-point into the end result of a rational and necessary teleological process. Hegel's 
system explicitly theorises its own mode of operation. One of Derrida's common themes 
is that any rational system depends on an irrational decision to be rational, any system of 
meaning depends on a nonsensical decision to make sense, any system of law is founded 
through a non-legal moment of force. Hegel's system demonstrates an explicit 
awareness that this is precisely what it is doing, an awareness it includes within itself as 
a moment of its very systematicity. What Derrida terms the' quasi-transcendental' nature 
of that which eludes and is necessarily suppressed by the system will be discussed in 
detail in a later section. For now, the point is that the Hegelian circle is not an 
expressivist organicism of a retreat and return of the origin. It is not a theory of the loss 
and return of an originary oneness, a theory that characterises a pre-critical metaphysics. 
Rather, Hegelian circular retroactivity is a completion of Kant's critical revolution. 
Hegel expresses this in the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology of Spirit. He 
aIms to radicalise Kant's critical project by superseding the latter's transcendental 
conditions of possibility of knowledge with an immanently self-critical approach. 
Hegel's critique of Kantian critique involves a questioning of the position from which 
knowledge can be known. The investigation into the nature and limits of knowledge 
itself involves a form of knowledge, the nature and limits of which in tum require 
examination. This leads to an infinite regress that demonstrates the ultimate incoherence 
of maintaining a presupposed position of meta-knowledge. Kant's philosophy is caught 
in a performative contradiction whereby his own critical approach to the study of 
knowledge is not itself submitted to critique, and the criteria applied by this approach are 
not applied to the approach itself, or to themselves, and are thus simply presupposed. 
Hegel wishes to investigate knowledge without such presupposed criteria. This is 
achieved by regarding knowledge as self-critical, as immanently engendering its own 
criteria of adequacy. The distinction between knowledge and its object as an 
independently existing thing-in-itself is a distinction which lies within knowledge. It is a 
distinction within consciousness between consciousness of what appears to it to be the 
truth, or the in-itse(f, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. The distinction 
becomes a movement between two moments of consciousness, where there is a change 
in both knowledge and its object. That which was initially taken to be an in-itse(( is then 
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recognised as being merely an in-itself for consciousness, and thus not an in-itse({ at all. 
In this way consciousness itself tests the adequacy of its knowledge, and the criterion of 
this test is itself tested and changed; thus both knowledge and its object undergo a 
transformation. Hegel writes: 
~I]t comes to pass for consciousness that what it previously took to be the in-itself 
IS not an in-itself, or that it was only an in-itself for consciousness. Since 
co~sci~usness thus finds that its knowledge does not correspond to its object, the 
object Itself does not stand the test. .. [T]he testing is not only a testing of what 
we know, but also a testing of the criterion of what knowing is. 56 
In this movement of consciousness the in-itself is not simply replaced by the for-
consciousness, it is shown to have been always already a for-consciousness, through a 
retroactive reconfiguring. Consciousness is not aware that this is what is happening. This 
teleological progression of consciousness through circles of retroactive reconfigurations 
is itself a retroactive reconfiguring of the entire movement of the experience of 
consciousness, imposed from the standpoint of philosophical comprehension, or 
'absolute knowing', which is the position of the narrator of the phenomenological 
discourse, referred to in that discourse as 'us'. Hegel writes: '[T]he new obj ect shows 
itself to have come about through a reversal of consciousness itself. This way of looking 
at the matter is something contributed by us, by means of which the succession of 
experiences through which consciousness passes is raised into a scientific progression -
but it is not known to the consciousness that we are observing. ,57 
Hegel's circular retroactivity has certain implications for the meanmg of 
'alienation' in his works. Zizek argues that 'de-alienation' in Hegel is nothing more than 
a retroactive shift in perspective. He writes: '[T]he Hegelian "loss of the loss" [consists] 
not in the annulment of the loss, not in the reappropriation of the lost object in its full 
presence, but in the experience of how we never had what we have lost' .58 Zizek concurs 
with the interpretation of Hegel that maintains that the de-alienating 'reconciliation' is 
effected through the recognition of inherent alienation, a recognition that alters 
retroactively what was initially an alienating experience. He puts forward, as an example 
of this, the Pauline re-reading of the death of Christ that founds Christianity: '[T]he 
fundamental Hegelian motif[,] "reconciliation"['] does not convey any kind of 
miraculous healing of the wound of scission, it consists solely in a reversal of 
perspective by means of which we perceive how the scission is in itself already 
reconciliation - how, for example, Christ's defeat and infamous death are already in 
themselves reconciliation. ,59 
7.+ 
For Hegel, there is no originary immediacy, or rather, what initailly appears to be 
originary immediacy is shown to be derived and mediated. He writes: 'In the progression 
of the Idea the beginning proves itself to be what it already is in-itself, namely, what is 
posited and mediated and not what simply and immediately is. ,60 In the Science of Logic, 
Hegel argues that the immediacy of the beginning is something grounded retroactively, 
and thus derived, and that such immediacy is merely a provisional hypothesis. He writes: 
[T]he retrogressive grounding of the beginning, and the progressive further 
determining of it, coincide and are the same. The method, which thus winds itself 
into a circle, cannot anticipate in a development in time that the beginning is, as 
such, already something derived; it is sufficient for the beginning in its 
immediacy that it is simple universality. In being that, it has its complete 
condition; and there is no need to deprecate the fact that it may only be accepted 
provisionally and hypothetically.61 
Originary immediacy is also derided in the opening chapter of the Phenomenology, on 
'Sense-Certainty', where the immediate singularity of linguistic demonstratives is shown 
to be already mere abstraction and mediated universality. 62 
Hegel is opposed to any theory of the type exemplified by Rousseau that 
celebrates the primitive condition of natural immediacy. He is also opposed to any 
interpretation of the biblical fall myth on this basis. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion, Hegel attributes to immediacy an ultimately evil self-seeking atomism. 63 He 
interprets the fall myth not as a fall from innocent immediacy, but as a fall into 
immediacy. It is a fall from the pure concept of the human, which is a divine idea in the 
image of God, into an actually existing initially sinful immediate self-consciousness.64 
Immediacy is not an unalienated condition that is later lost. It is itself, in its atomistic 
positivity, a state of alienation, alienation from the living unity of the concrete universal. 
Hegel's system is not an expressivist organicism whereby the oneness of an 
originary immediacy externalises itself and develops teleologically towards an eventual 
return to its oneness. The circular retroactivity of philosophical comprehension 
demonstrates that the originary immediacy is always already derived and mediated. 
Abstract immediacy, like positivity, is a form of alienation. 
Substance and Subject 
It is the power of the negative that overcomes the reified positivity of abstract 
immediacy, a power which is, as we have seen, identical to \vhat Hegel calls 
subjectivity. Hegel writes: "This power [of the negative] is identical with what we earlier 
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called the Subject, which by giving detenninateness an existence in its own element 
supersedes abstract immediacy, i.e. the immediacy which barely is, and thus is authentic 
substance: that being or immediacy whose mediation is not outside of it but which is this 
mediation itself. ,65 This 'authentic substance' is what Hegel calls 'Geist' ('Spirit'). 
substance which is at the same time subject. It is a paradoxical unity of difference, a 
unity that subsists in its very mediatedness, a mediated immediacy. Hegel defines spirit 
thus: '[Spirit is] this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent 
self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and 
independence: "I" that is "We" and "We" that is "1".,66 
This implies a social unity founded on individualism, or at least on the freedom 
of the individual. In the Science of Logic, Hegel asserts the identity of negativity, 
subjectivity, and freedom. He writes: '[T]he negative of the negative... [is] the 
innermost, most objective moment of life and spirit, through which a subject, a person, a 
free being, exists. '" [A]s absolute negativity the negative moment of absolute 
mediation is the unity which is subjectivity and soul. ,67 Stanley Rosen writes of 
Hegelian substance and subject in tenns of social unity and individualism: '[S]ubstance 
(the ethical folk) and subjectivity (individualism), .68 
Substance transfonning itself into subject is conceived as the overcommg of 
alienation. It is spirit knowing itself as spirit, and not as a limited figure, object, or 
representation that is alien to itself. It is the absolute knowing that is the truth and 
overcoming of Christianity. For Hegel, the speculative meaning of the resurrection myth 
is the raising [Aujhebung] of the absolute in the fonn of representation into the absolute 
idea. He writes: 'This Knowing is the inbreathing of the Spirit, whereby Substance 
becomes Subject, by which its abstraction and lifelessness have died, and Substance 
therefore has become actual and simple and universal Self-consciousness .... In this way, 
therefore, Spirit is self-knowing Spirit'. 69 The transfonnation of substance into subject is 
the raising of the object, external and alien in its objectivity, into the Notion, 
paradoxically internalised and actualised in its spiritual comprehensibility, wherein there 
is no longer any distinction between subject and object. Hegel writes: '[Spirit] is in itself 
the movement which is cognition - the transfonnation of that in-itself into that which is 
for-itself, of Substance into Subject, of the object of consciousness into an object of se(f-
d . h N . ,70 consciollsness, i.e. into an object that is just as much supersede , or mto t e Otr017. 
The overcoming of the religious representational fonn of reconciliation by the genuine 
fonn of reconciliation in the self-comprehending Notion is the entering into the 
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actualised world of self-knowing spirit, a 'spiritual daylight of the present,7! that spirit 
knows as its own self. Hegel writes: 'Not until consciousness has given up hope of 
overcoming that alienation [Fremdseyn] in an external, i.e. alien, manner does it turn to 
itself, because the overcoming of that alienation is the return into self-consciousness· not 
, 
until then does it turn to its own present world and discover it as its property,.72 
Lukacs bases his critique of Hegelian reconciliation on its subjectivism, its 
transfonnation of substance into subject. He recognises that, for Hegel, the alienated 
realm of positivity is a realm of mere substance, devoid of the living activity of 
subjectivity, and that the overcoming of this realm necessitates an awakening of the 
subject within substance. He refers to alienation as 'subjectivity devoured by substance 
(positivity)' and reconciliation as the 'reintegration of substance in the newly-awakened 
subject. ,73 However, in his other fonnulations of Hegelian reconciliation he tends to 
ignore the role of substance, as if the awakening of the subject involves the abolition of 
substance. He interprets Hegelian de-alienation as the assertion of subjectivism at the 
expense of the abolition of objective reality. He writes that this de-alienation involves 
'the abolition of the object-world along with "externalization". ,74 For Lukacs, de-
alienation as absolute knowing is nothing but a subjectivist mysticism. He writes: '[T]he 
identical subject-object of absolute idealism, the return of absolute spirit from its total 
alienation in nature and its partial alienation in history to the perfected knowledge of 
itself, is ultimately nothing other than the absorption of all objectivity into the mystified 
subject which has allegedly created it: viz. the annulment of all objectivity.'75 Lukacs 
regards Hegelian de-alienation as an ultimate retreat into subjective idealism, a retreat 
from the objective idealism that led Hegel to take into account the importance of society 
and history in much of his system. According to Lukacs, Hegel's absolute knowing is an 
'attempt to abolish reality's character as real, to transmute objectivity into something 
posited by the subject and into an identity of subject and object, in short to complete the 
transfonnation of substance into subject. ,76 
Certainly, for Hegel, objectivity, which is the same as externality and positivity, 
IS posited by the subject, is an externalisation of the subject, is the subject's self-
positing. But the subject itself, the subject to which Hegel refers, is not a positive being; 
it is not the individual. Hegel writes: '[T]he living Substance is being which is in truth 
Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of 
positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as 
Subject, pure, simple negativity'. 77 The Hegelian subject is the truth of substance, or, as 
r: 
we have seen, it is 'authentic substance'. Authentic substance is substance that is aware 
of its own self-positing nature, its non-pre-givenness. This is what Hegel means by its 
subjectivity. The subject is the negative activity of substance itself, what makes it 'living 
Substance'. The full awakening of the subject in absolute knowing is not therefore the 
abolition of substance. It is the abolition of the objectivity of substance, an objectiyity 
which is nothing but substance posited as separate from and external to the positing 
subject. This abolition of objectivity means that substance itself is the subject, and vice 
versa. Thus the living authenticity of substance supersedes the dead positivity of pseudo-
substance. The idea that the absolute cannot be absolute if it is an object opposed to a 
subject, that it would thus be merely partial and relative, that it must be apprehended 
directly as the absolute subject in order to be truly absolute, is the major theme of 
German Idealism, whether in its Schellingian or Hegelian form. 
Living substance, substance that is at the same time subject, is precisely what 
Hegel calls Geist ('Spirit'). The de-alienated condition of absolute knowing is 'Spirit 
that knows itself as Spirit,.78 Spirit [Geist] is a social and collective conception of the 
mind, therefore its 'subjectivity' is not that of the individual. Lukacs, however, regards 
the Hegelian notion of absolute knowing as an 'internalization [ErinnerungJ' of the 
objectivity that came about through the subject's 'externalization', a reintegration into 
the subject conceived as the overcoming of all externality through an interiorising 
reappropriation. He writes: 
According to Hegel, spirit has created the real objects of the world in the process 
of "externalization". It is only logical for the reverse process of "internalization" 
to be nothing other than the supersession of the forms of objective reality so 
created, and their reintegration into the subject. 
The highest stage of spirit in the Phenomenology is designated absolute 
knowledge as opposed to religion because it alone clearly and unambiguously 
expresses this principle, whereas religion... still retains a certain element of 
obj ectivity[.] 79 
Lukacs's interpretation of absolute knowing on the basis of internality is misleading. 
The absolute supersedes the opposition between inner and outer. It does not, therefore, 
make sense to describe it in terms of the abolition of the outer and the affirmation of the 
inner. As absolute knowing is 'Spirit that knows itself as Spirit', it is the self-knowing of 
a supra-individual collectivity. Hegel asserts that spirit must not be understood in terms 
of internality. He writes: 'Spirit .. .is not what is inner, but what is actual. ,80 Spirit is 
manifest relationality, relational because manifest; it subsists in its intrinsic relationality, 
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and is thus both substance and subject, substance founded on negative activit\·. on the 
productive nothingness that is the subject. 
Although it is a precondition for the differentiating unity of a society that 
respects the freedom of the individual, the Hegelian subject is not the self. Conflating the 
subject with the self involves ignoring Hegel's own definition of the subject as pure 
negative activity, and maintaining a non-Hegelian, even pre-philosophical use of the 
term. Jean-Luc Nancy writes: 
The Hegelian subject is not to be confused with subjectivity as a separate and 
one-sided agency for synthesizing representations, nor with subjectivity as the 
exclusive interiority of a personality .... In a word: the Hegelian subject is in no 
way the self all to itself. It is, to the contrary, ... what ... dissolves all substance -
every instance already given, supposed first or last, founding or final, capable of 
coming to rest in itself. .. The reader of Hegel who does not understand this ... 
has surreptitiously presupposed an ideological notion of the "subject" - a notion 
that is nonphilosophical, individualist, egoist, and "liberal,,[.]81 
The subject that is negative activity is not itself a self, is not itself substantial. It is the 
self-positing and self-dissolution of substance. However, it only 'dissolves all substance' 
if substance is conceived in terms of pre-given positivity. As we have seen, Hegel 
redefines substance at a higher level as 'authentic substance', manifest and living 
substance, manifest and living through the work of its own inherent subjectivity. 
Thus Lukacs's interpretation of absolute knowing in terms of a 'reintegration into 
the subject' of objectivity is also misleading. Nothing can be 'reintegrated' into the 
subject if the subject is the very principle of disintegration. The subject is the negativity 
of substance, therefore it is nothing but the inability of substance to remain identical to 
itself in a simple unity or immediacy. Hegel writes: '[The] negative ... is ... the disparity 
of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside of it. .. is really its own 
doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. ,82 Zizek puts it in these 
words: 'The Subject is nothing but the gap in the Substance, the inadequacy of the 
Substance to itself. 83 This self-division is what raises substance into spirit, an 'authentic 
substance', living and manifest, that subsists in its very division, its productive 
disintegration. Nancy writes: 
The subject is ... the expenence of its being-affected as the ordeal of what 
dissolves its subsistence. But... it is not "some thing"... that undoes this 
subsistence from the exterior. It is not another subsistence that divides the 
subject it is substance that divides itself - that enters into relation, or that opens 
itself to it, or that manifests itself. The subject is the experience of the power of 
division, of ex-position or the abandonment of self. 84 
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The fact that the Hegelian subject is the negativity within substance that disables 
substance from being identical to itself undermines the claim of the early Derrida that 
the concept of the subject has always, in the history of philosophy, referred to a self-
present substantial being. 85 
The transformation of substance into subject, the awakening of spirit in its self-
knowing, is Hegel's conception of de-alienation. Through the subject, the productive 
negativity of the non-identical self-dissolution of substance, substance itself is actualised 
into the open, exposed, living, manifest relationality and collectivity of spirit, a unity in 
difference that is substance at the same time as it is subject. Authentic substance, 
manifest spirit, is the concrete universal, a genuine universality that depends on the 
productive indeterminacy, the free determinability that is the subject. The very 
contentlessness of the subject makes it both genuinely universal and irreducibly singular 
at the same time. The subject is negative universality in that it evades its own 
particularisation in any determinate content. Such an evasion is also the basis of its 
irreducible singularity, as its particularisation would involve the attribution of generally 
applicable predicates. In the Science of Logic Hegel writes: 
[T]he I is ... pure self-related unity... only as making abstraction from all 
determinateness and content and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted 
equality with itself. As such it is universality; a unity that is unity with itself only 
through its negative attitude... [T]he I as self-related negativity is no less 
immediately individuality [Einzelheit] or is absolutely determined... This 
absolute universality which is also immediately an absolute individualization 
[Vereinzelung] ... constitutes the nature of the 1[. ]86 
The subject's absence of determination is the condition of both its 'absolute 
determination', the emptiness of its mere numerical identity, and its 'absolute 
universality', its unlimited non-specificity. Its universality depends on its bare 
singularity and vice versa. The two must be thought in their mediated unity. Zizek 
explains: 'On the one hand, subject is pure negative universality: an identity-with-itself 
which "repels" ... all its determinate content ... ; yet on the other hand, "I" ... is the very 
opposite of universal self-identity: a vanishing point, the "other-of-itself' eluding every 
determination - in other words, a point of pure singularity. ,87 
This mediated unity of supposed opposites is the basis of the concrete universal. 
the unity in difference of absolute spirit. The subject is the ex-position of substance that 
enables it to break free from the reified positivity of abstraction, whether particular or 
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universal, and enter into a state of open and living relationality, a paradoxical unity of 
irreducible singularities, open and exposed to the singular otherness of each other. 
Appropriation of the Other 
However, the relation to otherness in Hegel's system often appears to take the form of a 
violent assimilative appropriation, a reduction and domestication of the other to a 
moment in the economy of the same. For example, Hegel conceives of self-
consciousness as 'Desire in general', the abolition of the otherness of what is other and 
the realisation of itself as the other's underlying reality.88 According to Derrida, Hegel's 
system is a 'restricted economy' where nothing can remain unassimilated by the 
appropriative logic of the dialectic; the other is always ultimately appropriated by the 
same and cannot subsist in its own irreducible alterity.89 A primordial form of the 
relation to otherness is the dialectic of recognition. The 're' of recognition suggests the 
abolition of the uniterable singular alterity of the other. Derrida writes: 'A pure 
singularity can recognize another singularity only in abolishing itself or in abolishing the 
other as singularity. ,90 Recognition involves an encounter with another self-
consciousness. Only in such an encounter is self-consciousness actualised as self-
consciousness. This is because in self-consciousness the object of the self is the self 
itself, a unity in difference of subject and object that can only genuinely occur through 
an encounter with an object that is at the same time a subject, i.e. another self-
consciousness. Self-consciousness is actualised through the recognition of another self-
consciousness; recognition of the other is at the same time recognition of the self. Hegel 
writes: 'A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-
consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become 
explicit for it. ,91 The self only recognises itself through seeing itself in the other. Hegel 
writes: '[I]ts essential being is present to it in the form of an "other", it is outside of itself 
and must rid itself of its self-externality.,92 The self is ultimately constituted in its proper 
element through the internalisation and appropriation of the other. 
This 'appropriation' of the other, however, is not a reduction of the other to the 
self; it is, rather, an awakening of the other as other within the self itself. Hegel writes 
that consciousness as reason 'seeks its "other", knowing that therein it possesses nothing 
else but itself: it seeks only its own infinitude. ,93 If the self is itself at the same time as 
being an other, it ceases to be enclosed within the simple static exclusionary positiyity of 
an abstract finite identity. This is a reduction of the other to the self only insofar as it is 
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also a reduction of the self to the other. Jean-Luc Nancy regards it one-sidedly in tenns 
of the latter. He writes: ' [A ]ppropriation of the other. .. is of the other as other. Which 
means that, in appropriating the other to myself, I do just the opposite of a taking of 
possession or an assimilation. I do not reduce the other to the same; it is, rather, the same 
- the one-sided, closed-off, and "despotic" "ego" - that makes itself other. ,94 Derrida 
concedes that Hegelian 'appropriation' can be read in both ways, as assimilation or loss. 
He writes: 'The logic of the Aufhebung (re)turns itself at each instant into its absolute 
other. Absolute appropriation is absolute expropriation. Onto-logic can always be reread 
or rewritten as the logic of loss or of spending without reserve. ,95 
The appropriation of the other involves the awakening of infinite alterity within 
the self itself, as well as the ex-position of both the self and the other, and their entering 
into the manifest relationality of actuality. Appropriation as the opening onto 
relationality is a necessary condition of the otherness of the other. The 'other' IS an 
essentially relational concept. It would not be an 'other' if it were not the other of 
something that is not other, i.e. the self. Concomitantly, the self, to be properly itself in 
its relational actuality, must be, at the same time, an other. In the Science of Logic, Hegel 
writes: 
[T]he mediating detennination ... in its truth ... is a relation or relationship; for it 
is the negative, but the negative of the positive, and includes the positive within 
itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is 
indifferent - in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -
rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its 
own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of 
. lf96 ztse . 
The appropriation that the very otherness of the other involves is the ex-position that is 
the condition of relationality. The occurence of the other brings the abstract reified 
positivity of the self out into its relational actuality. For Hegel, self-recognition and self-
consciousness only come about through the intervention of the other, through the self 
being at the same time an other. The other is this very intervention, not an abstract 
absolute externality. 
Thus the phrase, 'its own other', indicates that the appropriation of the other is 
the occurrence of alterity in the constitution of the proper, the proper element of the self, 
its 'truth', being its actualisation into the living relationality of spirit, a relationality 
dependent on the ex-position of the self through the infection of alterity. Appropriation 
is not then a violent assimilation of the other, but an opening to it. Nancy writes: 'The 
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move out of self is ... the appropriation of the other. .. which, as my other, is the infinite 
alterity, in me,.97 This infusion of alterity enables the self to become truly itself in the 
'spiritual daylight' of actuality, freed from the dead positivity of abstract givenness, 
alive in its 'truth', its proper element, which is the identity in difference that Hegel calls 
'spirit', or what Nancy calls the 'community of negativity' .98 For Hegel, the proper itself 
comes about only through the occurrence and appropriation of alterity. In Glas, Derrida 
explains it in this way: 'The "its other" is the very syntagm of the Hegelian proper' .99 
The Transcendental Remainder 
The main theme of Derrida's study of Hegel, Glas, is the 'remainder', which is that 
which cannot be assimilated into the system. He wishes to pay attention to that which 
cannot be domesticated by any system of thought, and to demonstrate that Hegel's all-
inclusive totality depends on exclusion. The system understands itself as an all-inclusive 
infinite totality from which nothing can be excluded; all non-rational non-systemic 
singularities, alterities and diversitities are regarded as negativity, and are thus co-opted 
as moments in the system and its self-reproduction. Derrida contends that not only is 
there an unassimilated remainder that is unconsciously repressed and excluded by the 
system, but also that this exclusion of the remainder is necessary for the system's very 
constitution. Derrida writes: 'Isn't there always an element excluded from the system 
that assures the system's space of possibility? The transcendental has always been, 
strictly, a transcategorial, what could be received, formed, terminated in none of the 
categories intrinsic to the system. The system's vomit. '\00 The exclusion of the 
remainder is the transcendental condition of possibility of the system. 
As we have seen, Hegel's system is put forward as a supersession of the Kantian 
philosophy of the transcendental conditions of possibility of knowledge, replacing it 
with an immanently self-critical approach that avoids getting caught in the performative 
contradiction entailed by the transcendental position of meta-knowledge. For Derrida, 
however the excluded remainder is the transcendental limit and condition of possibility , 
of Hegelian knowledge. Hegel's critique of Kant involves the argument that it is self-
contradictory to claim that there are ultimate limits to knowledge, because knowledge of 
a limit of knowledge is already the limit's overcoming. 101 However, the limit that the 
excluded remainder constitutes is not included within Hegelian knowledge; it is 
unknowingly repressed. The Hegelian systemic totality regards itself as unlimited, 
infinite and all-inclusive, whereas Derrida regards the system's self-knowledge as 
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unconsciously repressmg its own structural and textual operations that necessarily 
involve exclusion and restriction. Any systemic totality can only be constituted through 
what it excludes; an 'infinite totality' is thus a contradiction in terms. One of Derrida' s 
commentators, Rodolphe Gasche, writes: 'For structural reasons, there is always more 
than totality; the extra valence added by the delegate of the asemic space of diacritical 
differentiation of the totality of semes always - infinitely - remains to be accounted 
for.,102 
There is not always more than the Hegelian totality in that it is infinite, or rather, 
the 'always more than' is its very structure. However, Hegel's 'infinite' is the all-
inclusivity of his system's meaningfulness, whereas Gasche's Derridian 'infinite' is not 
of the order of meaning; it is 'asemic', and thus a structural category that necessarily 
undermines the operations of exclusion that occur in the formation of any meaningful 
closed totality and identity. A meaningful open totality and infinite identity, such as 
Hegel's speculative system, have to be demonstrated to be in reality closed and finite 
before the deconstructive infinite can undermine their closure. The notion of 'infinity' 
will be explored in detail in the next section. What is of concern here is the proximity of 
Hegel and Derrida in their treatment of the excluded remainder. 
Gasche argues that the remainder must be conceived as a 'quasi-transcendental' 
condition of possibility and impossibility of the system, and not one of the system's 
dialectical moments. Its transcendentality is 'quasi-' because it is not semantic, but 
'asemic' and 'infrastructural'. It is a condition of both possibility and impossibility, 
because the systemic totality not only comes to be through the exclusion of the 
unassimilable remainder, but also ultimately fails to operate as a systemic totality, fails 
to become identical with itself, because the unknowingly repressed remainder comes 
back to haunt the system as an undermining and disabling element. According to 
Gasche, this remainder cannot have the form of immediacy or mere being, as these do 
not elude the system, but constitute its first moment. 103 He also concedes that it makes 
no sense to speak of a remainder to the Hegelian absolute, as the absolute is by 
definition that which is without remainder, or as he puts it, 'the Absolute is sublated 
remainder, the remaining totality of all remains.' 104 
The remainder cannot remain as remainder if it is conceived as simply outside 
the system. A not yet systematised immediacy will always already have been integrated 
into the system as the system's starting point, whereupon it will immanently show itself 
to have always already been its own opposite. A simple outside of the system cannot 
help but become the system's speculative other, and thus one of the system's essential 
moments. A genuine non-assimilable remainder must therefore remain as that which 
within the system eludes the system. The system necessarily presents itself by means of 
a written text, and the materiality of the writing always exceeds the restricted economy 
of its idealisation as system. The critical and analytical operation of deconstruction aims 
to highlight what, within the textual exposition of the system, both eludes the system 
and, in this very elusion, functions as central to the system's constitution, rendering the 
system possible and impossible at the same time. Deconstruction does not simply 
pinpoint, from an exterior standpoint, that which the system simultaneously excludes 
and depends on; it operates immanently and parasitically within the text, with a strategy 
of repeating, doubling, re-marking and parodying the moments of the system, so as to 
prevent the system from ossifying into a closed totalised mechanism. Only in this way 
can the remainder remain genuinely unassimilated, not as an abstract uncolonised non-
identity that will always already have been co-opted. 
However, only a reductionist interpretation that overlooks Hegel's fundamental 
concepts of negativity and infinity could ever have regarded the system as a closed 
totalised mechanism anyway. The notion of the excluded remainder working as a 
condition of the institution of a positive system that can never ultimately come to rest in 
an exclusionary positivity is remarkably close to Hegel's depiction of negativity. As we 
have seen, Derrida concedes that the proximity of deconstruction and Hegelianism is 
'almost absolute', and that the logic of the Aujhebung can always be read as a 
deconstructive 'logic of loss'. Indeed, the Aujhebung does constitute the loss of the 
positive plenitude of abstract givenness and the founding of an identity in difference that 
maintains the infinity of living contradiction, the subsisting effectivity of paradox and 
aporIa. 
In Glas, Derrida comments on the all-burning fire of the religion of light, 
discussed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit, as a repressed and excluded 
remainder that makes the system possible and impossible. It is a play of light, without 
essence, self, identity or time. It thus cannot be a temporal moment in the process of the 
constitution of self and the speculative identity of spirit that Hegel's system describes. 
But Hegel insists that it must bum itself out and become 'for-itself .105 Derrida regards 
this Hegelian 'must' as 'the implacable force of sense, of mediation, of the hard-working 
negative. ,106 For Derrida, this is the 'must' of force, not logical necessity. The 'force of 
sense' is the senseless beginning of sense. This senseless force is the senseless decision 
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to make sense. However, as we have seen, Hegel is fully aware that his system begins 
with a founding decision, not a given origin. Nevertheless, for Hegel, the all-burning 
burns itself out due to its own logic. The essenceless play of light is essence less because 
in its all-burning nature it constantly ceases to be what it is. The blaze itself must be 
consumed and cease to be a blaze, or, as Derrida puts it, 'If you want to burn all, you 
must also consume the blaze, avoid keeping [garder] it alive as a precious presence . .107 
For Hegel, this is the negation of the selfless from which the self arises. He writes 
regarding the all-burning light: 'The immediate being ... is itself the negative power 
which dissolves its distinctions. It is thus in truth the Self. 108 The pre-systemic, 
essenceless flux will always already have been negativity, the force which dissolves all 
distinct entities, but which is the very motor of the system's development and self-
reproduction. It is in the nature of the Hegelian system that the pre-systemic be the not-
yet-systemic, or the systemic-to-be, that will always already have been systemic. For the 
all-burning to be irreducibly what it is, it must, of necessity, burn itself out and become 
the first moment of the system; otherwise it would be reified as a sacred 'precious 
presence', thus losing its constantly changing essenceless nature. Gasche remarks: 
'[W]hat "jams it [the system] inconceivably" is also what confirms the implacable force 
of the hard-working negative.' 109 The remainder undermines and confirms the system at 
the same time. However, it is of the very nature of the Hegelian system to reaffirm 
through undermining, and for all confirmations to undermine themselves. A 
deconstructive parodic undermining through confirmation, a strategy not far removed 
from the dialectic of Socratic irony, barely differs from the operation of the Hegelian 
dialectic itself, the difference being infinitesimal, a rhetorical inflection that hardly 'jams 
the system'. The fact that Derrida describes the undialecticised all-burning remainder as 
a 'precious presence' , a phrase that usually describes the principle target of 
deconstruction, indicates that the proximity of deconstruction and the Hegelian dialectic 
is such as to make them indistinguishable in this instance at least, the Aujhebung of the 
remainder here being the deconstruction of presence. 
Another case of an 'excluded remainder' discussed in Glas is the nature of the 
relationship between sister and brother as portrayed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. For 
Hegel, this is a relationship of peace and equilibrium, devoid of the struggle for 
recognition and self-recognition, of the antagonistic mutual dependency characteristic of 
other human relationships, the archetype being the dialectic of master and slave. Hegel 
writes: '[Brother and sister] do not desire one another, nor have they given to, or 
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received from, one another this independent being-for-self; on the contrary, they are free 
individualities in regard to each other.' 110 The conflictual mutual recognition that is the 
precondition of self-recognition is absent from the relationship of brother and sister. 
Derrida suggests that the uniqueness of this relationship contradicts the whole of the 
Hegelian system. Derrida writes: ' [A] symmetrical relation that needs no reconciliation 
to appease itself, that does not know the horizon of war, the infinite wound, 
contradiction, negativity. Is that the inconceivable? What the greater logic cannot 
assimilate?' III It is an unalienated relationship, taking the form of diversity and 
immediacy, as opposed to contradiction and mediation, which cannot coherently 
participate in a system of alienation and reconciliation. 
However, it does participate in Hegel's text, III his phenomenological, 
comprehensively rational description of the process of the development of spirit. In this 
narrative, it provides a prefiguration of the state of 'justice' in the realm of the ethical 
life [Sittlichkeit] of the community. Here the word 'justice' simply refers to balance and 
equilibrium, in this case a balance and equilibrium between the realms of 'divine law' 
and 'human law'. For Hegel, the term 'divine law' refers to the hidden realm of private 
life and singularity, which is the preserve of the feminine principle, and the term 'human 
law' refers to the outside realm of social life and universality, which is the preserve of 
the masculine principle. The brother-sister relationship is a figuration that symbolises a 
relationship between feminine and masculine, of 'divine' and 'human', of singular and 
universal, devoid of a desire that has the form of the mutually antagonistic dependency 
of contradiction. It is thus a resolution of the conflict between feminine and masculine, 
an interpersonal Aufhebung that prefigures the social Aufhebung of the conflict between 
'divine' and 'human' law in the harmony and equilibrium of the ethical social order of 
this stage of spirit. This ethical order is described by Hegel in the following way: 'The 
ethical realm is ... an immaculate world, a world unsullied by any internal dissension.' 112 
To suggest, as Derrida does, that the absence of contradiction in the brother-sister 
relationship itself contradicts the Hegelian system is to suggest the same of this 
harmonious ethical realm, as well as all other cases of non-contradictory harmony or 
diverse immediacy. However, the equilibrium of the ethical realm is temporary and new 
contradictions arise through the act of the individual insinuating its negativity. Neither 
non-contradictory harmony nor diverse immediacy lie outside the system; they are 
essential moments of the system, and as moments are inherently transient. Contradiction 
and the resolution of contradiction constitute change, the movement bet\veen these 
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moments. Diverse immediacy, which is difference that does not enter into contradiction 
, 
cannot 'contradict the system' if it is to remain non-contradictory diversity. It must, 
however, be overcome, and become embroiled in contradiction and mediation if it is to 
, 
enter into the relationality of spiritual actuality, as opposed to the mere indifference of 
juxtaposition, devoid of the effectivity of intervention. 
Zizek argues that the constitutive nature of the excluded remainder is 
fundamental to Hegel's system itself, and not merely a systemic oversight. His example 
is Hegel's portrayal of constitutional monarchy in the Philosophy of Right. This is a 
system in which the monarch is the irrational constitutive exception to a rational social 
totality. The monarch is excluded from the system of law, of equality before the law, of 
relations of exchange, of the restricted economy of meaningful mediation, and in her 
very exclusion she makes this system possible. She is an an-economic immediacy, in 
that her position is entirely based on biological lineage, on the natural and non-rational 
body, and in that she guarantees the system of law through the irreducibly decisionistic 
'1 will' behind the meaningless empty formality of the royal signature. 113 Zizek writes: 
'[The monarch] constitutes the Whole of the social fabric in its "organic articulation" 
[organische Gliederung] - the "irrational" surplus as a condition of the rational 
totality' .114 This negative effectivity of the excluded remainder is a basic element of 
Hegelian logic. Zizek further writes: 
The Monarch is a strange body within the fabric of the State; he remains 
"unaccounted for" by rational mediation. However, precisely as such, he is the 
element through which rational totality constitutes itself. '" In other words, what 
the Derridean "deconstruction" brings out after a great struggle and declares to 
be the inherent limit of the dialectical mediation - the point at which the 
movement of the Aufhebung necessarily fails - Hegel posits directly as the 
. I f h' t liS cruCta moment 0 t IS movemen . 
Whatever the validity of Hegel's account of constitutional monarchy, it is clear that he 
regards the non-rational excluded remainder as constitutive of, and essential to, any 
rational totality. An-economic immediacy will always already have become the power of 
negativity within the system. He describes this effectivity of the remainder as 'truly 
speculative in its nature' and as belonging to 'logic,.116 
It does not make sense to speak of an excluded remainder to the Hegelian system, 
because the system is not a closed mechanism. The word 'system' simply refers to a 
thinking together, a thinking of things in their interconnectedness and relationality. As 
we have seen, a closed system would involve the machinations of positive substance. 
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without the dislocating power of negativity, the irruption of irreducible contingency and 
singular alterity that is the subject. Hegel's system is an attempt to think the effects of 
negativity within substance. There is nothing to say about the brute existence or mere 
being of indifferent diversity unless it comes to intervene in, and thus dislocate, a closed 
totality, unless, that is, it acts as negativity. Derrida himself is critical of thinkers, such 
as Georges Bataille, who make reference to an absolute outside of the restricted 
economy of discourse. For Derrida, the unassimilated remainder must intervene within 
discourse, dislocating and undermining it immanently. This is the very way that the 
Hegelian system 'assimilates', or rather, infects itself with, the so called remainder. Of 
course, as we have seen, Derrida allows that Hegelianism can be interpreted in two 
ways, on the basis of a traditional notion of assimilation, or, alternatively, on a 
deconstructive basis. The claim that Hegel's system is exclusionary depends on the view 
that it is ultimately closed and finite. 
Actual Infinity 
Hegel's system is a critique of all limitation and finitude. The form of a teleological 
narrative that reaches completion implies closure, but in this case the 'completion' is the 
knowing of the absolute that dissolves all finitude and closure. Hegel's system, and the 
meaning of its very systematicity, rests on the idea stated in the preface to the 
Phenomenology that 'the True is the Whole.' 117 This statement means that the true, or 
the absolute, is nothing particular or finite. The 'whole' is not an exclusive totality that 
could be compared to other exclusive totalities, which would just be a big particular 
finitude. It is the dissolution and overcoming of all finitude. The absolute manifests itself 
negatively; it cannot be represented in the positivity of a finite figure. Thus all 
determinate claims to absolute truth are demonstrated to be false, or mere transient 
moments. Hegel's system is a critique of false absolutism. It differs from any critical 
relativism in that its critique is based on the insinuation and manifestation of the absolute 
within the finite, effecting the latter's dissolution. Jean-Luc Nancy writes: 'What is 
asked of thought ... is ... to not give up on the inscription of the absolute in the present, 
such that no present ... is absolutized.' 118 The absolute is the force of the negative that 
overcomes all finitude. The absolute, to be absolute and unconditional, cannot be 
defined in opposition to anything else, cannot be bounded or finite. For Hegel, the form 
of the absolute, and of his speculative system in general, is the infinite. This is the 
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infinite not as something abstract and unattainable, but as concrete, living. actual and 
effective. 
Hegel distinguishes between two types of infinity, the 'bad', or 'spurious', 
infinite and the 'true' infinite. The 'bad infinite' refers to an endless progress, or regress, 
that implies completion in an unattainable beyond; a merely potential infinite that Hegel 
characterises as the perennial and ultimately unrealisable 'ought' of a religious 
yearning. 119 In Hegel's work, the word schlechte (translated as 'bad' or 'spurious') 
means the same as 'abstract', or something that is one-sided, that is not mediated 
through its other, and thus remains trapped in its own finitude. This infinite stands in 
opposition to its other, the finite. It is thus limited and therefore itself finite. Hegel 
writes: 'The finite reappears in the infinite itself as its other, because it is only in its 
connection with its other, the finite, that the infinite is ... The infinity of the infinite 
progress remains burdened with the finite as such, is thereby limited and is itself 
finite.,120 The 'bad infinite', abstract and one-sided in its absolute opposition to the 
finite, is implicated in an equally abstract and one-sided treatment of finitude. Hegel 
writes: '[T]he spurious [schlechte] infinite, held fast as only negative ... is supposed to 
be unattainable ... which is at bottom the result of holding fast to the finite as such as a 
merely affirmative being.' 121 Abstract infinity and abstract finitude are two sides of the 
same coin; the former, whether a religious yearning for an unattainable beyond or the 
endless slippage and deferral of literal meaning of a Romantic or 'postmodern' irony, is 
implicated in the latter, a positivist empiricism that restricts knowledge to isolated facts 
that are not regarded as inherently related in a wider whole. 
What Hegel calls 'die wahrhafte Unendlichkeit' ('the true infinite') is the self-
overcoming of all finitude and one-sidedness. It is not opposed to the finite, but is the 
self-mediation and interpenetration of the finite and infinite. It contains the finite within 
itself and is itself contained within the finite. It is truly infinite and unlimited, because it 
is not opposed to anything other than itself, but is beyond all opposition, containing the 
whole process of opposition and limitation within itself. In the 'true infinite' the finite 
does not subsist as the isolated entity of positivism, but is a self-negating and dissolving 
moment in a relational totality. Hegel writes that in the 'true infinite' the finite 'is not an 
independent, self-subsistent being, but only a moment.' 122 The 'true infinite' is the self-
ex -position of the finite. Hegel describes it as the very nature of his speculative dialectic, 
which immanently overcomes finitude and enables the manifestation of a wider whole. 
He writes: 
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[T]he specific nature of speculative thought... consists solely in grasping the 
opposed moments in their unity. Each moment actually shows that it contains its 
opposite within itself and that in this opposite it is united with itself; thus the 
affirmative truth is this immanently active unity, the taking together of both 
thoughts, their infinity - the relation to self which is not immediate but 
infinite. 123 
It is this form of comprehension, one which overcomes the limits of a thought and sees 
its immanent and infinitely mediated unity with its other and in this way sees beyond the 
one-sidedness of any finite dogmatic assertion, that is Hegel's conception of 'Reason 
[Vernunft]' . The immanently active unity of opposites goes beyond the finite 
decidability of the law of non-contradiction, affirming the infinite undecidability of 
intrinsically exposed and manifest relationality, which takes the form of impossible 
paradox only to the limited consciousness of the chained-to-finitude analytical 
'Understanding [VerstandJ'. 
For Hegel, the infinite is the true nature of the finite. The finite is only finite 
through being opposed to an other, the other thus being intrinsic to the finite's very 
subsistence; its limit, the absolute otherness of its other, is thus overcome in its very 
constitution. Hegel writes regarding the finite: '[l]t is its nature to be related to itself as 
limitation ... and to transcend the same, or rather, as self-relation to have negated the 
limitation and to be beyond it. ... [T]he finite is only this, through its own nature to 
become itself the infinite ... Thus the finite has vanished in the infinite and what is, is 
only the infinite.' 124 The finite will always already have been the infinite. It is ultimately 
false, a reified atomistic abstraction, the abstraction of dead positivity. The genuine 
infinite, the infinite restlessness that is the essential nature of the finite, is identified with 
'Life' in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel writes: '[In] [t]he determination of Life ... 
[eJssence is infinity as the supersession of all distinctions ... its self-repose being an 
absolutely restless infinity' .125 
The 'true infinite' is infinite in that it has no other, and it has no other precisely 
because it is itself the opening to the other. Hegel writes: '[T]he genuine Infinite ... 
consists ... in remaining at home with itself in its other, or. .. in coming to itself in its 
other.,126 He further comments: '[I]n its passing into another, something only comes 
together with itself; and this relation to itself in the passing and in the other is genuine 
Infinity. ,127 The 'true infinite' thus involves openness to alterity, and not the annihilation 
of all the remains of otherness through its appropriating all-inclusiveness. 
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Derrida, however, maintains that the latter is the true nature of the Hegelian 
infinite. He regards it as the abolition of all alterity and the absolute dominion of the 
metaphysics of presence. Interpreting Hegel, Derrida writes: 'The destruction of 
singularity must leave no remain(s), no empiric or singular remain(s). It must be total 
and infinite.' 128 The 'true infinite' is thus the name of the destruction of all singular 
alterity qua singular alterity through the active actuality of the all-encompassing, 
limitlessly appropriating, speculative identity. Actual infinity is absolute presence, the 
annihilation of all trace of singular alterity. According to Derrida, Hegelian absolute 
spirit is infinite in that it is a self-knowing and self-presence without exteriority. He 
describes it as 'the infinite of a knowing that, as infinite, no longer has any exteriority, 
thus knows itself, becomes present to itself. Presence (Dasein) that knows itself since it 
is infinite and has no outside'. 129 Thus Derrida regards the Hegelian manifestation of the 
absolute in absolute knowing in the form of genuine infinity as involving the arrival of 
parousia, the absolute presence of the fullness ofbeing. 13o In the Science of Logic, Hegel 
himself appears to characterise the 'true infinite' in terms of full presence and absolute 
closure. He writes: '[T]he image of the true infinity, bent back into itself, becomes the 
circle, the line which has reached itself, which is closed and wholly present, without 
b .. d d ,131 egznmng an en . 
Derrida claims that the 'true infinity' of absolute knowing involves the abolition 
of all exteriority and thus an infinite internalisation. As we have seen, Lukacs makes the 
same claim, arguing that absolute knowing is the ultimate internalisation [Erinerrung] , 
an integration of all external objectivity into the subject. We argued that at this point the 
notion of internalisation is misleading as the absolute overcomes the distinction between 
inner and outer, it being Hegel's view that spirit is 'actual' and not 'inner'. The circle 
image demonstrates that the 'true infinite' constitutes the self-relation of speculative 
identity, an identity that returns to itself through the other, and is only constituted 
through this return. Without the return, the circular bending back to the self, the infinite 
would entail the ultimate loss of identity. The circle demonstrates that the infinite is 
actual and not an unattainable beyond. The latter is the 'bad infinite' and is represented 
by a straight line that goes on forever. As the end of the line can never be reached, it is a 
potential infinite. The circle thus represents the actuality of the 'true infinite', hence its 
'presence'. The non-presence of the 'bad infinite' involves the supposition of an 
absolute distinction between the infinite as unattainable, as non-actual non-identity, and 
the finite as a simply positive exclusionary identity. In contrast, the speculative identity 
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is infinite, in that it maintains itself while containing its other within itself. This is the 
infinite intervening in the finite, actual and effective, as opposed to the non-actual and 
ineffectual subjectivist neutrality of the spurious infinite. The circle image makes sense 
only if it is understood as an image of genuine infinity as opposed to the unending 
straight line of spurious infinity. Its 'closure' indicates nothing other than that the self 
returns to itself in its otherness, enacting a speculative identity, a paradoxical infinite 
identity, an identity in difference that is actually an open identity. If it represented a 
closed identity, exclusive of alterity, it would be a representation of abstract finitude. 
Derrida's notion of 'presence', set up as the ultimate target of all deconstructions, 
refers to both the exclusionary finitude of the full simplicity of a 'walled-in' identity and 
the all-inclusive infinity of the total manifestation of absolute being, the parousia. The 
deconstructive critique of the former, the demonstration of the trace of the other within 
the selfsame, in itself does not conflict with Hegelianism. However, Hegel would agree 
with this critique precisely on the basis of the all-inclusive 'true infinite', which he 
conceives of as the infinite within the finite. The stasis of an absolute fullness and 
completion is a misleading portrayal of the 'true infinite'. The circle image does not 
represent completion, but endlessness, incompletion, infinity; it is 'without beginning or 
end'. It represents the movement of turning, of self-othering and return, the effectivity of 
the other within the same, the infinite within the finite. The infinite is the restlessness of 
the finite. Jean-Luc Nancy writes: 
The form that Hegel privileges is indeed the circle, but this circle is a "circle of 
circles"; not the simple disposition of the same that always comes down to the 
identical, but much rather, at the same time, both the ground of all circles, the 
pure movement of the point that turns ... and the ceaseless movement that leaves 
h· 132 not mg at rest. 
The unending turning of the circle of circles represents the self, not as the completion of 
a simple identity, but as a ceaseless process of identification and determination, of self-
othering and return, where an open transformative identity is exposed to the constant 
intervention of irreducible alterity. The infinite within the finite is the intervention of the 
other within the selfsame. Actual infinity is active alterity. It is not the parousia of 
absolute presence, if absolute presence means the annihiliation of all alterity. Nancy 
writes: 
[For Hegel,] there is, explicitly, neither beginning nor end, but only the full ~nd 
complete actuality of the infinite that traverses, works, and transforms the fillIte. 
Which means: negativity, hollow, gap, the difference of being that relates to 
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itself through this very difference, and which is thus ... the infinite act of relating 
itsel~ to it~elf, and thus the power of the negative. It is this power of the negativ~ 
that mhabIts the gap where relation opens, and that hollows out the passage from 
presence to presence: the infinite negativity of the present. 133 
The 'true infinite' can be convincingly read as the undermining of the metaphysics of 
presence, rather than its ultimate expression. 
Derrida, however, reads it as the latter. This raises the question of the relation 
between deconstruction and what Hegel calls the 'bad infinity'. The notion of differance 
refers to an infinite deferral of the presence of meaning, through the perpetual process of 
differentiating determination, whereby the same is constituted purely by the negation of 
its other, this trace of the other rendering the same simultaneously possible and 
impossible, being that which constitutes and dislocates any determinate self-present 
identity, the latter being merely a momentary illusory effect and effacement of the 
perpetual dislocating chain of the movement of the trace, a play of presence and absence 
that never comes to rest in the pure presence of an origin or an end. Differance is thus an 
infinite regress, like the effect of mirrors reflecting each other, like the 'endless 
succession of mirrors' 134 of the infinity of Romantic irony, the Schlegelian 'irony of 
irony'. Derrida himself depicts the play of the trace in terms of such an infinity. In Of 
Grammatology he refers to it as an 'infinite reference' from mirror to mirror,135 and to 
the 'indefinitely multiplied structure - en abyme' of 'textuality' .136 This is an infinity 
that resists totalisation, its endlessness meaning that it is unfulfillable and non-identical. 
It is opposed to the Hegelian 'true infinite' in that the latter refers to the all-
encompassing nature of the absolute totality. It would thus appear that the deconstructive 
infinite is an affirmation of what Hegel dismissed as a spurious 'bad infinite'. 
However, Rodolphe Gasche argues that Derrida is as much opposed to the 'bad 
infinite' as he is to the 'true infinite'. This argument involves the claim that the 
deconstructive infinite is a 'structural infinity', one which is of a different order to the 
Hegelian distinction between a spurious potential infinite and a genuine actual infinite. 
Deconstruction involves the endless undermining, through the infinitising movement of 
the trace, of the stability of presence, the latter always being a closed, and thus finite, 
totality or identity. Derrida himself refers to 'the structural necessity of the abyss' .137 
Gasche interprets this statement as meaning that the Derridian infinite is structural and 
necessary, as opposed to semantic and empirical. He writes: '[Structural infinity's] 
structurality ... is in contraposition to the semantic .... In many ways similar to spurious 
infinity, structural infinity ... is different from it because it is a nonsemantic concept and 
is distinguished by ... necessity.' 138 The structural necessity of the Derridian infinite 
distinguishes it from the 'bad infinite', which is semantic and empirically contingent. 
Gasche's interpretation of Derrida's notion of differance in terms of infinity as a 
structural necessity is an expression of his reading of Derridian concepts as 
'infrastructural' 'quasi-transcendental' conditions of the possibility and impossibility of 
meaning. This differs from the Kantian transcendental philosophy that asserts that 
finitude is constitutive, that the limits of knowledge are the conditions of its possibility. 
The quasi-transcendentality of the structural infinity of differance indicates that meaning 
is constituted by that which makes it ultimately impossible, the infinity whose chain of 
differentiation produces the effect of meaning while endlessly preventing and deferring 
its stabilisation in the closure of a finite identity. The constitutive necessity of the 
Derridian infinite suggests that it is closer to the Hegelian genuine infinite than to the 
empirically contingent 'bad infinite'. As we have seen, for Hegel, the infinite is the truth 
of the finite, because the latter's very constitutive limit, the otherness of its other, is 
overcome in the very act of constitution, whereby the other is essential to the identity of 
the same. Thus both the Derridian and Hegelian infinites are conditions of both the 
possibility and impossibility of any finite determinacy. Despite this, Gasche wishes to 
maintain a distance between his Derridian structural infinity and the Hegelian genuine 
infinity, which he does by holding to Derrida' s interpretation of the latter as the ultimate 
destruction of alterity. He writes: '[Structural infinity] opens up the possibility of 
genuine infinity, of the dream of totalization, but in such a manner that it remains 
essentially limited by its indelible reference to its Other.' 139 However, as we have seen, 
the genuine infinite has no other, because it is itself the opening to the other. The same 
can be said regarding structural infinity or differance. The structural infinite may 
describe the opening and reference to the other inscribed within finite identity, but it 
does not make sense to refer to it as limited by its other, otherwise it would itself be 
finite. Differance is more fundamental than the logic of opposition, therefore it should 
not be inscribed within that logic; it is not, for example, the opposite of presence. 
Differance, like genuine infinity, has no other, but is itself the trace and intervening 
effectivity of the other within the same. 
'True infinity' and 'differance' also have in common the fact that they are put 
forward as resisting or evading all forms of mastery and servitude. In 'Ousia and 
Gramme', Derrida writes: '[The trace] (is) that which must elude mastery. Only presence 
is mastered.' 140 Similarly, for Hegel, only the finite can be mastered, while the infinite is 
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unmasterable. In Glas, Derrida paraphrases Hegel's ideas on this matter: 'One masters 
only finite life' .141 Hegel himself states, in his early essay, 'On the Scientific Ways of 
Treating Natural Law', that it is only the limited and finite that can be coerced. He 
writes: '[N]othing is external to [freedom], so that no coercion is possible for it. ... By 
virtue of singularity [Einzelheit], the individual is [placed] directly among determinacies, 
so that something external is present for him, and coercion is accordingly possible.' 142 
Only the finitude of determinacy can be coerced; the infinity of indeterminate 
determinability evades all coercion. 
Despite all this, as we have seen, Derrida reads the Hegelian infinite as the 
parousia of full presence, the ultimate effacement of alterity, dijferance, and the trace. 
He regards Hegel as effectively equating finite servility with the notion of the trace. In 
Glas, he writes: 'Seen since Sa [savoir absolu (absolute knowing)], thought of the trace 
will then be a jealous (finite ... servile ... ) thought. ,143 This equation of the trace with 
finitude only makes sense if one accepts that the Hegelian infinite involves full presence, 
in which case the trace, which is neither present nor absent, would be finite in Hegelian 
terms. However, the 'presence' of the genuine infinite refers to an 'actuality 
[WirklichkeitJ' different from the stasis of the absolute (abstract) fullness of completion, 
the latter being an ultimately exclusionary and thus finite totality. The 'actuality' of the 
genuine infinite is its activity and effectivity [Wirklichkeit], such that it is not an 
abstraction separated from the finite, but concretely intervenes within the latter, enacting 
its ex-position from its dead positivity into living relationality, through the infiltration of 
the negativity of the absolute that prevents the abstract absolutisation of any determinate 
finitude. The 'presence' of the genuine infinite refers to the active infinity of difference, 
of active difference, differentiation, dijferance. In the 'Natural Law' essay, Hegel writes: 
'[T]he absence of difference... presents the totality as something enclosed and 
undeveloped [unentfaltet] , in which movement and infinity are not present in their 
reality. ')44 The 'presence' of genuine infinity works against the 'presence' of enclosure 
and exclusion. Likewise, the Derridian trace enacts the ex-position of the static closure 
of self-present determinacy into the openness of infinite determinability, enacting the 
intervention of alterity as opposed to the indifference of juxtaposition. The trace is the 
trace of the other in the selfsame that prevents the latter's closure within the presence of 
a simple finite identity. It is thus an infinitisation of the finite, the self-overcoming of the 
finite that Hegel characterises as the genuine infinite. 
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The 'true infinite' is the fonn of the absolute idea and its actuality is the de-
alienated condition. In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel refers to 'the 
sublation of natural finitude, of immediate existence, the overcoming of divestment 
[Entauj3erung (alienation as externalisation)], the dissolution of limitation.' 1.+5 Here the 
overcoming of externalisation is equated with the overcoming of finitude, de-alienation 
with the actual infinite. 
Unalienated Mind 
It has been demonstrated that Derrida's concept of differance can be seen as involving, 
in Hegelian tenns, either a 'spurious infinite' or a 'genuine infinite', depending on how 
it is interpreted and the implications that are drawn from it. We have already discussed 
the 'almost absolute proximity' of certain Derridian and Hegelian concepts. We have 
also discussed the proximity of differance to the infinity of Schlegelian Romantic irony. 
It is significant that Hegel places Romantic irony at a point of proximity to his notion of 
'absolute knowing', the culmination and self-theorisation of his system of philosophy. 
Irony is invoked towards the end of last volume of the Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences, immediately before the final chapter on absolute knowing 
entitled 'Philosophy'. Here, irony is compared and contrasted with absolute knowing, 
and argued to be the subjectivistic empty fonn of the latter. Hegel writes: 
If the result - the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself - is 
taken in a merely fonnal, contentless sense, so that the spirit is not also at the 
same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding;- then that 
infinite subjectivity is the merely fonnal self-consciousness, knowing itself in 
itself as absolute - Irony. Irony, which can make every objective reality nought 
and vain, is itself the emptiness and vanity, which from itself, and therefore by 
chance and its own good pleasure, gives itself direction and content, remains 
master over it, is not bound by it - and with the assumption that it stands on the 
very summit of religion and philosophy, falls back rather into the vanity of 
wilfulness. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite fonn, the self-centred 
manifestation, throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in which it is the 
vanity of thought, that it is the free thought which has its infinite characteristic at 
the same time as essential and actual content as an object in which it is also 
free. 146 
Irony and absolute knowing occupy the same position, that of the result and self-
consciousness of the process of the mediations and reconfigurations of the forms of 
consciousness. Spirit, when reaching this position of self-awareness, is faced with a 
choice between the two. Both irony and absolute knowing involve the self-consciousness 
of the necessary failure of the absolute to be represented in any figure of consciousness. 
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However, irony restricts this self-consciousness to being a mere empty play of 
subjectivity. In this play of irony the subject provides its own content which it can 
dissolve at will. It overcomes all one-sidedness except the one-sidedness of its own 
subjectivity, and thus remains a spurious infinity, one that is ultimately limited. In 
contrast, absolute knowing is truly free and unlimited, in that it is spirit that knows itself 
as spirit in its 'objective self-unfolding', which comprehends the activity of the absolute 
in the logic of the dissolution of all the figures of intelligibility. 
To the extent that Derridian deconstruction involves merely an affirmation of the 
freeplay of the signifier and of active interpretation it remains locked in what Hegel 
would dismiss as the empty sUbjectivism of irony. Rorty reads Derrida in this way and 
calls deconstruction an example of 'private ironism'. However, deconstruction that 
intervenes, ethically and institutionally, that enacts the ex-position of reified positivity 
and the opening to alterity, is closer to the genuine infinity of an absolute knowing. 
Close, but not identical, for Derrida does not explicitly theorise his deconstructive praxis 
as a higher form of knowledge and reason. Unlike Hegel with his notion of absolute 
knowing, Derrida does not account for the possibility and standpoint of the 
deconstructive operation as a form of conscious activity. 
Absolute knowing is not a mysterious arrival of the parousia of absolute being, 
manifest and illuminated in its fullness of presence. It is but a self-description of the 
necessary nature of the standpoint of Hegelian philosophy, the conditions under which it 
is possible to observe and describe, in a rationally comprehensive, therefore purposive 
and teleological, manner, the process of configuration and de-figuration of forms of 
consciousness and intelligibility. The chapter on the 'Absolute Idea' at the end of the 
Science of Logic is not a revelatory consummation of the fullness of being, but is merely 
a brief discussion of method, describing the method and standpoint of philosophy as 
Hegel conceives it. He writes, regarding the absolute idea: '[W]hat remains to be 
considered here is not a content as such, but the universal aspect of its form - that is, the 
method.,147 The absolute idea cannot be separated from the dialectical process leading 
up to it, and consists of nothing but that process, it being the unity of theory and practice, 
the 'unity of the theoretical and the practical Idea' .148 It is the self-description of the 
narrator of this comprehensive process. Zizek describes the Hegelian absolute thus: 
'[nhe true Absolute is nothing but the logical disposition of [the] pre\'ious failed 
149 'C ' If attempts to conceive the Absolute'. The absolute can only ever mallliest ltse as 
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negativity, and absolute knowing is the self-consciousness of the negative power that is 
the dialectical method of thought. 
Absolute knowing is a looking-back on the dialectical temporal process leading 
up to itself. Hegel writes: 'This movement, which philosophy is, finds itself already 
accomplished, when at the close it seizes its own notion - i.e. only looks back on its 
kn I d d50 Th' If' ,151 . ow e ge. e annu ment 0 tIme referred to III Hegel's characterisation of 
absolute knowing does not mean that the latter is a supra-temporal or supra-historical 
form of knowledge whose content applies to all time, including the future. Absolute 
knowing is only a looking-back, and is inseparable from the temporal process it looks 
back on. It is not itself within time, as it is formally unlimited; it is the self-
consciousness of the temporal dialectical process, a self-consciousness that only comes 
about retrospectively when the process reaches the unlimited consciousness that is the 
self-knowing of the dialectic itself. This absolute knowing is beyond time in the sense 
that the self-knowing of the dialectic cannot itself be dialecticised, simply because it is 
itself the name of the process of dialecticisation. That is to say, the absolute, the true 
infinite, the self-overcoming of finitude, cannot itself be overcome, precisely because it 
is the act of overcoming itself. 
The dialectical comprehension of history, i.e. Hegel's system, may be the 'end' 
of history, but this does not mean there will be no more history in the future. Absolute 
knowing is a comprehension of the past, and is beyond time in the sense that such 
comprehension can only occur when the past is finished, that is, from the standpoint of 
the present. Lukacs writes: 'Hegel is neither ahistorical nor supra-historical, but instead 
he provides a recapitulation of the entire process from his present vantage-point.' 152 The 
'annulment of time' is merely the necessary standpoint of the present. In the Philosophy 
of Right, Hegel, writes: 'Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until 
reality has completed its formative process, and made itself ready .... When philosophy 
paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot 
be rejuvenated, but only known. ,]53 Systematic rational knowledge is retroactive; the 
future is contingently open, and does not obey the laws of necessity. Zizek writes: 'For 
Hegel, .. , there is no contradiction between our absorption into the historical process and 
the fact that we not only can but are obliged to speak from the standpoint of the "end of 
history". .. And "absolute knowledge" is nothing other than the explication of this 
historically specified field that absolutely limits our ho,.i~on: as such, it is "finite'" .154 
The standpoint of the present, of the end of the process leading up to it, is a necessity for 
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philosophical comprehension, but future periods of history will have other 'ends'. 
However, Zizek's use of the word 'finite' to describe the 'horizon' of absolute knowing 
involves a different understanding of 'infinity' to that of Hegel. The Hegelian infinite is 
the self-overcoming of finitude, and thus an opening to alterity, not an all-encompassing 
knowledge irrespective of time or place. The latter would entail omniscience. or at least 
a pre-critical metaphysics. The retrospectivity of absolute knowing, its status as the 
standpoint of the present looking back, means that only the past can be philosophically 
comprehended, implying that the future is ungraspable by systematic thought. Nancy 
interprets the Hegelian characterisation of the philosophical standpoint of the 'present' 
in the following way: 
[T]he present [is] ... the restlessness opened between the twilight of a fulfillment 
and the imminence of an upsurge. '" It is not the time of an apotheosis outside of 
time and of a parousia of the absolute. It is what each time is for itself: the 
grasping of its passage, which means at the same time self-affirmation and the 
restlessness of the other. 155 
The past is knowable as spirit's knowing of itself, of its own unfolding and development. 
The future is something undetermined and unknowable. 
For Hegel, the 'standpoint' of the absolute is an unalienated consciousness. It is 
spirit that knows itself as spirit, that recognises all its positive extemalisations as 
moments of its own self, but is itself liberated from the limited positivity of figuration 
and determinacy, being in a state of infinite determinability, and thus independent and 
free. In its state of genuine infinity it is grounded on nothing but itself, itself being 
nothing other than the negativity of the conscious overcoming of determinacy. In 
absolute knowing there is no distinction between subject and object, as it is a self-
knowing, the self-knowing of the absolute idea that knows itself as such. This identity of 
subject and object gives absolute knowing the quality of simple immediacy, formally 
resembling in this respect the simple indeterminate immediacy of sense-consciousness 
that the system begins with, only this time consciousness is actual, effective, concrete 
and living, a universality that intervenes and contains all particularity within itself in the 
identity-in-difference of a living oneness, unlike the alienated abstraction of universality 
that the purported particularity of sense-consciousness proved itself to be. 
Hegel writes: '[T]he self-knowing Spirit, just because it grasps its Notion, is the 
immediate identity with itself which, in its difference, is the certainty of immediacy, or 
sense-consciousness - the beginning from which we started. This release of itself from 
the form of its Self is the supreme freedom and assurance of its self-knowledge. ,\5(, The 
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freedom and self-knowing of the absolute involves the liberation of the self from the 
form of the self, from form itself, from the determinacy of figuration. The self-othering 
and overcoming that is the opening to alterity is the genuine infinity of absolute 
knowing. For Hegel, absolute knowing is the pure negativity of indeterminate singularitv 
'- -
that is the condition of genuine universality, a universality involving indeterminate 
determinability, not the false universality of a hypostatised determinacy. He writes: 
[Absolute knowing] is'!', that is this and no other'!', and which is no less 
immediately a mediated or superseded universal'!,. It has a content which it 
differentiates from itself; for it is pure negativity or the dividing of itself, it is 
consciousness. This content is, in its difference, itself the 'I', for it is the 
movement of superseding itself, or the same pure negativity that the'!, is .... [I]t 
is only when the'!, communes with itself in its otherness that the content is 
comprehended. 157 
The self that is liberated from the self, that is always other, exposed to alterity in its 
negative indeterminacy, the point of pure singularity and haecceity, that in the negativity 
of its singularity is universality, the negative unity of all singularities, that is the '''we'' 
that is "I'" of the identity-in-difference of spirit, knows itself to be all its content, all 
reality, the actual infinity of the othering of the same, the absolute. 
Hegel's conceptualisation of de-alienating appropriation does not necessarily 
depend on a metaphysics of presence. The authentic proper comes about in the actuality 
of spiritual relationality, which itself comes about through the ex-position and 
deconstruction of abstract, reified, positive givenness. By taking seriously Derrida's 
assertion of the proximity of deconstruction and Hegelianism, the latter can be 
convincingly interpreted as a rational philosophical system based on the same premises 
as the former, the Aujhebung being read as the reconfiguration of discourse through the 
intervening power of negativity, or active difference, which dislocates the one-sided 
identity, and given positivity, of a walled-in presence. Hegelianism is not a philosophy 
of origins and an expressive organicism whereby an originary plenitude of immediacy is 
lost and regained at a higher level through an immanent teleological development. as the 
originary immediacy is shown to be a false, reified and alienated abstraction. The 
development occurs through the negative intervention of infinite alterity, and the 
reconfigurations are given the form of teleological necessity retroactively from the 
philsophical standpoint that occurs when spirit overcomes the limitation of figuration 
and subsists in the self-awareness of the genuine infinity of its proper element. This de-
alienated condition of absolute spirit occurs when the reified abstraction of 'substance' is 
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transformed into the 'authentic substance' of spirit, a substance which is at the same 
time 'subject', the subject being the negativity of the irruption of irreducibly singular 
alterity within the self-identity of substance. Appropriation of the other is not a violent 
reduction of alterity, but the liberation of the self from itself through the intervention and 
infinite act of the other. Hegel's system is not an exclusionary totality, as it attempts to 
think the absolute as an actual infinity, which is itself to think the intervening effectivity 
of the excluded remainder of any closed configuration. The Hegelian infinite is not the 
all-inclusive fullness of presence of the parousia, but the infinite within the finite which 
is the opening to alterity. Actual infinity is the form of Hegel's system and the 
unalienated mind wherein absolute spirit knows itself as such in all its manifestations. 
De-alienation is not an exclusionary completion in the fullness of presence, but is the 
state of freedom that is the opening to the other, the conscious experience of the actuality 
of infinity. 
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Chapter 3 
Determinability and Objectification in Marx 
According to Derrida, Marx's concern with the overcoming of alienation is a case of the 
metaphysics of presence, involving a desire for the suppression of dijferance and the 
'exorcism' of the spectrality of the trace. The concern here will be to ascertain the extent 
to which Marx's writings support an alternative interpretation of the relationship 
between deconstruction and de-alienation. 
This investigation will involve an inquiry into the relationship between Derrida 
and Marx, with particular emphasis on the way in which dijferance inheres within 
phenomena which Marx regards as manifestations of the capitalist mode of production. 
The fundamental role that social relationality plays in Marx's conception of the human 
'essence' will be discussed with regard to its implications for any notion of essence 
based on substantial presence. Marx's concept of 'objectification' will be analysed with 
regard to its relationship to alienation and de-alienation, and attention will be given to 
the extent to which the latter furthers a narcissistic appropriation. The relationship 
between Marxian de-alienation and the Derridian notions of restricted and general 
economy will then be discussed. The question here is not only the accuracy of Derrida's 
critique of Marx, but also how the aspects of Marx's conception of the overcoming of 
alienation may be interpreted anew in the light of Derrida' s critique of the metaphysics 
of presence in general. 
Capitalist Differance 
For Derrida, Marx's critique of capitalism exhibits an aversion to dijferance and a desire 
for the establishment of the fullness of presence. In the terms used in Derrida' s Spectres 
of Marx, Marx objects to the spectral quality of capitalist social relations and wishes to 
'exorcise' this in order to restore the reality of a living presence. This spectrality is that 
of the trace, of dijferance, of that which is neither fully present nor fully absent, nor fully 
anything. Marx's dislike of this spectrality, and his concomitant desire for the 
overcoming of the capitalism and alienation that it manifests, involve a prejudice in 
favour of the spurious, and ultimately dangerous, metaphysical myth of a fully integrated 
life, free from the disjuncture of otherness and death. In the J 844 Manuscripts, Marx 
writes that '[C]ommunism ... [is] the complete return of man to himself. .. the true 
resolution of the strife between existence and essence'. 1 For Den-ida, this reintegration of 
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'man with himself in the abolition of alienation involves the elision of alterity, and thus 
of the possibility of a 'justice' understood as the opening to the other. He writes: 'Is not 
disjuncture the very possibility of the other? How to distinguish betw'een two 
disadjustments, between the disjuncture of the unjust and the one that opens up the 
infinite asymmetry of the relation to the other, that is to say, the place for justice,?,2 The 
question indicates the possibility of a distinction between two types of 'alienation', one 
bad and unjust, and the other good and just, the badness of the first and the goodness of 
the second both having their basis in 'disjuncture'. The disjuncture in question is that of 
alienation, as Derrida explicitly identifies alienation with his deconstructive concepts, 
for example, when he writes that the 'ghost effect' of spectrality amounts to 'a 
supplementary dimension, one more simulacrum, alienation, or expropriation.,3 It is 
Marx's notion of the overcoming of capitalism's alienating disjuncture that Derrida 
equates with a 'pre-deconstructive ontology of presence',4 as opposed to the 
'hauntology' of de constructive and capitalist differance, a 'hauntology' of the spectrality 
of the commodity form. 5 
Derrida claims that Marx effectively determines the commodity form in terms of 
the'spectrality' of exchange value as opposed to the 'real presence' of use value. In the 
Grundrisse Marx writes: '[E]xchange value is present, exists, only in use value,.6 The 
use value of a thing is that which within its qualitative presence responds to human 
needs. Exchange value is thus an insubstantial, phantom-like non-presence, detached 
from the specific qualities of the thing upon which it rests. Marx writes that exchange 
value is the 'pure form of value - in which the traces of its becoming, as well as its 
specific presence in use value, have been extinguished,.7 It is the illusory phantom that 
provides the 'basis' of the capitalist system of production and circulation. 
Conversely, Derrida argues that the 'presence' of use value IS an illusory 
effacement of the movement of differance, a differance that he detects in Marx's 
characterisation of exchange value. The presence of use value is always already 
'haunted' by the spectral, phantasmatic differance of exchange value. Derrida writes: 
'The commodity ... haunts the thing, its specter is at work in use value. ,8 Derrida 
identifies exchange value with the fundamental difference of the trace. He writes: 
Just as there is no pure use, there is no use-value which the possibility of 
exchange and commerce (by whatever name one calls it, meaning itself, value, 
culture, spirit [!], signification, the world, the relation to the other, and first of all 
the simple form and trace of the other) has not in advance inscribed in an out-of-
use - an excessive signification.9 
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Capitalism is a manifestation of this excessive 'possibility', an open system. or 'general 
economy' of dijferance, whereby the limitless circulation of exchange value is set in 
motion by the extraction of excess value, surplus-value. One commentator on the 
relation between Derrida and Marx, Michael Ryan, puts it in the following way: 'The 
structure that initiates this interminable process without closure [of exchange value] is 
the extraction of surplus value from labor ... There is ... a skidding inscribed in the very 
rationality. .. of the capitalist system which situates the system in an interminable 
seriality it cannot arrest or close off.' IO Although Ryan goes on to suggest that it is this 
excess that contains the potential for the system's immanent deconstruction, a more 
apposite inference from what he and Derrida have to say about the infinite excess of 
exchange and surplus value is that capitalism is itself deconstruction. 
Indeed, money itself has the emptily formal, insubstantial and excessive quality 
of dijferance. Marx notes, with horror, the menace it does to the properness of meaning. 
He writes: '[Money is] the transformation of all human and natural properties into their 
contraries, the universal confounding and distorting of things ... Money [is] the external, 
universal medium and faculty. .. for turning an image into reality and reality into an 
image ... [M]oney, as the existing and active concept of value ... is ... the confounding 
and confusing of all natural and human qualities.' II In effacing the qualitative presence 
of anything, money enacts an infinite play of distortion and reversal. Its infinite excess 
disrupts the 'restricted economy' of the proper, of the oikos, the home. In Given Time, 
Derrida identifies money with the 'general economy' of dijferance: 'As soon as there is 
monetary sign - and first of all sign - that is, differance and credit, the oikos is opened 
and cannot dominate its limit.' 12 Simon Critchley concludes from this that 'money is a 
kind of deconstruction, it opens the closure of the oikos to the unrestricted "economy" of 
desire where money circulates and where wealth is accumulated or squandered - the 
nomadic and quasi-automatic flows of capital.' I3 
However, money, and thus dijferance as money, is, according to Marx, in its 
formal universality, an alienated projection of humanity's own universal character, its 
generic nature. He writes: '[T]he divine power of money - lies in its character as men's 
estranged, alienating and self-disposing species-nature. Money is the alienated ability of 
mankind.,14 The universal character, or generic-being [Gattungswesen ('species-
being')], of humanity rests on the latter's sociality and relationality. Derrida links the 
spectrality and d?fierance of the commodity form to relationality and sociality \\"hen he 
writes: '[T]he spectral effect of the commodity ... is born of a relation (ferance. 
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difference, reference, and differance), as double relation, one should say as double social 
bond. ' 15 For Marx, this empty spectral relationality of exchange value and the 
commodity form is merely the alienated projection of humanity's essential relationality. 
Essential Relationality 
A spectral, emptily formal, insubstantial relationality is what for Marx characterises 
humanity. This insubstantiality is the basis not only of sociality, but also of the fonnal 
universality definitive of consciousness. In his early works, particularly the 1844 
Manuscripts, Marx uses the term Gattungswesen to refer to the conscious universality 
intrinsic to humanity. Gattungswesen can be translated into English as 'genus-essence', 
'genus-being' , or 'generic-being', but has usually been misleadingly rendered as 
'species-being', a disastrous translation given that it is generality and not specificity that 
is being emphasised. The term Gattung ('genus') refers to generality and universality, 
and to say that a human is a Gattungswesen is to say that it is a living universality, that 
is, a conscious being. Consciousness involves apprehending universals as objects, and is 
not the mere awareness of phenomena in their immediate sensuous particularity, an 
awareness that animals are limited to. Marx writes: 
Man is a species-being [GattungswesenJ, not only because in practice and in 
theory he adopts the species [GattungJ (his own as well as those of other things) 
as his object, but - and this is only another way of expressing it - also because he 
treats himself as the actual, living species [GattungJ; because he treats himself as 
a universal and therefore a free being. 16 
Unlike an animal, a human is not confined to the immediacy of its individual life 
activity. The ability to separate itself from its individuality and apprehend generality is 
what makes a being conscious. Marx writes: 'Man makes his life activity itself the object 
of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a 
determination with which he directly merges. .,. It is just because of this that he is a 
species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being' .17 
A wareness of genera depends on not being bound to a specific detennination. 
As Marx's notion of Gattungswesen derives from the works of Feuerbach and 
Hegel, its meaning and implications can be clarified by looking at the use of the concept 
of 'genus' by these thinkers. In Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity. awareness of 
generality is the basis of consciousness. Feuerbach writes: 'Consciousness in the strictest 
sense is present only in a being to whom his species [Gattung], his essential nature, is an 
object of thought. ... Where there is this higher consciousness there is a capability of 
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science. Science is the cognizance of species [Gattungen].' 18 It is the understanding of 
generality as such that is important here. For Feuerbach, an animal is directly at one \\'ith 
its immediate individuality, whereas a conscious being distinguishes itself from its 
individuality, having a 'twofold life'; an outer life of particularity and an inner life of 
universality, of thought, of the apprehension of genera. This universality is only possible 
because of an insubstantial indetenninate detenninability and substitutability. Feuerbach 
writes: 'Man thinks - that is, he converses with himself. ... Man is himself at once I and 
thou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this reason, that to him his species 
[Gattung] , his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is an object of 
thought.,19 Thought and consciousness are possible because human 'nature' is not 
substantial, but relational. The universality of consciousness is an effect of the 
insubstantial indetenninacy of an infinite detenninability that is essentially relational. 
Thought and consciousness are essentially a conversation, a relation. 
This emptiness of consciousness, its lack of a pennanently limiting determinacy, 
makes possible its infinitely flexible ability to assume any determination. Feuerbach 
writes: '[C]onsciousness is essentially infinite in its nature. ,20 As consciousness is what 
distinguishes humans from animals, human 'nature' is precisely this unlimited creative 
nothingness. Feuerbach claims that 'human nature' is 'infinitely varied, infinitely 
modifiable'.21 In other words, the human 'essence' is not to have a substantive essence; 
the distinguishing feature of humans is not to have a distinguishing feature. It is this that 
makes possible the free conscious universality and limitless modifiability of humanity. 
Of course, each actual instantiation of this limitless universality, each living 
conscious being, is, in its individuality, limited and finite. Feuerbach writes: '[T]he 
human being, as an individual, can and must. .. feel and recognize himself to be limited; 
but he can become conscious of his limits, his finiteness, only because the perfection, the 
infinitude of his species, is perceived by him' .22 Therein lies the human's 'twofold life'; 
a finite living being that is also free and conscious, conscious in that the limitless 
universality of the genus, as a detenninable nothingness, is manifest within it. It is this 
infinitude of humanity, of general consciousness as opposed to the finitude of the 
individual, that Feuerbach argues is falsely projected onto an alien theological being. 
Feuerbach's notion of living genus, or general consciousness, is, despite its 
purported 'anthropological' concretisation, merely a more abstract version of Hegel's 
concept of 'spirit'. It is significant that in the Phenomenology of Spirit the term 
'Gattung' ('genus') is only used at the point of the inception of 'spirit' in the narrative of 
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the development of consciousness. Just prior to the exposition of the expenence of 
mutual recognition (the 'master-slave dialectic'), the term' genus' is used to refer to an 
iterable universality characteristic of genuine consciousness that comes about through 
the self-othering relationality of nascent sociality. The genus is the negative unity of the 
general relationality, or sociality, that constitutes consciousness. Hegel writes: 
[The genus] is the universal unity which contains all [its] moments as superseded 
within itself. It is the simple genus which, in the movement of Life itself. .. Life 
points to something other than itself, viz. to consciousness, for which life exists 
as this unity, or as genus .... The simple "I" is this genus or the simple universal, 
for which differences are not differences only by its being the negative essence of 
the shaped independent moments ... [The] universal independent nature in which 
negation is present as absolute negation, is the genus as such, or the genus as self-
consciousness. Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-
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conSCIOusness. 
The term 'genus' occurs at the point of transformation from sensuous particularity to the 
negative universality of spirit, of consciousness as social being, and names that negative 
universality in its initial abstractly formal aspect. 
For Marx, as for his predecessors, the term Gattungswesen refers to the negative 
universality that constitutes consciousness, a universality stemming from the lack of any 
specific determination, an insubstantial intrinsic relationality. To say that a human is a 
Gattungswesen is simply to say that a human is a conscious being, having the 
indeterminacy productive of universal awareness. It is not to say that a human is a being 
who has an identification with its biological 'species', with humanity. Marx writes: 'An 
animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to 
which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of 
every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. ,24 
A human qua conscious being is a 'species-being [Gattungswesen]' precisely because it 
does not 'belong' to a 'species', because it is free from specific determination and is 
hence able to perceive generality. A human qua sensuous bodily individual finite being 
is a type of animal, and 'belongs' to the 'human' biological species. The point is that 
Gattungswesen involves freedom from specific determination. 
Misunderstandings of the term Gattungswesen have tended to involve regarding 
it as referring to a human 'essence', a set of qualities distinguishing humans from other 
'species'. For example, Allen Wood writes that Gattungswesen refers to 'humanity as a 
single collective entity or else to the essential property which characterizes this entity 
and makes it a single distinctive thing in its own right. ,25 Gatfungs11'(?sen is actually not a 
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distinguishing property, but an absence of properties enabling an awareness of 
universality, which paradoxically 'distinguishes' a conscious being from an animal. 
Wood goes on to state: 
Feuerbach believes that it is our consciousness of our own species nature which 
makes it possible for us to be conscious of the species nature of other things, and 
hence that our species being is the foundation of our ability to form universal 
con~epts. !here a:e some passages in Marx which may be read as endorsing this 
thesIs. NeIther phIlosopher, however, presents any real arguments in favor of the 
thesis ... in fact, the truth would seem to be just the opposite, that it is the human 
ability to form universal concepts which makes it possible for people to know 
themselves as members of a species.26 
Wood's error is to regard 'species being [Gattungswesen]' as consciousness of being a 
member of a species. It is nothing of the sort, but rather the awareness of universality as 
such, being itself 'the ability to form universal concepts', an ability founded on an 
inherent indeterminacy, on not belonging to a species. 
The infinitude of the genus also involves freedom from the finitude of need. 
Marx writes: '[ A]n animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its 
young. It produces one-sidedly, while man produces universally. It produces only under 
the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free 
from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.,27 The alienation of 
the Gattungswesen of the worker under capitalism turns her productive activity into a 
mere means to her physical subsistence, the free universal productive ability is 
harnessed, expropriated, and becomes for her a mere means to the maintenance of the 
bare subsistence of her finite particularity. Marx writes: '[I]n degrading spontaneous, 
free activity to a means, estranged labour makes man's species-life a means to his 
physical existence ... Estranged labour turns thus ... [mJan's species-being ... into a being 
alien to him, into a means for his individual existence.,28 The infinitude of genus-ability 
is distorted into being the means for an enslavement to finitude. 
According to Marx, human Gattungswesen is alienated through the division of 
labour. He writes: '[T]he division of labour ... is nothing else but the estranged 
[entfremdete], alienated [entauBerte] positing of human activity as a real activity of the 
species or as activity of man as a species-being [Gattungswesen]. ,29 This means that 
under the division of labour the universality of humanity, its lack of restriction to 
specific determinacy, is a feature of humanity in general that is alienated from indiyidual 
human beings. The latter are restricted to particular one-sided activities that stifle their 
multi-faceted potential. Marx also writes: '[D]ivision of labour and exchange ... are 
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perceptibly alienated expressions of human activity and essential power as a species 
activity and species power.,30 Division of labour and exchange are both expressions of 
human universality and the way in which that universality is alienated from individuals 
in capitalism. 
In Marx's later works the term Gattungswesen is abandoned, but his concern 
with human universality is not. In Capital he asserts that the one-sided determinate 
particularity of the individual enslaved to partiality through the division of labour must 
be replaced by the unrestricted universality of a multi-faceted individual. He writes: 
'[T]he partially developed individual, who is merely the bearer of one specialized social 
function, must be replaced by the totally developed individual'. 31 In the Grundrisse he 
argues that human universality is made possible by capitalist exchange and that 
capitalism simultaneously alienates it from individuals. He writes: 
Universally developed individuals ... are no product of nature, but of history. The 
degree and the universality of the development of wealth where this individuality 
becomes possible supposes production on the basis of exchange value as a prior 
condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation of the individual 
from himself and from others, but also the universality and the 
comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities. In earlier stages of 
development the single individual seems to be developed more fully, because he 
has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them as 
independent social powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to 
yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this 
complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. 32 
As we have seen, Derrida argues that Marx wishes to 'exorcize' the insubstantial 
spectrality of exchange value. Yet here Marx argues that it is the very 'emptiness' of 
exchange value that makes possible the universal comprehensiveness of the individual, 
while at the same time alienating her from this universality. The purported fullness of 
the pre-capitalist individual of a 'Romantic' conservatism is the fullness of an 
immediacy that is ultimately one-sidedly determined, which contrasts with the suggested 
post-capitalist comprehensive individual who has the mediated 'fullness' of an infinite 
determinability. The latter is not the fullness of a final, i.e. finite, fulfillment, but is the 
fulfilling freedom of an absolute becoming. This is clear when Marx refers to 'the 
universal development of the individual. .. as a constant suspension of its barrier, which 
is recognized as a barrier, not taken for a sacred limit. ,33 
The spectrality of exchange value is precisely its negative universality, de\'oid of 
the particularity of use value. This spectrality is the precondition of both alienation and 
the realisation of human universality. In the Grundrisse Marx writes: 
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[W]hen the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than 
the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., 
create~ t~ough universal exchange? ... The absolute working-out of his creative 
potenhahh~s ... [~]here ~e does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but 
produces hIS totahty? Stnves not to remain something he has become. but is in 
the absolu~e movem~nt ?f becoming? In bourgeois economics - and in the epoch 
of productIOn to whIch It corresponds - this complete working-out of the human 
content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total 
alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the 
human end-in-itselfto an entirely external end.34 
Thus the universality of exchange value, and hence the system of production resting on 
the commodity form, brings about the absolute becoming of infinite determinability of 
humanity in general, while at the same time alienating it from the human individual, who 
is in the process reduced to the most limiting one-sided specificity, a repetitive, 
mechanistic, quantitative labour, an isolated cog in the machine of human universality. It 
is the individual who is alienated, from the freedom of the productive nothingness of 
infinite malleability, from the negative universality of her Gattungswesen, by a 
capitalism that brought it about in the first place. 
The spectrality of the commodity form, of exchange value, its trace-like nature, 
its non-presence, its dijJerance, is the precondition of the free determinability of the 
universally developed individual, but it is alienated from the individual through the 
capitalist relations of production. This means that the dijJerance that is brought into the 
open by capitalism is itself alienated through the latter from the human individual. This 
individual, because of the essential nothingness and non-presence that underpin its 
nature as a conscious being, is itself the source of the dijJerance from which it is 
alienated. It is not the lack of a determinate essence itself that is a product of capitalism, 
but the manifestation of this indeterminacy. The fact that humans differ in their 
specificity across history and geography, unlike any other species of animal, is testament 
to the essential unessential indeterminate emptiness of their 'nature'. Capitalist 
modernity enables this free universality to become consciously manifest. This is a 
Hegelian view of modernity as the awakening of reason qua the unbounded 
consciousness of freedom. In Spectres of Marx, Derrida, interpreting and advocating 
Kojeve's quasi-Hegelian thesis on 'post-historical Man', writes: 'There where man, a 
certain determined concept of man, is finished, there the pure humanity of man. of the 
other man and of man as other begins or has finally the chance of heralding itself - of 
~ h' .3" Tl . promising itself. In an apparently inhuman or else a-human las IOn. - 1e negatl\'e 
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universality of fonn frees humanity from being tied to the positive specificity of a 
particular content. What Derrida is advocating here is identical to Marx's conception of 
Gattungswesen. 
For Marx, as for Hegel, the universality of humanity is inherently bound up with 
its sociality. Marx writes: 'My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of 
that of which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric... In his 
consciousness of species [Gattung] man confinns his real social life and simply repeats 
his real existence in thought' .36 Conscious universality is an expression of sociality. A 
human is not bound to its immediate sensuous existence, and is hence a conscious 
generic being, because of its intrinsic insubstantial relationality. 
The notion of essential relationality is most clearly expressed in Marx's 'Sixth 
Thesis on F euerbach'. He writes: '[T]he human essence is no abstraction inherent in 
each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations. ,37 Traditionally, 
the tenn 'essence' has referred to the set of qualities which are shared by all things of a 
certain type, without all of which a thing would not be a member of that type. Thus the 
notion of a human essence refers to the qualities that make a human what it is and 
distinguishes it from non-humans. If a human's 'nature' as a conscious being is to have 
no fixed detenninate qualities then there is no human essence. However, as the term 
refers to what something is, it is involved in the linguistic function of defining, and a 
linguistic definition need not refer to something ontologically qualitative and 
substantive. Hence the tenn 'essence' can itself be redefined, or at least its meaning can 
be displaced. Etienne Balibar writes: 'To say that. .. the human essence is the ensemble 
of social relations ... is to attempt radically to displace the way in which it has until now 
d I h " " . d btl d " " ,38 been understoo ,not on y were man IS conceme, u a so as regar s essence. 
'Essence' is displaced here, because traditional ontologies in which the term operated 
were unable to account for relationality. Balibar continues: 
At bottom, the words 'ensemble', 'social' and 'relations' all say the same thing. 
The point is to reject both of the positions (the realist and the nominalist) ... the 
one arguing that the genus or essence precedes the existence of individuals: the 
other that individuals are the primary reality, from which universals are 
'abstracted'. For, amazingly, neither of these two positions is capable of thinking 
precisely what is essential in human existence: the multiple a~d. active relat~ons 
which individuals establish with each other. .. and the fact that It IS these relatIOns 
. h" 39 which define what they have III common, t e genus . 
An essential relationality, a relationality that makes humans what they are, does not 
inhere 11'ithin humans, but occurs between them. Humans are beings for whom nothing is 
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intrinsic other than, paradoxically, this very betweenness. Balibar uses the tenn 
'transindividual' to name the 'constitutive relation which displaces the question of the 
human essence', and explains that it is '[n]ot what is ideally "in" each individual (as a 
form or a substance), or what would serve, from outside, to classify that individual, but 
what exists between individuals by dint of their multiple interactions. ,-lO As the 
'Gattungswesen' is the contentless negative universality that constitutes the necessary 
non-essence of the social, or relational, individual, it is itself nothing other than this 
'transindividual' . 
Allen Wood argues that the 'Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach' merely means that the 
human essence is embroiled in social relations, not that it is displaced or replaced by a 
notion of relationality. He writes: 'The sixth thesis on Feuerbach does not deny that 
there is a "human essence" shared by individuals, but only asserts that this essence is 
inextricably bound up with the social relationships in which those individuals stand' .41 
However, for Marx, the 'human essence' is not bound up in social relations; it is nothing 
other than those relations. Michael Ryan argues that radical relationality is indeed a 
fundamental feature of Marx's 'ontology', and he identifies relationality with Derridean 
difJerance. He writes: 'To say that what appears to be a simple "thing" is in fact a 
"relation" is to say that alterity precedes and produces identity. ,42 He goes on to claim 
that Marxian social relationality and Derridean difJerance are analogous: 'Marx 
describes the relationality that becomes congealed in "things" like property as social. 
Derrida confines to philosophical terms the differential relations that produce entities 
and things without themselves being reducible to an ontology of "being." But the general 
. I ,43 pattern ... IS ana ogous. 
Just as, for Marx, the proletariat is the 'universal class', the class that represents 
not only specific interests but the interests of humanity as a whole, precisely because it 
has nothing, no property, the universal relationality of humanity is based on its essential 
lack of determinacy, its lack of essential properties. A free universal consciousness 
becomes manifest due to the universalisation of exchange, the modem, capitalist 
rendering paradigmatic of the 'spectral' indeterminacy of the commodity fonn, of 
exchange value, a universality that is at the same time alienated from the individual 
through the capitalist relations of production. 
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Types of Objectification 
As we have seen, Marx claims that the empty universality of money, and thus of the 
exchange value of commodities, is an alienation, projection, and objectification of the 
emptily determinable universality of humanity. Alienation and objectification are related 
but not synonymous terms. A rigorous distinction between the two concepts is the basis 
of Marx's critique of Hegel's notion of alienation. Marx regards Hegel as falsely 
equating the two terms. For Marx, alienation is a type of objectification; there can be an 
unalienated objectification. This distinction is also the basis of Lukics's critique of both 
Hegel and his own earlier work, a critique of the equation of the overcoming of 
alienation with the overcoming of objectivity. 
Marx regards all production as objectification, which means that a product is the 
result of the transformation of productive activity, or labour, into an object. Marx writes: 
'The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has 
become material: it is the objectification of labour. Labour's realization is its 
objectification. Under these economic conditions this ... appears as loss of realization for 
the workers; objectification as loss of the object' .44 All production involves 
objectification, but it is under the economic conditions of capitalism that this 
objectification takes the form of alienation. 
Allen Wood explains the meaning of Marx's use of the term 'objectification' in 
the following way: 'All labor does ... display or embody itself in an "object" if that term 
is understood broadly as any result or state of affairs in the external world which labor 
has brought about. ,45 The term 'brought about' implies a simple cause and effect relation 
between labour and its 'object', which suggests far less than the term 'embody'. In the 
Grundrisse Marx elaborates: 'Products ... are objectified labour. As objects they assume 
forms in which their being as labour may certainly be apparent in their form (as a 
purposiveness posited in them from outside; ... this is not at all apparent with e.g. the ox, 
or with reproduced natural products generally), .46 The products of purposive activity, or 
labour, express, embody, and objectify that purposiveness. 
For Marx, objectification as such is a necessary aspect of being a consclOUS 
being, it being the creative expression and realisation of the conscious being's generic 
abilities. The living generic being, i.e. the human individual, is only able to be creative 
because she is an infinitely determinable nothingness. Marx writes in the J 844 
Manuscripts: '[I]t is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in 
society the world of man's essential powers ... that all objects become for him the 
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objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and realise his individuality' .47 
This objectification occurs through the activity of labour, the activity of positive 
freedom. Marx writes in the Grundrisse that with free labour 'the external aims become 
stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as 
aims which the individual himself posits - hence as self-realization, objectification of 
the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour. ,48 Labour involves 
objectification, and when it is freed from need it becomes creative self-realisation an , 
actualisation of the limitlessly malleable potential of the indeterminate nothingness of 
the human 'essence'. 
Objectification takes the form of alienation under historically specific social and 
economic conditions. Alienation is a type of objectification. Marx writes that under 
capitalism' [t]he alienation [EntauBerung] of the worker in his product means not only 
that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that ... the life which he has 
conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien. ,49 The term 
'Entauj3erung' ['alienation', 'externalisation'] does not simply mean 'externalisation', 
this English word being neutral and non-judgemental; it can also be translated as 
'dispossession' and 'divestment'. It entails not only an externalising objectification, but 
also the loss and estrangement of the object. Here, objectification is not experienced as 
self-realisation, but as loss of the self in the product and the production process. Marx 
writes: '[F]rom the standpoint of capitaL .. [t]he emphasis comes to be placed not on the 
state of being objectified, but on the state of being alienated, dispossessed, sold [Der 
Ton wird gelegt nicht auf das Vergegenstandlichtsein, sondern das Entfremdet-, 
Entaussert-, Veraussertsein] ... [T]his process of objectification ... appears as a process 
of dispossession [Entauj3erung] from the standpoint of labour,.5o We argued in the 
previous chapter that in the interpretation of Hegel's writings the meanings of the two 
terms for 'alienation', Entauj3erung and Entfremdung [ estrangement], can be clearly 
distinguished, the latter naming the conscious experience of the former, the former being 
a purely formal and logical term. For Marx, in contrast, the two terms are inextricably 
bound up, the very meaning of Entauj3erung entailing Entfremdung. 
Objectification under capitalism is formal and quantitative, in contrast to the 
qualitative and determinate objectification characteristic of pre-capitalist modes of 
production. Marx writes: 
Before it is replaced by exchange value, every form of ~atural. we~lth 
presupposes an essential relation between the individual and the objects, m WhICh 
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th~ individual i~ one of his aspects objectifies [vergegenstandlicht] himself in the 
thmg, so that hIS possession of the thing appears at the same time as a certain 
?ev.el~pment of his individuality: wealth in sheep, the development of the 
mdIvIdual as shepherd ... Money, however, as the individual of general wealth ... 
as a merely social result, does not at all presuppose an individual relation to its 
owner; possession of it is not the development of any particular essential aspect 
of his individuality; but rather possession of what lacks individuality, since this 
social [relation] exists at the same time as a sensuous, external object which can 
be mechanically seized, and lost in the same manner. 51 
The pre-capitalist qualitative objectification involves an individual tied to a particular 
determination, such that 'one of his aspects' metonymically constitutes his entire being. 
The quantitative generality of capitalist production is unrestricted by primitive 
determinacy, but this unrestrictedness is a 'merely social result' in that it is alienated 
from the individual. Marx writes: 'All production IS an objectification 
[Vergegenstandlichung] of the individual. In money (exchange value), however, the 
individual is not objectified in his natural quality, but in a social quality (relation) which 
is, at the same time, external to him. ,52 Capitalist objectification is a socialisation, but an 
alienated one as regards the individual. What is socially realised is general social labour, 
not the worker in her living individuality. Marx writes that, for bourgeois economists, 
'the necessity of the objectification of the powers of social labour appears to them as 
inseparable from the necessity of their alienation vis-a-vis living labour. ,53 The worker 
qua social labour is realised in the multi-faceted sociality of modernity, but the worker 
qua living individual is alienated from her social product. There can thus be found three 
types of objectification in Marx's writings: the pre-capitalist qualitative objectification, 
particular labour producing a particular use value; the capitalist quantitative 
objectification of abstract social labour into the universal substitutability of exchange 
value; and the post-capitalist free manifold objectification as the realisation of the 
universal determinability of the human. 
General quantitative labour produces the sociality of exchange value, as opposed 
to the particular qualitative labour that produces use value. Exchange value only comes 
about if the labour that produced it is measured in purely quantitative terms, regardless 
of the particular nature of the work itself. In Capital, Marx writes that the labour that 
produces exchange value is 'undifferentiated, socially necessary general labour, utterly 
indifferent to any particular content. ,54 The exchange values, or commodities, are an 
objectification of labour as a quantitative homogeneity. Marx writes: 'There is nothing 
left of them [the products of labour] in each case but the same phantom-like objecti\'ity~ 
they are merely congealed quantities of homogeneous human labour, i.c. of human 
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labour-power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure. ,55 Commodities 
qua commodities are insubstantial, substitutable, non-things; they are social relations 
that are produced by formal quantitative labour, relations that take the form of 
insubstantial things, things that are not things and are thus 'phantom-like'. The 
separated, isolated, thingly appearance of the social relations produced by labour is an 
expression of the worker's alienation from sociality. These 'things' masquerade as a 
power independent of their producers. In his essay 'Results of the Immediate Process of 
Production' (1865) Marx writes: 'The objective conditions essential to the realization of 
labour are alienated [entfremdet] from the worker and become manifest as fetishes,.56 
This fetishism disguises the fact that commodities, or exchange values, are not things but 
social relations, which are themselves the objectification of social labour taken as a 
purely quantitative amount of human labour. Commodities are thus an alienated form of 
social relations, specifically an alienation of individual workers from social labour, from 
the totality of labour. In Capital Marx writes: 
[T]he commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as 
objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves ... Hence it also 
reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labour as a social 
relation between objects, a relation that exists apart from and outside the 
producers. Through this substitution, the products of labour become 
commodities, sensuous things which are at the same time suprasensible or social. 
.... [The commodity-form] is nothing but the definite relation between men 
themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation 
between things.57 
Commodities are a disguised manifestation of the comprehensive sociality that 
capitalism produces. A radicalised and mechanised division of labour produces general 
social labour, but this sociality is alienated from the individual workers in that it is 
experienced by them as homogeneous, abstract, quantitative labour activity, whose 
products they experience as autonomous, separate, and entirely independent from the 
labour that produced them. 
A commodity is the objectification of abstract quantitative labour. The formal, 
quantitative, insubstantial substitutability of exchange value is the product of a 
mechanically quantitative abstract labour. The value of a commodity is understood by 
Marx to be determined by the quantity of abstract labour objectified in it. He writes: 
'[W]ith reference to use-value, the labour contained in a commodity counts only 
qualitatively, with reference to value it counts only quantitatively. once it has been 
reduced to labour pure and simple. In the former case it was a matter of the "how" and 
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"what" of labour, in the latter of the "how much", of the temporal duration of labour. ,58 
Exchange value is the objectification of abstract labour quantitatively measured 
according to labour-time. Marx's 'labour theory of value' is inextricably bound up \\-ith 
the concept of objectification. He writes: 
A use-value, or useful article ... has value only because abstract human labour is 
objectified [vergegenstiindlicht] or materialized in it. How, then, is the magnitude 
of this value to be measured? By means of the quantity of the "value-forming 
substance", the labour, contained in the article. This quantity is measured by its 
duration, and the labour-time is itself measured on the particular scale of hours 
days etc.59 ' 
The homogeneous, abstractly calculable, purely quantitative labour-time that is 
objectified in the exchange value of a commodity is the labour-time of social labour, the 
socially average, socially necessary labour-time of individual workers. Marx writes: 
'[T]he labour that forms the substance of value is equal human labour, the expenditure 
of identical human labour-power. ... [Which constitutes], in order to produce a 
commodity, the labour time which is necessary on an average, or in other words is 
socially necessary. ,60 The social generality of labour produces the social generality of 
exchange value, and the socially general average amount of qualitatively empty labour-
time required to produce a commodity determines that commodity's qualitatively empty 
exchange value. 
Objectification is the overriding theme of both the early Marx of the 1844 
Manuscripts and the mature Marx of Capital. In both it is analysed in terms of the 
capitalist expropriation of labour and its products. Marx's later labour theory of value 
and his earlier theory of alienation are both ways of theoretically describing the capitalist 
expropriating objectification of labour. The term' Vergegenstiindlichung' (translated as 
'objectification') is prevalent throughout his writings. This continuity belies the 
Althusserian thesis of a discontinuity between the early 'humanist' Marx's concern with 
alienation and the later 'scientific' Marx's concern with the social relations of 
production. 
For Marx, the objectification of labour in exchange value, vza its practical 
abstraction as general homogeneous labour, involves an exchange between labour and 
capital that forms the basis of labour's exploitation and expropriation. The limitless 
value-creating activity of living labour is acquired by capital. and in return labour 
receives a pre-measured, already objectified quantity of value. Marx writes in the 
Grzmdrisse: 'The worker. .. sells labour as a simple, predetermined exchange value. 
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determined by a previous process - he sells labour itself as objectified labour; . .. capital 
buys it as living labour, as the general productive force of wealth ... [The worker] divests 
himself [entaussert sich] of labour as the force productive of wealth; capital appropriates 
it, as such. ,61 The commodification of labour itself involves the expropriation of wealth 
creating power. The wage that labour receives, the price of the labour-commodity, bears 
no relation to the value that labour creates. Marx writes: 
What the worker exchanges with capital is his labour itself (the capacity of 
disposing over it); he divests himself of it [entaussert sie]. What he obtains as 
price is the value of this divestiture [Entausserung]. He exchanges value-positing 
activity for a pre-determined value, regardless of the result of his activity. Now 
how is its value determined? By the objectified labour contained in his 
commodity. This commodity exists in his vitality. . .. Capital has paid him the 
amount of objectified labour contained in his vital forces. 62 
This objectifying alienation [Entauj3erung] is a divestment, expropriation, and 
commodification of the productive life activity of living labour, in return for the 
exchange value, or objectified labour, that is enough to maintain the subsistence, health, 
and thus reproducibility of to-be-objectified living labour. Thus labour creates the wealth 
of society, but, in return, is paid only enough to maintain itself effectively as labour. 
This exchange allows for the production of surplus value, which, for Marx, amounts to 
an extortion of value from labour. He writes in Capital: '[T]he valorization process is 
essentially the production of surplus-value, i.e. the objectification of unpaid labour. ,63 
Value-creating living labour is bought with objectified labour, or money as exchange 
value. It is the labour-time of living labour that determines exchange value, but when 
that living labour is itself commodified, objectified as a unit of duration, its exchange 
value is equivalent to the objectified labour-time socially required to produce the 
commodities whose use value can maintain its mere existence as living labour. This 
exchange of living labour for objectified 'dead' labour both maintains and rests on the 
poverty and lack of property of the workers. Marx writes in the Grundrisse: 
Production based on exchange value ... is at its base the exchange of objectified 
labour as exchange value for living labour as use value ... At the same time, the 
condition of exchange value is its measurement by labour time, and hence hying 
labour - not its value - as measure of values .... [Labour] appears as mere labour 
on one side, while on the other side its product, as objectified labour, has an 
entirely independent existence as value opposite it. The exchange of labour for 
labour ... rests on thefoundation of the lvorker's properfylessness.64 
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The propertylessness of living labour, its status as 'mere labour', its constant 
expropriation by capital, makes possible the qualityless insubstantiality of value. the 
universal substitutability of exchange value and the accumulation of abstract financial 
wealth through the production of surplus value. 
The living labour that is required to produce exchange value is thus necessarily 
propertyless. In its very existence as abstract homogeneous qualityless labour it is 
always already expropriated, pre-expropriated, or, to use Derrida' s term, ex-
appropriated. This non-objectified labour, a purely subjective labour devoid of objects 
and objectivity, a productive negativity entirely separated from its products, is the 
precondition of the existence of the insubstantial substitutability of exchange value, 
which is its spectral objectification. Marx writes: 
Separation of property from labour appears as the necessary law of [the] 
exchange between capital and labour. Labour posited as not-capital as such is: 
(1) not-objectified labour [nicht-vergegenstandlichte Arbeit], conceived 
negatively . .. This living labour, existing as ... this complete denudation, purely 
subjective existence of labour, stripped of all objectivity .... (2) Not-objectified 
labour, not-value, conceived positively, or as a negativity in relation to itself, is 
the not-objectified, hence non-objective, i.e. subjective existence of labour itself. 
Labour not as an object, but as activity; not as itself value, but as the living 
source ofvalue. 65 
This pure labour, appropriated by capital as a use value that produces exchange value, is 
sold to capital as an objectified exchange value, measured as limited units of labour-
time. The productive nothingness of pure labour is a limitless determinability that has 
always already lost its determinations. Marx refers to 'labour pure and simple, abstract 
labour; absolutely indifferent to its particular specificity [Bestimmheit (determination)], 
but capable of all specificities. ,66 'All specificities' are appropriated by capital and 
alienated from labour. 
The empty, insubstantial, indeterminacy of abstract homogeneous social labour 
has its limitless determinability appropriated by capital, taking the form of the limitlessly 
substitutable determinability of exchange value, entirely separated from the labour that 
makes it possible, a labour left indeterminate and propertyless. The poverty of 
indeterminacy is rigorously separated from the richness of determinability. The 
nothingness of indeterminacy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of 
determinabili ty. 
As we have seen, for Marx, production on the basis of exchange \'alue is the 
precondition of the existence of the 'universally developed individual'. whose free 
125 
detenninability involves not being restricted to a specific determination. This mode of 
production, i.e. capitalism, simultaneously makes possible and inhibits the formation of 
such an individual. The free detenninability is abstractly socialised, a characteristic of 
society as a whole entirely separated and alienated from the individual. A post-capitalist 
overcoming of alienation would involve an internalisation of this social determinability 
on the part of the individual. While, in such a society, the products of labour would not 
be alienated and expropriated from the producers, the generality and sociality of 
production, itself dependent on abstract labour, would be maintained. The generality of 
production would not produce the generality of exchange value, of money, which is but 
the alienation of human generality; it would produce human generality and 
substitutability, not the financial liquidity of exchange value but the social flexibility of 
the multi-faceted individual. Marx writes: '[I]n communist society, where nobody has 
one exclusive sphere of activity ... society regulates the general production and thus 
makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the 
morning, fish in the afternoon ... criticize after dinner ... without ever becoming hunter, 
fishennan ... or critic. ,67 
It is unfortunate that Marx here uses pre-capitalist, pastoral examples whose 
relation to 'general production' is not entirely clear. This raises the question of whether 
the generality of production upon which this overcoming of the division of labour 
depends does not itself depend upon this same division of labour. However, the abstract 
labour at the basis of the generality and sociality of production does not necessarily 
involve a rigorous, rigid, and inflexible assignment of labour-roles to individuals. Its 
very abstraction opens the possibility of substitutability. The point here is that the 
overcoming of exchange value is not an 'exorcism' of the spectrality of differance and 
the manifestation of the fullness of presence in a humanised sociality, but rather a 
reabsorption of differance, in the fonn of an indeterminacy productive of free infinite 
detenninability, into the individual, from whom it had been separated and alienated in 
the fonn of exchange value or money. 
Although exchange value may have the form of differance, it is largely 
experienced in the fonn of the fetishism of commodities, a form of consciousness which 
involves a fixation on the spectral embodiment of exchange value as if it is a substantial 
thing, fully present, and not what it really is, a social relation. The commodity fetish is 
an ossified presence that is nothing but an effacement of differance, relationality, and the 
temporality of its becoming. Marx's analysis of the commodity form in terms of 
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objectified labour deconstructs that fetishistic presence. For Derrida, presence is but an 
effect of difjerance that hides and effaces its differential nature. To restate it with more 
pertinent and specific tenninology, presence is an objectification and reification of the 
productive negativity of difjerance, of the living negativity of becoming, of 'ex-
appropriated' and propertyless, objectless living labour, an objectification effaced and 
hidden through the fetishistic presentation of the fullness of substance. In the 
Grundrisse, Marx writes: 
[C]ommodities ... are objectified labour . ... [DJistinct from objectified labour is 
non-objectified labour, labour which is still objectifying itself, labour as 
subjectivity. Or, objectified labour, i.e. labour which is present in space, can also 
be opposed, as past labour, to labour which is present in time. If it is to be 
present in time, alive, then it can be present only as the living subject, ... hence 
as worker. 68 
An ossification or 'congealment' of labour in the commodity-fetish, which presents itself 
in the simple positivity of a thing, is 'presence' as objectification, reification, and 
presentation, which involves the spatialisation of time. However, the 'presence in time' 
of the non-objectified, purely subjective, productive negativity of a living, propertyless, 
bare singularity, is not 'presence' in the Derridian sense of the word, but what he calls 
'the here and now', which, in its always otherness, is precisely differance. 
Objectification, whether fetishised or not, is a form of consciousness. This does 
not mean that it is not a feature of the world of social reality, quite the contrary; 
consciousness is inherently social and 'objectively' effective. Marx writes: 'When we 
speak of the commodity as a materialisation [MateriaturJ of labour - in the sense of its 
exchange value - this itself is only an imaginary, that is a merely social mode of 
existence for the commodity which has nothing to do with its corporeal reality,.69 The 
influential distinction, promoted by Marx himself, between an idealist Hegelian 
philosophy of spirit, based on conscious contemplation, and a materialist Marxian 
philosophy of praxis, based on socio-economic reality, is thus misleading. 
In the 'First Thesis on Feuerbach', Marx concedes that German Idealist 
'subjectivity' is more active and practical than traditional materialist 'objectivity'. He 
writes: 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism ... is that the thing, reality, 
sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the object [ObjektsJ or of 
contemplatio~, but not as sensuous human acti\'ity. practi~e, not subjecti\'ely. 
Hence in contradistinction to materialism, the active SIde was de\'eloped , 
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abstractly by idealism ... Feuerbach wants sensuous objects ... but he does not 
conceive human activity itself as objective [gegenstandliche] activity. 70 
Traditional materialism, including that of Feuerbach, is here considered by Marx to 
involve objects observed by a contemplative subject. Existence conceived 'in the form 
of the object' is equated with existence conceived through the contemplative 
consciousness rigorously separated from its objects, and is contrasted with existence 
conceived 'subjectively', as practical activity. The conceiving of existence in terms of 
objects involves its division into positive isolated determinate stases standing opposed to 
the merely contemplative activity of an observing subject. As, for Marx, human activity 
is by definition 'subjective', his claim to 'conceive human activity itself as objective 
activity' involves a redefinition of the term gegenstandliche (translated as 'objective'). 
Here his use of the term 'gegenstandliche' ('objective') appears to have a similar 
meaning to his use of the term 'subjektiv' (,subjective'). Marx, of course, uses the word 
gegenstandliche ('objective') here to refer to activity in the world, in 'reality', nature, 
and society, as opposed to just in the theoretical contemplative realm of the mind, of 
mere ideas. This is, however, quite different to the use of the term to refer to the 
objectivity of objects, their petrified positive determinacy standing against the merely 
observing consciousness. The term 'objective [gegenstandliche], can mean either, 
'concerning things as fixed and determinate objects of contemplation', or simply 'in the 
world'. Marx's own confusion of the two meanings of the term 'gegenstandliche' is the 
basis of his critique of Hegel's conception of the overcoming of alienation. 
As we saw in the last chapter, Lukacs criticises Hegel's notion of absolute 
knowing for involving not only an abolition of alienation, but also an abolition of 
objectivity in general, claiming that it involved an ultimate internalisation and thus an 
affirmation of subjectivity and the self. We argued that Lukacs's critique depended on a 
spuriously individualistic interpretation of Hegel's conception of subjectivity, ignoring 
the professed actuality, as opposed to internality, of absolute spirit. Lukacs's critique of 
Hegel is a repetition of Marx's own critique in his 1844 Manuscripts, and directly 
derives from Lukacs's reading of them when they were first posthumously published in 
the 1930s. 
We have seen that Marx argues that there can be an alienated and an unalienated 
objectification, whereas for Hegel alienation and objectification are the same thing. 
Marx writes that Hegel's notion of consciousness 'takes offence not at estranged 
[enifremdet] objectivity, but at objectivity [GegensHindlichkeit] as SllCh. ,71 For Hegel, 
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objectivity as such is alienated objectivity, and it is objectivity as such that is overcome 
in the overcoming of alienation. Marx writes: '[F]or HegeL.. it is objectivity 
[Gegenstandlichkeit] which is to be annulled, because it is not the determinate character 
of the object [Gegenstandes], but rather its objective [gegenstandlicher] character that is 
offensive and constitutes estrangement [Entfremdung] for self-consciousness. ,72 
According to Marx, this notion of the overcoming of objectivity means that Hegel 
regards 'human nature' as entirely 'spiritual', as consciousness itself. Marx writes: 
'Objectivity [Gegenstandlichkeit] as such is regarded as an estranged human relationship 
which does not correspond to the essence of man, to self-consciousness. The 
reappropriation of the objective [gegenstiindlichen] essence of man ... therefore denotes 
not only the annulment of estrangement, but of objectivity [Gegenstandlichkeit] as well. 
Man ... is regarded as a non-objective [nicht-gegenstandliches], spiritual being. ,73 
Marx regards this Hegelian non-objectivity as a purely theoretical and 
contemplative state of being which is inactive as regards the world. This interpretation 
relies on regarding 'objectivity' as activity in the world and 'subjectivity' as 
contemplation. However, the reverse is the case in the Hegelian usage of these terms. As 
we have seen, the misunderstanding stems from a slippage across two different 
meanings of the term Gegenstiindlichkeit ('objectivity'), i.e. 'objectivity' as observed 
phenomena or as involvement in the world. Spirit that knows itself as spirit is 'non-
objective', because 'absolute knowing' is the self-consciousness of actuality; the world 
is not separated from, but is identical to, the subject that 'knows' it. This 'knowing' is 
not then the self-consciousness of some individual 'subject' separated from the world. 
Balibar points out that in Marx's philosophy of praxis 'the subject is nothing 
other than practice which has always already begun and continues indefinitely. ,74 In this 
regard Marx is contiguous with Hegel and German Idealism, and, according to Balibar, 
this notion of subjectivity means that 'Marx and his "materialism of practice" [is] the 
most accomplished form of the idealist tradition' .75 While an object is a static 
determinacy, a subject is an active determinability, a determinability dependent on its 
lack of given properties. The active nature of subjectivity is an effect of its 
propertylessness. Marx writes in the Grundrisse: '[T]he worker. .. stands there purely 
without objectivity, sUbjectively ... 76 [The] free worker [is] objectless, purely subjective 
labour capacity,.77 Objectivity is a static givenness, whereas subjectivity is a productive 
propertylessness. In Capital, Marx writes: '[L]abour constantly undergoes a 
transformation, from the form of unrest [Unruhe] into that of being [Sein], from the form 
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of motion [Bewegung] into that of objectivity [Gegenstandlichkeit]. ,78 The givenness of 
objectivity involves a dead stasis independent of living human activity. Marx writes that 
social forces 'confront the individual workers as something alien, objective, ready-made, 
existing without their intervention' .79 Thus, objectivity involves property, givenness, and 
the stasis of being, whereas sUbjectivity involves productive nothingness and the actiyity 
of becoming. 
When Marx uses the term 'gegenstandliche Tatigkeit' ('objective activity') he is 
referring to the activity of subjectivity in the world, and not to 'objectivity' in the sense 
of a positive givenness. He writes: 'In the act of positing ... this objective being does not 
fall from his state of "pure activity" into a creating of the object; on the contrary, his 
objective [gegensHindliches] product only confirms his objective [gegenstandliche] 
activity, his activity as the activity of an objective [gegenstandlichen], natural being. ,80 
Marx also uses the term gegenstandliches ('objective') to refer to relationality as such, 
and not just to the relation between a given object and a subject of contemplation. He 
writes: 'A being which has no object [Gegenstand] outside itself is not an objective 
[gegenstandliches] being. A being which is not itself an object for some third being has 
no being for its object; i.e. it is not objectively related. ,81 
The so-called 'objectivity' of both living negative activity in the world and 
intrinsic relationality is precisely the annulment of the 'objectivity' of the world as the 
dead static positivity of a reified givenness. Thus Marx's notion of an unalienated 
objectification, of free productive activity in the social world, is, to say the least, not 
interpretatively incompatible with the Hegelian annulment of 'objectivity' in the non-
objective actuality of the 'subjectivity' of absolute spirit. 
Humanising Appropriation 
This abolition of the reified positivity of 'objectivity' is described by Marx in terms of 
the humanisation of nature. Marx writes, in the 1844 Manuscripts: '[W]hen the objective 
world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers ... all 
objects become for him the objectification of himself. .. become his objects: that is, man 
himself becomes the object. ,82 The unalienated human lives in a world in which she 
belongs and which belongs to her, which is an expression of her own nature, a world 
with which she identifies and feels at one. Marx writes: '[I]n his work upon the objecti\'c 
world ... [t]hrough this production, nature appears as his work and his reality .... [H]e 
sees himself in a world that he has created. ,83 This appropriation of the \\'orld is 
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perverted by the institution of private property, which, in its reified externality, separates 
and estranges the social world from human life. Private property ironically amounts to 
an expropriation, an expropriation of the world from humanity. Marx writes: "The 
positive transcendence of private property as the appropriation of human life, is 
therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement [Entfremdung], .84 For Marx. 
true appropriation involves a sensual and intellectual unity with the world, and must be 
liberated from the mere possession which is the alienation of all the senses, of all the 
human relations with the world. Marx writes: 
[H]is human relations to the world ... are ... the appropriation of the object, the 
appropriation of human reality. Their orientation to the object is the 
manifestation of the human reality, it is human activity ... Private property has 
made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it. .. In 
the place of all physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer 
estrangement of all these senses, the sense of having . ... The abolition of private 
property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and 
qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes 
have become ... human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has 
become a social, human object - an object made by man for man. 85 
Genuine human appropriation is the formation of nature as human reality through free 
productive activity, involving a unity with the world that is free from the estranged 
externality of mere possession and utility. 
In Derridian terms, the human who 'sees himself in a world that he has created' 
appears to be entangled in the narcissistic enclosure of metaphysical presence. In the 
Grundrisse, Marx writes: 'Property ... originally means no more than a human being's 
relation to his natural conditions of production[,]... relations to them as natural 
presuppositions of his self, which only form ... his extended body[,] [relating] to the 
earth as the individual's inorganic body[,]... as to a presupposition belonging to his 
individuality, as modes of his presence [Dasein]. ,86 Appropriation is thus another word 
for the humanisation of nature. 
The notion of the world as a human creation is suggestive of a form of idealism. 
However, in The German Ideology, Marx claims that 'ideas' are the expressions of 
'material relationships' .87 In his early book, Positions, Derrida is interviewed by two 
Marxists, lean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta, who argue that Marx's assertion of 
the primacy of 'matter' to "consciousness' undermines the narcissistic enclosure of 
consciousness in a proto-deconstructive manner. Here, Derrida expresses scepticism 
131 
towards the suggestion that materialism has been a force of resistance within the history 
of metaphysics. He says: 
[I]~... m~tter... de~i.gnates... radical alterity (I will specify: in relation to 
phIlosophIcal opposItions), then what 1 write can be considered "materialist." ... 
[T]hings are not so simple. It is not always in the materialist text... that the 
concept .of matter has been defined as absolute exterior or radical heterogeneity . 
... [T]hIs concept ['matter'] has been too often reinvested with "logocentric" 
valu~s, values associated with those of thing, reality, presence in general, 
senSIble presence, for example, substantial plentitude[.]88 
Derrida suggests that it is 'rather new' to attribute the concept of 'alterity' to 
materialism.89 By the time he wrote Spectres of Marx, he felt free to explicitly attribute 
metaphysical qualities to Marx's materialism. He writes: 'Marxist ontology was ... 
struggling against the ghost in general, in the name of living presence as material 
actuality' .90 For Derrida, this ontology of material presence is just as prevalent in the 
analysis of the commodity form in Capital as it is in Marx's early works. Derrida writes: 
'There is a mirror, and the commodity form is also this mirror, but. .. since it does not 
reflect back the expected image, those who are looking for themselves can no longer 
find themselves in it. Men no longer recognize in it the social character of their own 
labor.,91 According to Derrida, Marx's critique of the commodity form involves an 
advocacy of de-commodification as a narcissistic humanisation in the fullness of 
presence of a 'material actuality', it being human expression in a material presence that 
is effaced by the spectrality of the commodity. Thus, alienation is a failed narcissism and 
de-alienation would be a narcissistic self-confirmation. 
Such narcissism is the principle target of Derridian deconstruction. Derrida refers 
to 'the very concept of narcissism whose aporias are. . . the explicit theme of 
deconstruction.'92 However, Marx's notion of a humanising appropriation need not be 
interpreted in terms of the enclosure of a narcissistic self-confirmation. To understand 
what 'humanisation' might entail, it is necessary to understand what Marx means by the 
word 'human'. We have already argued that Marx's understanding of the so-called 
human essence is of a conscious being qua living instantiation of an insubstantial, 
infinitely determinable, universality. A 'humanising' appropriation of the world would 
thus bring it into the realm of the unrestricted freedom of universal consciousness, 
rendering the world itself as infinitely determinable. This may be read as implying a 
domineering conscious control over nature, a utilitarian instrumentalistic mastery of the 
subject over its objects, and thus a self-confirmingly narcissistic suppression of alterity. 
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However, this is not how Marx represents it in the 1844 Manuscripts. As we have seen, 
Marx regards the universality of humanity, its Gattungswesen, as liberating it from the 
immediate particularity of utilitarian concerns. Animals are trapped in the immediate 
particularity of need, whereas humans qua humans, unalienated humans, 'produce 
universally', free from need, for its own sake. 93 Such humans produce and consume as 
ends in themselves, not as mere means to other ends. Marx writes: 'For the starving man, 
it is not the human form of food that exists' .94 This man is in a dehumanised thrall to the 
immediate particularity of need; in his actualised human condition he is free from need 
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and so enjoys the activity of eating for its own sake, free from mere instrumental utility. 
Marx writes regarding unalienated humanity: 'The senses... relate themselves to the 
thing for the sake of the thing ... Need or enjoyment has consequently lost its egotistical 
nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use. ,95 A non-
egotistical, non-narcissistic humanising appropriation would thus involve an interaction 
with nature not as a positive givenness to be simply utilised, but as a manifold to be 
experienced. 
Universal An-Economy 
As the 'free productive activity' of the unalienated condition is inherently liberated from 
need and utility, it is not 'productive' at all, in the usual 'economic' sense of the term. 
What Derrida terms a 'restricted economy' of calculative productive appropriability, he 
opposes to a 'general economy' of non-appropriable non-productive activity. If 
something is conceived as radically being an end in itself, it ceases to circulate in any 
economy of calculably purposive productive meaningfulness. In his essay, 'Differance', 
Derrida describes differance as the impossible thinking together of the restricted 
economy of productive reappropriation and the general economy of non-productive loss. 
He writes: 
How are we to think simultaneously, on the one hand, differance as the economic 
detour which, in the element of the same, always aims at coming back to the ... 
presence ... deferred by ... calculation, and, on the other hand, differance as .. : the 
irreparable loss of presence, the irreversible usage of energy ... and as the entIrely 
other relationship that apparently interrupts every economy? . . . [T]he 
economical and the noneconomical, the same and the entirely other, etc., cannot 
be thought together. ... [D]ifferance is unthinkable in this way... I haye 
attempted to indicate ... a rigorous ... relating of the "~estr.icted economy" ~hat 
takes no part in expenditure without reserve, death, opemng Itself to n~ru:neanmg, 
etc., to a general economy that takes into account the nonreserve ... If It can be 
96 put thus. 
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Although economy and an-economy cannot be thought together, they cannot be 
absolutely separated either. A deconstructive reading can always demonstrate the 
inherence of the unappropriable excess of irreducible otherness within the restricted 
economy of the selfsame, while it can also demonstrate how the apprehension of the 
singular otherness of an absolute outside is always already caught up in the terms of the 
specular logic of the all-encompassing restricted economy of meaning, and thus 
appropriated, recuperated, and domesticated. 
Anything imbued with value, meaning and purpose is inherently involved in a 
restricted economy. The latter is a circulation of exchange, reference, and teleological 
relations, which is restricted in that it remains constant to itself, not allowing itself to 
dissipate in non-meaning and purposelessness. Such a dissipation would open it up to 
general economy, an 'economy' of non-productive expenditure. The term 'general 
economy' is paradoxical, as this type of generality is non-economic. That which is 
economic is part of a circulatory system that is ultimately closed, that produces and 
maintains itself in its proper limits, its oikos. For this reason, the term 'general economy" 
is largely replaced by the term 'an-economy' in Derrida's later works. 
A restricted economy of meaning means everything is a means to an end; 
productive purposiveness is itself that which makes sense. What cannot be made sense 
of is that which is radically an end in itself. The latter is an-economic, unproductive, 
pointless and senseless. As we have seen, Marx's 'generic being', the Gattungswesen, is 
an indeterminate infinitely determinable universality which only comes into its own 
when freed from need. The active expression of this unconstrained determinable 
universality is what Marx calls 'free conscious activity', activity that is an end in itself, 
not a means. The alienation of humanity's 'generic being' involves making its life 
activity a mere means to physical subsistence. Thought radically, as an end in itself qua 
unappropriable purposelessness, this 'free conscious activity' is an-economic. 
Despite the fact that Marx describes free activity as that which is not a means to 
an end, but an end in itself,97 he still uses the term produktive (,productive') in his 
descriptions of such free activity. For example, he writes: '[M]an produces [produ.::iert] 
when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. ,98 The 
later Marx refers to freedom as something separate from production, but the difference 
from his earlier formulation is merely terminological, not conceptual. In the . Results of 
the Immediate Process of Production', Marx uses the term prodllktive (,productive') to 
refer to labour that produces capital and the term unproduktive (,unproductive') to refer 
to labour that does not. He writes: 
Th~ capitalist mode of production. " is a process which absorbs unpaid labour, 
whIch makes the means of production into the means for extorting unpaid labour. 
... [L ]abour with the same content can be either productive or unproductive. '" 
Milton, who wrote Paradise Lost was an unproductive worker. ... [He] produced 
Paradise Lost . .. as an activation of his own nature .... It is possible for work of 
one type ... to be performed ... either in the service of an industrial capitalist or on 
behalf of the immediate consumer. '" [The worker] is a productive worker in the 
one case and unproductive in the other, because in the one he produces capital 
and in the other not; because in the one case his work is a factor in the self-
valorization process of capital and in the other it is not. 99 
In this passage the terms Arbeit (,labour') and Produktion (,production') are 
distinguished. 'Productive' labour is appropriable, extortable, and value creating labour. 
Labour that expresses and actualizes the worker's 'own nature', unalienated labour, is 
'unproductive'. However, this passage refers to what is designated productive under 
capitalism. The terminology is used differently elsewhere in Marx's writings. A famous 
passage from Capital Volume 3 rigorously separates the realm of freedom from 
production, while equating production and labour. Marx writes: 
[T]he realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined 
by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things 
it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production ... Freedom in this field 
can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating 
their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of 
being ruled by it ... But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond 
it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true 
realm of freedom which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of 
. . b . 100 
necessIty as ItS aSIs. 
Here, freedom is conceived as being a liberation from both production and labour. 
Production may make freedom possible, but freedom itself does not involve production. 
Freedom is here determined as activity that is an end in itself, not a means to a further 
end. Marx's emphasis on production here is a recognition of the fact that the freedom of 
non-productive expenditure depends on the prior fulfillment of utilitarian needs. 
The notion of 'an-economy' is related to ethics in Spectres of Marx. Derrida 
refers to Kant's moral philosophy, where humans are considered as ends in themselves 
not to be used as means to further ends, as an-economic, He mentions . that 
unconditional dignity (Wiirdigkeit) that Kant placed higher, precisely Uustement] , than 
I 101 K' "k' d f d' any economy, any compared or comparable va ue'. ant s utopIan mg om 0 en s 
is a general an-economy. Derrida also advocates a Levinasian conception of justice as an 
an-economic 'relation' to alterity. He refers to 'justice as incalculability of the gift and 
singularity of the an-economic ex-position to others.' 102 For Derrida, the empty. 
insubstantial, unspecific universality of humans is precisely what makes them open to 
alterity and futurity, 'futurity' being the temporal equivalent of the spatial term, 
'openness'. He writes, regarding this human indeterminacy: '[A]n essential lack of 
specificity, an indetermination that remains the ultimate mark of the future[,] '" 
[m]arking any opening to the event and to the future as such, it ... conditions the interest 
in and not the indifference to anything whatsoever, to all content in general.' 103 It is 
human empty insubstantiality and propertyless universality that provide the non-basis of 
a de-alienated communism to-come. Derrida speaks of an 'alliance ... without property 
(the "communism" that we will later nickname the new International).' 104 
De-alienation is not a re-establishment of the narcissistic enclosure of 
metaphysical presence; it is, rather, the manifestation of the free determinability of 
negative universality within the life of the human individual. Capitalism realizes such 
universality on a macro-social level, but alienates it from the individual. This alienation 
involves universal determinability taking the form of the 'spectrality' of money and 
exchange value. For Marx, humanity's 'generic being' is an insubstantial unessential 
universality, not tied to specificity, which is the basis of its social relationality, but 
which is alienated from the individual through capitalist social relations and the division 
of labour, which in tum tie her to specific determinacy. Exchange value and capitalist 
social universality in general are an objectification of general abstract homogeneous 
labour, labour that amounts to emptily quantitative units of labour-duration. This is an 
objectification separated from the life of the individual, involving an extortionate 
expropriation. An unalienated objectification, an actualisation of an individual's free 
determinability, is not incompatible with the 'idealist' notion of an actualising 
subjectification. This involves free activity that interacts with a nature free from merely 
utilitarian appropriation. Such free unalienated activity is an end in itself, not a means to 
an end and is thus a liberation from the 'economic' interpretation of 'labour' and , 
'production'. De-alienated society is thus a general an-economy. For Marx, this involves 
free human 'appropriation' liberated from any economy of the propeL from private 
property. 
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Chapter 4 
Heidegger's Deconstruction of Ontological Alienation 
Expropriation is an intrinsic aspect of the concept of alienation; the latter depends on a 
prior understanding of what is 'proper'. Heidegger is the thinker for whom 'the proper' 
is explicitly a principal concern. He is also the thinker whose critique of metaphysics 
Derrida regards himself as furthering. Thus Heidegger could hardly be overlooked by an 
inquiry into the concept of alienation in the light of Derridian deconstruction. 
The question to be investigated is the extent to which Heidegger's writings are a 
response to, and a deepening of the critique of, the phenomenon of alienation. Notions of 
objectification, technicity, and finitude, will be analysed with regard to this question. 
There will be a discussion of Heidegger's notions of appropriation and authenticity. and 
the nexus of concepts summed up by Derrida's term 'the proper', involving an analysis 
of the relation of such concepts to the notion of singularity. The overall aim is to assess 
the extent to which the Heideggerian 'proper', in any of its forms, necessarily depends, 
as Derrida maintains, on a metaphysics of presence and suppression of difference. 
The Presence of Alienation 
It may be argued that it is inappropriate to speak of the concept of alienation in 
Heidegger's work, as alienation belongs to a paradigm alien to that of Heidegger. It 
inheres within the thought of Hegel and Marx, a particular configuration of the 
metaphysics centred on the concepts of 'subject' and 'object'. Heidegger's aim is to 
overcome metaphysics in general, and the post-Cartesian 'philosophy of the subject' in 
particular. However, a number of thinkers have regarded 'alienation' as being one of 
Heidegger's principal concerns. Marxist thinkers such as Lukacs and Adorno regarded 
Heidegger as 'ontologising', i.e. de-historicising and de-socialising, alienation, rendering 
it an essential and permanent feature of the human condition. In the 1967 preface to 
History and Class Consciousness Lukacs writes regarding the 1920s: 'The unmasking of 
alienation by philosophy was in the air. .. In the philosophical, cultural criticism of the 
bourgeoisie (and we need look no further than Heidegger), it was naturaL .. to convert an 
essentially social alienation into an eternal "condition humaine", .1 In his critique of 
Heidegger, The Jargon of Authentici(v, Adorno writes: 'What Hegel and Marx in their 
youth condemned as alienation and reification... is what Heidegger interprets 
ontologically as well as unhistorically,.2 Whatever their level of understanding of 
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Heidegger, some eminent thinkers regarded alienation as being one of his principal 
concerns. 
Heidegger explicitly refers to Marx's concept of alienation in his 'Letter on 
Humanism'. He writes: 'What Marx recognized in an essential and significant sense, 
though derived from Hegel, as the estrangement [Entfremdung] of man has its roots in 
the homelessness of modem man. This homelessness is specifically evoked from the 
destiny of Being in the form of metaphysics, and through metaphysics is simultaneously 
entrenched and covered up as such.,3 Thus what Marx describes as the alienation of the 
worker under capitalist relations of production is, for Heidegger, rooted in a more 
fundamental predicament of modem humanity, what Heidegger calls Heimatlosigkeit 
(translated as 'homelessness'). 
Homelessness and its manifestation in the form of 'metaphysics' constitute a 
'forgetting of Being'. The latter is a forgetting of the distinction between entities and 
being, the ontico-ontological difference. Such a 'forgetting' is definitive of a 
consciousness that is only concerned with entities and not the being of those entities. 
Being as such is not itself an entity, not a being, though 'metaphysics' traditionally treats 
it as such and in so doing effaces it. The human being, referred to onto logically by 
Heidegger as 'Dasein' (,existence' or 'being-there'), is that entity which is 'ontically 
distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. ,4 Therefore, 
when Dasein is oblivious of being, it is estranged from its 'essence', inauthentic and 
homeless. Heidegger writes: 'Homelessness ... consists in the abandonment of Being by 
beings. Homelessness is the symptom of the oblivion of Being.,5 In describing Marx's 
concept of alienation as 'rooted' in homelessness, Heidegger is suggesting that Marx's 
theory is too superficial, and that the overcoming of 'social alienation' would require 
addressing a more primordial ontological 'alienation'. He writes: '[T]he overcoming of 
homelessness begin[ s] from Being, a homelessness in which not only man but the 
essence of man stumbles aimlessly about.,6 Thus, contrary to the claims made by Lukacs 
and Adorno, Heidegger does regard 'alienation', however 'ontologised', as 
surmountable. 
Heidegger himself uses the term Entfremdung (translated as 'alienation') in 
Being and Time. It is one of the characteristics of what he calls Verfallen (translated as 
'falling'). He writes: 'Dasein ... drifts along towards an alienation [Entfremdung] in 
which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the-world 
is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating. ,7 Such 'falling' 
is a falling away from Dasein's concern for its own being, for its eventual non-being. for 
its ownness itself, its 'authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]', into the social realm of 'the they 
[das Man]" a realm of inauthenticity where being is necessarily forgotten, as being is 
irreducibly singular, 'in each case mine'. 8 Falling is a state where Dasein "'lives" alt'GI' 
from itself.9 However, the alienation involved in falling does not entail the loss of 
Dasein to an alien entity; it is an essential possibility of Dasein itself, Dasein in its 
inauthentic (i.e. not concerned with its own being) aspect. Heidegger writes: 'This 
alienation [Entfremdung] closes ojJfrom Dasein its authenticity ... It does not, hO\\'ever, 
surrender Dasein to an entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its 
inauthenticity - into a possible kind of Being of itself. The alienation [Entfremdung] of 
falling - at once tempting and tranquillizing - leads by its own movement, to Dasein' s 
getting entangled [verfangt] in itself.' 10 In this alienation Dasein is not uninterested in 
itself, in terms of self-analysis or introspection, quite the contrary; it is, nevertheless, 
alienated from its own being. 
In the first chapter we discussed the link between the concept of alienation and 
the myth of the fall. However, despite choosing to use a word with such associations, 
Heidegger is at pains to dissociate his concept of 'falling' from the fall. He writes: 'The 
phenomenon of falling does not give us something like a "night view" of Dasein.,. our 
existential-ontological Interpretation makes no ontical assertion about the "corruption of 
human Nature" ... [it] is prior to any assertion about corruption or incorruption. Falling 
is conceived ontologically as a kind of motion.' 11 Falling is not a fall from an entity's 
originary pure essence into its impure corrupted form; it is a fall from a concern with 
being into an oblivion of being. Likewise, for Heidegger, alienation is not an alienation 
of an entity from its essence, but the alienation of that entity from being as such. 
In his posthumously published book, Mindfulness [Besinnung] (composed m 
1938-9), Heidegger equates the alienation from being with a de-humanising reification. 
He writes: '[W]ith the help of the rational appeal to the rationally conceived and pursued 
beings the utmost estrangement from be-ing is achieved. This is the end of man in total 
"dis-humanization".,12 Such 'rationality' involves inquiring into things solely at the 
level of their ontical 'whatness', at the level of entities and not the being of the entities. 
thus abandoning the question of being, the 'why?' of fundamental inquiry into being as 
such. For Heidegger, this abandonment of being is de-humanising, because the human, 
understood in fundamental ontological terms as Dasein, is that being for whom being as 
such is an issue. He writes: '[T]he more unconstrainedly the "dis-humanizing" of man 
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bears itself... the more exclusively he explains himself in terms of that which is 
neutrally extant [vorhanden] and objectively found in him ... But how can this "dis-
humanization" of man be overcome? Only from the decision to ground the truth of be-
ing.,13 The 'rationalisation' that involves regarding humans in the form of objectified 
and present-at-hand [vorhanden] entities de-humanises in that it alienates humans from 
being. Heidegger's 'ontologisation' of alienation does not render the latter 
insurmountable, it just means that alienation can only be overcome ontologically. 
Derrida is critical of Heidegger's aim of overcoming ontological expropriation. 
Derrida's project of the 'deconstruction' of metaphysics derives rhetorically from 
Heidegger's project of the 'destruction [Destruktion], of metaphysics. Despite this, the 
aims of the two projects are antithetical. Heidegger's Destruktion is aimed at 
overcoming the forgetting of being, the concealment of being by traditional metaphysics. 
Regarding traditional ontology, or metaphysics, Heidegger writes in Being and Time: 
If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this 
hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has 
brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which ... we 
are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those 
primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the 
nature of Being ... But this destruction is ... far from having the negative sense of 
shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the 
positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its 
t· . [] 14 zmlfs . 
Thus the notion of Destruktion involves a kind of immanent critique of the ontological 
tradition. This would be proto-Derridian were it not for the fact that its ultimate aim is 
the reawakening of the question of being. Derrida furthers the project of deconstructing 
metaphysics by dismissing Heidegger's ultimate aims as themselves metaphysical. For 
Derrida, the arch-deconstructive notion of 'difJerance' is more primordial, '''[0 ]lder" 
than Being itself .15 Its originary unoriginariness that 'unceasingly dislocates itself in a 
chain of differing and deferring substitutions' 16 must be affirmed without 'nostalgia' or 
'hope' for a lost presence. 17 Such an affirmation involves a Nietzschean 'active 
forgetting of Being' . 18 Derrida dissociates his work from that of Heidegger particularl y 
with regard to the concept of 'the proper', which involves a nexus of Heideggerian 
concepts, and which Derrida considers to be a form of the metaphysics of presence. 
Derrida says: 
I have marked quite explicitly ... a departure from the Heideggerean problemati~. 
This departure is related particularly to the concepts of origin and fall ... ThiS 
1.+.+ 
departu~e ~lso ... inte~enes as concerns the value proper (propriety. propriate, 
appr?~natlO~,. t?e entI:e family of Eigentlichkeit, Eigen, Ereignis) ... I have also 
exphc~tl~ cntIcIzed thIS value of propriety and of original authenticity, and.,. I 
even, If It can be put thus, started there .... [T]he Heideggerean problematic is the 
most "profound" and "powerful" defense of what I attempt to put into question 
under the rubric of the thought of presence. 19 
Derrida's starting point is the furthering of the critique of metaphysics by identifying 
Heidegger's purportedly anti-metaphysical concepts as themselves dependent on a 
metaphysics of presence. 
However, 'presence' is generally treated negatively in Heidegger's work. In 
Being and Time, the notion of 'falling' into the 'inauthenticity' of the 'they' involves a 
fixation with the present that alienates Dasein from being. Heidegger writes: 'In making 
present [Auch gegenwartigendJ ... Dasein ... has been alienated [enifremdet] from its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is based primarily on the authentic future and on 
authentically having been. ,20 This alienation is overcome in the 'anticipatory 
resoluteness' of authentic 'Being-towards-death' .21 Concern for being involves concern 
for non-being. The finite temporality of Being-towards-death constitutes authentic 
Dasein, because death, like being, is irreducibly singular, and thus absent from the 
fallen, inauthentic public realm of the 'they': 'The "they" never dies because it cannot 
die; for death is in each case mine'.22 Being-towards-death is the primordial temporality 
of Dasein's finitude, which Heidegger opposes to the unending temporality of the 'they', 
with its secondary, 'vulgar' experience of time as something that does not end. The 
fallen and inauthentic fixation with the present involves 'curiosity', the need to 
constantly find something new, which itself involves a forgetting of the past and future, 
Heidegger writes that this 'distracted not-tarrying becomes never-dwelling-anywhere. ,23 
Authentic temporality 'awakens' the present into an anticipatory futurity. He writes: 
'Primordial and authentic temporality ... awakens the Present. The primary phenomenon 
of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. ,24 This anticipatory futurity is not a 
projected future present, but an infusion of finitude that 'awakens' the tranquillised 
present to the projected end, eventual death. The overcoming of alienation and homeless 
non-dwelling is not a return to presence, but a return from the present to being, to the 
primordial, authentic, finite temporality of Being-towards-death. characterised by 
'anticipatory resoluteness', not fixation with the present. 
Derrida insists, however, that this reference to an authentic proximity to being is 
itself a return to a form of self-presence. In his essay on Heidegger, 'Ousia and 
d ' I h authentl'c are determl'ned as the proper Gramme', he writes: 'The primor la, t e 
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(eigentlich) , that is, as the near (proper, proprius), the present in the proximity of self-
presence. ,25 For Derrida, the concepts of the proper, the authentic, and the ownmost, are 
dependent on the metaphysics of presence. The notion of the primordial or originary, 
upon which the concepts of the authentic and the proper depend, is also metaphysical, as 
it too depends on the notion of presence. Derrida writes: 
Now, is not the opposition of the primordial to the derivative still metaphysical? 
Is not the quest for an archia in general, no matter with what precautions one 
surrounds the concept, still the' essential' operation of metaphysics? '" [I]s there 
not at least some Platonism in the Verfallen? Why determine as fall the passage 
from one temporality to another? And why qualify temporality as authentic or 
proper (eigentlich) - and as inauthentic - or improper - when every ethical 
preoccupation has been suspended?26 
The connotations of ethical judgement surrounding the term 'authentic [eigentlich], do 
not preclude its use in an ethically neutral, 'matter-of-fact' manner, a use that Heidegger, 
however unconvincingly, insists he is employing. As Dasein is that entity for whom 
being as such is an issue, authentic Dasein is concerned with being, inauthentic Dasein 
is oblivious of being, inauthentic Dasein is oblivious of its Dasein. As we have seen in a 
previous chapter, Derrida regards the metaphysical notion of origin (or archia) as 
referring to a unified fullness of presence, not yet corrupted by plurality and alterity. Yet 
the Heideggerian 'archia' is an originariness (or primordiality) [Ursprunglichkeit] that is 
not a single unified plenitude, but an underivative, hence originary, multiplicity. This is 
demonstrated by his use of the term gleichursprunglich (translated as 'equiprimordial '). 
Heidegger writes: 
[T]he fact that something primordial is underivable does not rule out the 
possibility that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be constitutive for 
it. If these show themselves, then existentially they are equiprimordial 
[gleichursprunglich]. The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive 
items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically 
unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple 
'primal ground [UrgrundJ,.27 
Unlike the single simple unified ongm of traditional ontology, Heideggerian 
originariness can admit a fundamental multiplicity. Moreover, Heidegger's archia. or 
origin, is not traditionally metaphysical in that it is not an originary being, or entity. but 
simply being itself, or being as such. An origin, or Ursprung, is not only not necessarily 
a 'primal ground', or Urgrund, but also it is not necessarily an originary thing. or Ur-
sache; the latter is usually translated into English as 'cause', a primal cause being the 
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ultimate 'metaphysical' concept.28 Heidegger's philosophy bears a merely fonnal 
resemblance to metaphysics, in that if the central concept, 'being', is replaced by the 
concept of a primal entity, like 'God', 'Spirit', or 'energeia', it would be an actual 
metaphysics. It is not a metaphysics, because its fundamental concept is not a primal 
entity, but simply being as such. Heidegger is compelled to use the language of 
metaphysics, he has no other language at his disposal, in order to get at something more 
fundamental than metaphysics. To attack him for being metaphysical, as Derrida does, is 
to be guilty of formalism. 
Heidegger's critique of metaphysics itself involves a critique of the notion of 
presence. In Mindfulness he writes: 'The metaphysical determination of being as 
beingness grasps beingness as presence and constancy. ,29 It is precisely through 
presence that being is concealed. He refers to the 'pre-eminence of presencing and the 
"present" and constancy ... wherein be-ing as (enowning) refuses itself for a very long 
while. ,30 Presence is a form of the oblivion of being. Thus authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] 
as proximity to being is something other than a case of the metaphysics of presence. 
Heidegger writes: "'Ownedness [EigentlichkeitJ" is a determination that overcomes 
metaphysics as such. Correspondingly un-ownedness, [Un-eigentlichkeit]... means 
lostness to beings'. 31 Inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit] involves being trapped in the 
ontical realm of entities, the realm of presence. In Contributions To Philosophy 
Heidegger's concept of 'echo' echoes Derrida's concepts of 'trace' and 'spectrality', in 
that it undermines presence. He writes: 'Echo carries far into what has been and what is 
to come - hence ... its striking power on the present.,32 The metaphysical reign of 
presence is precisely what Heidegger himself is attempting to put into question. 
Present in Heidegger's work is a concern with alienation. Alienation itself 
involves a fixation with presence. Thus de-alienation does not involve a return to the 
fullness of presence. Presence involves an oblivion of being and de-alienation involves a 
dwelling in the proximity of being. 
Presence as Objectification 
Heidegger's work also displays a concern with and reaction to the phenomenon of 
alienation in the form of objectification and reification. The latter two concepts are 
intrinsic aspects of the Hegelian and Marxian theories of alienation. Lucien Goldmann 
bl . ,33 h goes so far as to argue that Heidegger's work represents the same 'pro ematlc as t at 
of Lukacs, the principle theorist of the Marxist notion of reification, and that Being and 
147 
Time is partly a response to Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness, specifically 
regarding the concept of reification. Goldmann claims that the fact that Being and Time 
concludes, on its final page, with a paragraph on the concept of reification indicates that 
it is a central concern of Heidegger's. Goldmann writes: 'The position of this text giyes 
particular significance to the problem of reification and indicates that it is a central 
problem of the discussion for Heidegger.,34 
Despite this, Heidegger is critical of the concept of reification as it is traditionally 
framed. As with Marx's concept of alienation, he insists on its' ontologisation', in other 
words, he claims that it does not go deeply enough, because it ignores the question of 
being. Reification [Verdinglichung] is explicitly discussed not only at the end, but also 
near the beginning of 'Part One' (the only existing part aside from the 'Introduction') of 
Being and Time. This discussion is part of an attempt by Heidegger to dissociate his 
'analytic of Dasein' from other philosophical protests at objectifying 'de-humanisation'. 
He mentions in this regard Dilthey's 'life-philosophy', Scheler's 'personalism', as well 
as Lukacs's (implicitly, as here the proper name is absent) theory of 'reification'. 
Heidegger's aim in this brief discussion is to 'show that those investigations and 
formulations of the question which have been aimed at Dasein heretofore, have missed 
the real philosophical problem (notwithstanding their objective fertility)' .35 The 
philosophical problem in question is the oblivion of the question of being. Heidegger 
claims that such oblivion is the root of reification, and hence that any genuine theory of 
the latter needs to address the problem of the former. He writes: 'The Thinghood itself 
which such reification implies must have its ontological origin demonstrated if we are to 
be in a position to ask what we are to understand positively when we think of the 
unreified Being of the subject, the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person.,36 The 
theory of reification, though 'objectively fertile', is limited to the ontical realm of 
entities, a limitation that prevents it from getting to the roots of the problem it raises. 
Goldmann writes: 'According to Heidegger, this entire problematic of reification is 
valid. Yet it is situated at the level of science, pertains to the ontic, and can only be 
clarified by ontological investigations which are not concerned with science.,37 
Heidegger's 'analytic of Dasein' is an ontological deepening of the critique of 
reification. 
Heidegger is similarly wary of the word Objektivierllng (,objectification '), while 
occasionally using it in a manner which indicates that it is one of his principal concerns. 
The wariness stems from his concern to overcome the philosophy of the subject with 
which the term 'object' is inherently bound. In Being and Time the term is usually 
qualified with quotation marks.38 However, it is identified with his own concept of 
'presence-at-hand [Vorhandenheit],. He makes this identification when discussing the 
inherence of these concepts within the 'representational' model of positivist science, a 
model which deals with things in terms of 'presence'. He writes: 'Being which 
Objectifies [Das objektivierende Sein] ... is characterized by a distinctive kind of making 
- present [Gegenwartigung]. This making-present is... the kind of discovering which 
belongs to the science in question [which] awaits solely the discoveredness of the 
present-at-hand.,39 This is echoed in Contributions to Philosophy when he writes that 
'modem "science'" abandons being by 'thinking of beings as re-presented ob-ject' .40 In 
fact, the 'modem' 'abandonment of being' in general involves objectification. He writes: 
'[T]he abandonment of being[,] ... by its own unique ways of uncovering beings and 
their "pure" objectification, ... interpenetrates a definite appearing which is seemingly 
without background and fully groundless. ,41 The forgetting of being is manifested in the 
reduction of everything to the sphere of quantitative calculability, the latter being the 
primal characteristic of the paradigm of 'representation' and 'obj ectification'. He refers 
to quantitative calculability as 'what is ownmost to the dominion of re-presenting as 
such and the objectification of beings. ,42 It is clear that Heidegger regards objectification 
as a fundamental component of the forgetting of being. 
Heidegger only uses the term 'reification' in reference to someone else's theory. 
However, he comes to use the term 'objectification' as a part of his own critique (mainly 
in his posthumously published works of the late 1930s). This is perhaps because an 
'object' is something more precise than a 'thing'. 'Object' is a type of 'thing', or rather, 
it is a particular way of relating to thinghood. In his later essay, 'The Thing', Heidegger 
argues that objectification does violence to thinghood. He writes: '[T]he thingly 
character of the thing does not consist in its being a represented object, nor can it be 
. f h b· ,43 defined in any way in terms of the objectness, the over-agamstness, 0 teo ~ect. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger identifies two ways of relating to things, in terms 
of 'presence-at-hand [Vorhandenheit]" their givenness to observation, and 'readiness-to-
hand [Zuhandenheit]" their practical manipulability. Present-at-hand entities are objects 
standing before the observing theoretical consciousness. An object is identical to a 
present-at-hand entity. In Contributions to Philosophy he writes that in the abandonment 
of being 'beings are manifest ... as object and as extant [vorhanden] ' .44 As the category 
of the 'present-at-hand' [l'orhanden] involves an oblivion of being. it is inappropriate to 
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use it to refer to the kind of entity called Dasein. In Being and Time Heidegger writes: 
'[A]ny entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in the broadest 
) ,45 'Th b d t ' . . sense . e roa es sense III questIOn means all ontically bound entities, entities 
which are not Dasein, conceived prior to, and separately from, their involvement in the 
world of ready-to-hand [zuhanden] practicality. Goldmann identifies Heidegger's notion 
of the 'present-at-hand' with Lukacs's notion of 'reified consciousness'. He writes: 
Lukacs ... show~d how this reification, bound to market production, finally led 
to ... the perceptIOn of the external world as a pure object only capable of being 
know~ and modifie~, to what Heidegger would call Vorhandenheit ... [According 
to Heldegger, there IS a tendency] to understand 'Being-there' (man) on the basis 
of the world as Vorhanden, which is none other than the Marxist and Lukacsian 
analysis which tells us that, in reification, human reality and social facts are 
understood as things.46 
The present-at-hand is a product of reification qua objectification. The critical tenn 
'presence-at-hand [Vorhandenheit], is the principal component of Heidegger's 
ontologising deepening of the critique of reification. 
This terminological association only applies if 'reification [Verdinglichung], is 
identified with 'objectification', as it is for the Lukacs of History and Class 
Consciousness. In this case, both the terms 'reification' and 'presence-at-hand' refer to 
the abstraction of entities from the world, from their inherence in a living environment. 
This use of the term 'reification' is not appropriate for the later Heidegger of 'The 
Thing' essay (presented in 1950), who tries to rescue the 'thingly character of the thing' 
from the tentacles of objectifying presence-at-hand. Here 'the thing' is inherently 
worldly. Heidegger writes: 'The thing things world. ,47 The worldliness from which 
presence-at-hand is an ossifying abstraction is the pre-theoretical realm of ready-to-hand 
[zuhanden] practical 'everydayness'. This realm is the totality of pre-theoretical, 
unanalysed purposive activity that Dasein finds itself inherently bound up with. Here, 
'things' are 'humanised' in that they are invested with 'usability' in reference to 
'human' purposes and needs. (The term 'human' is qualified with inverted commas here, 
because it only refers to the human qua Dasein. The tenn without such a qualification is 
commonly associated with a biological species or the Aristotelian 'rational animal', both 
reifying debasements of Dasein; hence Heidegger's general avoidance of the tenn 
'human'.) 
These usably 'humanised' things are referred to by Heidegger as das Zeug 
(translated as 'equipment'). Regarding Heidegger's relating of 'world' and 'equipment', 
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Hubert Dreyfus writes: 'To understand worldhood ... we must begin with equipment. 
Now the primary point which distinguishes equipment from "mere things" is its 
thoroughgoing interrelatedness' .48 Equipmentality is basic to worldhood as purposiye 
totality. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes about the equipmental use-value of 
'humanised' things as they relate to the worldly purposiveness of work in the following 
way: 'That which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves 
[die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that which we concern ourselves primarily is 
the work - that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-
hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality [Verweisungsganzheit] within 
which the equipment [das Zeug] is encountered. ,49 The world is the interrelatedness, or 
relationality, of 'human' purposive productive activity. This primordial and authentic 
worldhood is not only 'pre-theoretical', but also pre-alienated and pre-expropriated, 
prior to the de-totalising dominion of the present-at-hand. Presence-at-hand, like 
Lukacs's 'reified consciousness', involves abstracting things from the totality of 
'human' practical engagements, or praxis, into an isolated positivity. The focus on 
purposive praxis displays a Marxian concern with both the use-value of things (as 
opposed to their abstracted, or 'fetishised', exchangeability) and an unalienated 
relationship of the worker to her work, whether product or activity. Heidegger writes: 
'The work produced refers not only to the "towards-which" of its usability and the 
"whereof' of which it consists: under simple craft conditions it also has an assignment to 
the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his figure; he "is" there along 
with it as the work emerges. ,50 This is a William Morris-like description of the world of 
work prior to its de-authentication through the dominion of the present-at-hand. 
Heidegger does not ascribe the latter to any socio-economic system, but to 
'metaphysics', 'technology', and the 'destiny of the West'. 
'Readiness-to-hand' does not only refer to the 'humanised' things of 
equipmentality, but also to 'humanised' nature. Heidegger writes: 
[I]n the environment certain entities become accessible which are alw~ys ~eady­
to-hand, but which, in themselves, do not need to be produced .... If Its kmd of 
Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, this 'Nature' itself.can be discovered and 
defined simply in its pure presence-at-hand. But when thIS happens, the Na~re 
which 'stirs and strives' which assails us and enthralls us as landscape, remams 
hidden. The botanist's ~lants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the 'source' 
which the geographer establishes for a river is not the' springhead in the dale' .51 
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Nature, when alienated from the 'world', the world of 'human' significance, becomes an 
object of 'science' and technological thinking through its objectification into the present-
at-hand. Prior to its de-worlding alienation into the present-at-hand, nature is 
apprehended as readiness-to-hand within the world, that is to say, 'humanly', 
'experientially', and 'subjectively'. 
The use of the word 'subjectively' here would raise the terminological ire of 
Heidegger every bit as much as the word 'human'. This is partly because, for Heidegger, 
the term 'subject' is tainted by the post-Cartesian modification of the forgetting of being. 
It is also because Heidegger regards the term as referring to a present-at-hand entity. 
involving the ontologically inappropriate treatment of Dasein as an object. He writes: 
The question of the "who" answers itself in terms of the HI" itself, the 'subject', 
the 'Self .... Ontologically we understand it as something which is in each case 
already constantly present-at-hand ... and which lies at the basis, in a very special 
sense, as subjectum . ... Even if one rejects ... the Thinghood of consciousness, or 
denies that a person is an object, ontologically one is still positing something 
whose Being retains the meaning of present-at-hand, whether it does so explicitly 
or not. Substantiality is the ontological clue for determining which entity is to 
provide the answer to the question of the "who". Dasein is tacitly conceived in 
advance as something present-at-hand .... Yet presence-at-hand is the kind of 
Being which belongs to entities whose character is not that of Dasein. 52 
Strangely, for Heidegger, the 'subject' is a type of 'object'. He regards the term Subjekt 
('subject') as referring exclusively to the subject of epistemological representation, a 
contemplative subject who contemplates objects. This subject-object relation is a 
relation between two present-at-hand entities. Contrasting it with his concept of being-
in-the-world, he refers critically to the notion of a 'Being-present-at-hand-together of a 
subject [Subjekts] and an Object [Objekts].,53 In Mindfulness he writes: '[S]ubjectivity 
d .c . ,54 means extantness [Vorhandenheit] of what is absolutely secure lor representmg. 
'Subjectivity' refers to nothing other than the contemplative subject of knowledge. The 
conception of the human as a subject is a central facet of the dominion of presence-at-
hand [Vorhandenheit]. Heidegger thus refers to 'the intensification of the extantness 
[Vorhandenheit] of man through the interpretation of man as "subject'''. 55 The critique 
of the reification of the subject does not go far enough in that the pre-reified subject in 
question is itself a present-at-hand entity, and therefore already subject to a certain 
reification. Derrida writes: 
[T]he thought of the subject ... [leads] to interpreting the "who" of Dasein as 
something which endures in a substantial identity of the type Vorhandensell1 or 
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of ~he subject ~s V?rhandensei~. As a result, however much one protests 
agal~st ... the relfic~tIOn of conscIOusness, or the objectivity of the person, one 
contmues to determme the "who" onto logically as a subject existing in the fonn 
of Vorhandenheit. 56 
However, as we have discussed in previous chapters, in the works of Hegel, Marx, and 
others, the subject is something quite different from a 'substantial identity', a subject not 
of mere contemplation, but a subject of praxis, a subject that is itself praxis. To describe 
the subject as a present-at-hand entity is to ignore the use of the tenn in Gennan 
Idealism and its legacy. The subject as praxis is closer to Heidegger's description of 
Dasein than to the Cartesian subject of representation. In Contributions to Philosoph."'. 
Heidegger writes: 'Da-sein is experienced - not re-presented as object, but rather as Da-
sein, enacted' .57 A conception of the subject as praxis could reasonably be used to 
describe Dasein's inherent being-in-the-world. 
It is not only the spatiality of being-in-the-world that is objectified into the 
present-at-hand, but also Dasein's authentic temporality. As we have seen, authentic 
temporality is the finitude of being-towards-death, a finitude forgotten through the 
'fallen' state of alienation in 'the they'. The latter involves the ordinary, 'vulgar' 
conception of time as an unending sequence of 'nows'. This amounts to seeing time in 
tenns of the present-at-hand. Heidegger describes unending time as 'a course of "nows " 
which is present-at-hand' .58 Thus, in a sense, time itself is objectified into the present-at-
hand. Derrida writes that what Heidegger calls vulgar time is 'a time which is ... present 
after the fashion of an ob-ject. ,59 
In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger discusses the vulgar conception of 
time with reference to the German word 'Zeitraum', which usually translates as 
'timespan', but which literally means 'timespace'. He writes: 'Timespace [Zeitraum] 
means a span of "time" which goes from now to then, from then to today, etc. - a "span 
of time" of a hundred years. Time is represented here as spacious [geraumig], insofar as 
it is a ratio for measuring and encompassing something ... [T]he ordinary concept of 
"time" is ... represented in the word timespace [Zeitraum].,6o The objectification of time 
is thus a spatialisation of time. As we saw in the first chapter, Lukacs describes 
mechanised, repetitive, quantitatively measured (as abstract labour-time) industrial work 
in tenns of the transformation of qualitative time into quantitative space. 61 \Vhile Lukacs 
only references Marx's Capital in this regard, the tenninology used suggests the 
influence of Bergson's notion of the spatialisation of time. In Being and Time. 
Heidegger argues against the equation of the rendering present-at-hand of time with its 
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spatialisation. He claims that the ordinary, inauthentic conception of time has its source 
in primordial, authentic temporality, and thus retains a temporal character. Thus he 
writes that ordinary vulgar time 'is not an extemalization [Verauj3erlichung] of a 
"qualitative time" into space, as Bergson's Interpretation of time ... would ha\e us 
b 1· ,62 H 'd e leve. el egger argues that the ordinary conception of time as a sequence of 
present-at-hand 'nows' would logically be considered reversible, were it not for its 
origins in authentic finite temporality, with the latter's anticipatory futurity. He writes: 
In the ordinary interpretation, the stream of time is defined as an irreversible 
succession. Why cannot time be reversed? Especially if one looks exc1usiyely at 
the stream of "nows", it is incomprehensible in itself why this sequence should 
not present itself in the reverse direction. The impossibility of this reversal has its 
basis in the way public time originates in temporality, the temporalizing of which 
is primarily futural and 'goes' to its end ecstatically in such a way that it 'is' 
already towards its end. 63 
Objectified, present-at-hand, vulgar time IS not spatial, because it is irreversible. 
However, Heidegger is here arguing that the irreversibility of vulgar time is a 
contradiction. Thus vulgar time could be described as a notion of spatialised time that 
contradicts itself. But the notion of spatialised time is supposed to refer to a 
contradiction, that is why it is used critically by Marx, Lukacs, and Bergson, to refer to 
the imposition of characteristics onto time that are not appropriate to it. Hence 
Heidegger's objection to the term 'spatialised' being used to describe vulgar time is 
merely a minor terminological quibble. As we have seen, Heidegger is happy to use the 
term 'spacious [geraumig]' to describe vulgar time in his later Contributions to 
Philosophy. 
The finite, primordial, authentic temporality of being-towards-death, 
characterised by the futurity of 'anticipatory resoluteness', is also described by 
Heidegger in terms of Dasein's 'being-a-whole'. He refers to 'Dasein's Being-at-an-end 
in death, and therewith its Being-a-whole,.64 This wholeness is experienced in the form 
of its anticipation, as something towards which Dasein faces. Heidegger writes: 
'Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein 's authentic 
Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness. ,65 This is a paradoxical 
wholeness, as it only occurs when Dasein ceases to be. Heidegger writes: 'As long as 
Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its "wholeness". ,66 Howe\er, this notion of 
'wholeness' as a completed temporality is itself a spatialisation of time and reification of 
Dasein. Though it is a projected and anticipated '\\'holeness', the completed temporality 
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is itself a span of time [Zeitraum], a reification of a living temporality into a spatialised 
artifact, a 'whole' life. However much this is an anticipation, a being-towards, it is still 
an anticipation of Dasein's eventual artifactualisation. It is an anticipation of a 
completed life, a potential completed life that stands before Dasein as something 
present-at-hand. 'Being-towards-death' could thus be redescribed as 'being-towards-
being-eventually-rendered-present-at-hand'. This means that objectification is overcome 
by the anticipation of eventually being thoroughly objectified. The dominion of the 
present-at-hand is overcome by the anticipation of eventually being rendered present-at-
hand. As Adorno writes, 'Insofar as death is absolutely alien to the subject, it is the 
model of all reification. ,67 
Occasionally, Heidegger uses the word 'spirit' to refer to the non-reified, non-
objectified, non-present-at-hand state that is appropriate to Dasein. Dasein is not only 
temporal in its being-towards-death, but also spatial in its being-in-the-world. This 
spatiality is not the spatiality of a three-dimensional ordering of corporeal things; it 
refers to the inherent worldhood of Dasein. Heidegger writes: 
To be able to say that Dasein is present-at-hand at a position in space, we must 
first take [auffasen] this entity in a way which is ontologically inappropriate .... 
Dasein's spatiality [may not] be interpreted as an imperfection which adheres to 
existence by reason of the fatal 'linkage of the spirit to a body'. On the contrary, 
because Dasein is 'spiritual', and only because of this, it can be spatial in a way 
which remains essentially impossible for any extended corporeal Thing. 68 
Although the word 'spiritual' is used in quotation marks, it is being used to refer to what 
is not thing-like in Dasein. The quotation marks have the function of dissociating 
Dasein's 'spirituality' from the metaphysical heritage, particularly Cartesian dualism 
and the notion of subjectivity as a 'thinking thing [res cogitans]'. The spatiality of 
being-in-the-world is 'spiritual' in that it does not inhere in things and animals. As we 
have seen, the 'world' is a context involving a living, purposive (in the sense of 
'humanly meaningful ') interrelatedness. In the Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger 
writes: 'World is always spiritual world. The animal has no world,.69 
A major claim of Derrida's Of Spirit is that the loss of quotation marks around 
the words 'spirit' and 'spiritual' in the published texts of the 1930s does not only 
indicate that Heidegger is appropriating the terms into his own lexicon, but also that he 
is deviating from his critical project of the destruction [Destruktion] of metaphysics. 
However, Derrida also argues that Heidegger already appropriates the term 'spirit" in 
Being and Time despite the quotation marks. Derrida writes: '[W]hen he undertakes to 
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explicate ... originary temporality ... Heidegger finally takes up the word "spirit" as his 
own,.70 Derrida is referring to the moment when Heidegger discusses Hegel's notion of 
a fall of spirit into time. Heidegger writes: '''Spirit'' does not first fall into time, but it 
exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality .... "Spirit" does not fall into time: 
but factical existence "falls" as falling from [aus] primordial, authentic temporality.,71 
'Spirit' is itself the Dasein of primordial temporality, and in falling Dasein falls out of 
[aus] that temporality, extemalised into vulgar objectivity. The word 'spirit' is properly 
Heideggerian, whether qualified with quotation marks or not, when it refers to the 
unalienated, un-extemalised, non-present-at-hand Dasein in its authentic finite 
temporality and its worldly spatiality. 
Technicity 
According to Heidegger, homelessness and the forgetting of being are further entrenched 
by modem technological thinking. His ambivalence towards the word 'spirit' is the 
consequence of the tension between his wariness of its traditional metaphysical baggage 
and the need to resist the reduction of Dasein and its world to a 'spiritless' quantitative 
measurability. In his Introduction to Metaphysics he writes: 'The prevailing dimension 
became that of extension and number ... until finally this quantitative temper became a 
quality of its own.' 72 The reduction of entities to the quantitatively measurable enables 
an attitude towards them of technological mastery and control. Heidegger writes: 'Being 
as calculable[,] ... Being as set into calculation, makes beings into something that can be 
ruled in modem, mathematically structured technology' .73 
In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger decries the dominance of the 
calculative and quantitative, which he regards as an outgrowth of the attitude to entities 
as present-at-hand, represented objects. He writes: '[M]achination [is] that interpretation 
of beings as re-presentable and re-presented. In one respect re-presentable means 
"accessible to intention and calculation"; in another respect it means "advanceable 
through pro-duction and execution.",74 The epoch of productivity and calculative 
mastery over entities is bound up with the Cartesian subject, the contemplative subject of 
representations. Under the dominion of technological 'machination' the merely 
quantitative reigns, and qualitative particularity is effaced. Heidegger describes the 
'shackles' of 'machination' as '[t]he pattern of generally calculable explainability. by 
which everything draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien 
to itself - yes, totally other than just alien.' 75 The quantitativeness of the calculable 
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involves a levelling off of everything, whereby being rendered quantitatively measurable 
and comparable alienates entities from their own 'alien' qualitative peculiarity. \Vith the 
modem technological mentality everything is subjected to a calculative instrumentalised 
productivity that equalises all particularity into a general equivalence. In Mindfulness 
Heidegger writes: 'Machination means the accordance of everything with 
producibility ... foster[ing] in advance the completely surveyable calculability of the 
subjugating empowering of beings to an accessible arrangement. ... Modem technicity 
releases man into the urge towards structuring his massive way of being through which 
every human particularity is overpowered'. 76 The term 'massive' here refers to the 
condition of being a mass, wherein particularity is subsumed. Modem technology 
reduces the uniqueness of Dasein to a quantitative equivalence. As we have seen in 
previous chapters, the reduction of quality to quantity is an aspect of the Marxian and 
Lukacsian conception of reification. 77 
While Heidegger's posthumously published works of the late 1930s discuss 
technology in terms of objectification and present-at-hand representability, his later 
essay, 'The Question Concerning Technology', moves subtly away from the terminology 
bequeathed by Being and Time in that it speaks of the 'objectlessness' of technological 
orderability. Technology involves reducing entities to a calculable and orderable 
'standing-reserve', available for any utilitarian call up, a 'standing-reserve' that does not 
stand before consciousness or observation as an 'object'. Heidegger writes: 'Everywhere 
everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just 
so that it may be on call for a further ordering. ... We call it the standing-reserve 
[Bestand] . ... Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over 
against us as object [Gegenstand].,78 The change of terminology from the present-at-
hand objects of Being and Time and its wake, to the objectless standing-reserve of the 
'Technology' essay, is not a significant philosophical shift, but a mere thematic shift 
from the present-at-hand objects of theoretical scientific observation to the practical. 
utilitarian, unobserved objectlessness of technological instrumentality. Heidegger writes: 
'[W]hen man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of his own conceiving, 
he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach 
nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of 
standing-reserve.,79 Technological instrumentality is not the instrumentality of the 
ready-to-hand, the former involving the orderability of quantitative calculability and the 
latter involving Dasein's manipulation of entities within the purposi\'e interrelatedness 
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of a living 'human' world. The ordering of entities into the technological inventory of a 
standing-reserve is just as much a de-worlding reification as the objectification of 
entities into the present-at-hand. Heidegger's name for this reification is 'enframing 
[Gestell],. He writes: 'The enframing... sets upon human beings ... to order everything 
that comes to presence into a technical inventory' .80 Technological enframing also 
captures these human orderers of orderability, rendering them a human resource, a 
human standing-reserve. Heidegger writes: 'As soon as what is unconcealed no longer 
concerns man even as object, but exclusively as standing reserve, then he comes to the 
very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have 
to be taken as standing-reserve. ,81 The calculative and mechanistic activity of 
technological ordering reifies the orderer herself into something calculative and 
mechanistic, alienated from her activity and thus from herself. 
In Of Spirit, Derrida argues that Heidegger's critique of technology involves the 
desire for a pure essence uncontaminated by technicity. Derrida puts into question 
Heidegger's claim that the essence of technology is nothing technological. Derrida 
writes: 
[T]his typical and exemplary statement: the essence of technology is nothing 
technological[,] ... maintains the possibility of thought that questions, which is 
always thought of the essence, protected from any original and essential 
contamination by technology. The concern [is] .,. to analyze this desire for 
rigorous non-contamination and... to envisage... the fatal necessity of a 
contamination. . . of a contact originally impurifying thought or speech. 
Contamination, then, of the thought of essence by technology, and so 
contamination by technology of the thinkable essence of technology - and even 
of a question of technology by technology, the privilege of the question having 
some relation already, always, with this irreducibility of technology. 82 
The all-encompassing quantifiability of technological enframing, a manifestation of the 
oblivion of being, always already characterises and contaminates any 'originary' and 
'primordial' thinking of being. A principal theme of Derridian deconstruction is that of 
an originary irreducible technicity; the 'natural' origin is always already a prosthetic 
supplement. Technology is thus a form of what Derrida calls 'writing', in that it eludes 
presence and origin. Writing is machine-like in that, due to its essential iterability, it 
functions regardless of the presence of any conscious intention; and even the purported 
'presence' of the latter in the voice is a mythical effacement of the mechanistic and 
grammatological features of speech itself. 83 
Derrida's originary technicity, another name for originary non-originariness, is 
not, however, an originary, reifying, calculative technological enframing. Differance and 
the trace, in their infinite undecideability, defy rational calculability and open up its 
restricted economy to the incalculability of irreducible alterity. The 'technicity' of 
differance is best illustrated by what we have in previous chapters termed 
'determinability', its very indeterminacy being productive of a limitless malleability free 
from any originary fixed and 'natural' determinacy. We have demonstrated such 
determinability to be a central feature of traditional conceptions of de-alienation. In 
contrast to Derrida's interpretation, Heidegger conceives of technology not as a 
contamination of the pure presence of a natural determinacy, but as a particular 
manifestation of the reign of entities and the oblivion of being, an oblivion of precisely 
that which transcends all ontical determination. 
Infinite Finitude 
It is of Dasein' s essence, being the being for whom being is an issue, to transcend the 
ontical realm of mere entities. The oblivion of being, enacted by technology, positive 
science, and metaphysics, involves the consequence of a reified consciousness trapped in 
the realm of the ontical. Being itself is a transcendence of the ontical. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger writes: 'Being ... lie[s] beyond every entity and every possible character 
which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. ,84 Heidegger's 
name for this transcendence is Endlichkeit (translated as 'finitude'). Finitude is a strange 
name for transcendence, and indeed Heidegger has to redefine it and give it a 
paradoxical aporetic significance in order to appropriate it into his lexicon. 
Dasein's finitude, the finitude of the finite temporality of being-towards-death, is 
not the mere limitedness of a span of time. It is precisely a being-towards, an 
anticipatory futurity, a sense of eventual non-existence infecting existence. Heidegger 
writes: 'Dasein ... does not have an end at which it just stops, but it exists jinite(r . ... Its 
finitude does not amount primarily to a stopping, but is a characteristic of 
temporalization itself. The primordial and authentic future is the "tmvards-oneself' (to 
onese!f'.), existing as the possibility of nullity'. 85 As death is irreplaceably singular, it can 
only happen to the individual Dasein; it is what is most authentically and distinctively 
ownmost to Dasein. Heidegger writes: 'Primordial and authentic coming-towards-
oneself is the meaning of existing in one's ownmost nullity. ,86 This nullity is not what 
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merely limits Dasein; it is what constitutes Dasein in I'tS sI·ngulan·ty. I \/. n . indfulness. 
Heidegger writes: 
[O]ne falls ... into the trap of the dialectic by "considering" that whe ' th 
"fi . " . . ne\ er e 
IllIte IS ~osIted, an infinite is already thought. One takes the "finite" here 
generally. III the sense of what is limited ... - one thinks "finitude" 
metaphysIcally. 
How~ver, t~e "finitude'~ ofbe-ing means something entirely different: the 
ab-ground-.dI~enslOn ... t~ ~hIC? the 'not-character' by no means belongs as a 
la~k or a hmIt, but as a dIstmctlOn. '" The "finitude" of be-ing ... should guide 
mmdfulness... to assert the uniqueness of be-ing ... that is held unto the 
abground. 87 
According to Heidegger, the Hegelian critique of the Kantian finitude of knowledge, 
based on the claim that consciousness of a limit involves already having transcended the 
limit, relies on the traditional 'metaphysical' understanding of finitude as limitedness, 
and therefore does not apply to the Heideggerian notion of finitude. The latter refers to 
the essential nothingness of Dasein, not grounded in anything, a contentless 
insubstantiality that is the (non)-basis of its openness to being as such, beyond entities, 
as well as of its irreducible ungrounded uniqueness. 
However, the Hegelian argument regarding finitude of whatever kind is that the 
awareness of finitude involves an awareness of infinity. Of course, when Heidegger says 
'finitude', he means 'awareness of finitude', but he avoids the tenns 'awareness' and 
'consciousness', because they are metaphysically loaded. There is a tension in Being and 
Time between its avowedly phenomenological method and its anti-Cartesian stance. As 
the method is phenomenological, a tenn like 'finitude' means, and can only mean, 
'finitude qua the appearance of finitude to consciousness'; yet it is precisely this 
observing consciousness as subject of representations that is being put into question. The 
problem here is that, as 'finitude' cannot be distinguished from 'appearance of finitude 
to consciousness', Heidegger is unable to make the thoroughly Hegelian distinction 
between 'finitude for consciousness' and 'finitude for us (the phenomenological 
observers of consciousness itself)'. Hence Heidegger is theoretically unable to theorise 
the effect that consciousness of a phenomenon has on that phenomenon. In Hegel's 
phenomenological dialectic, the consciousness of finitude involves the overcoming of 
finitude, and is already on the other side of its limit, on the side of infinity. A truly finite 
mind cannot have an awareness of its own finitude. 
For Heidegger, however, it is Dasein that is finite, a living a\\'areness of its 
finitude in the authentic anticipatory resoluteness of its existence. Its finitude does not 
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consist in the limits of its 'mind', but in the 'limits' (or rather, the ungroundedness) of its 
being. Its finitude is its mortality. To be precise, its finitude consists in the awareness of 
its mortality. An animal does not exist 'finitely' in its awareness of its own mortality; it 
is not in a state of being-towards-death, and thus it is neither 'mortal' nor 'finite' in 
Heideggerian terms. Only Dasein 'dies', properly speaking; an animal merely comes to 
an end, or 'perishes'. Mortality and finitude are aspects of the ontological structure of 
Dasein. They are ontological, rather than merely ontico-biological, because they invoh'e 
a concernful awareness, a non-oblivion, of being. 
It is, however, questionable whether mortality as such is ontological rather than 
biological, whether it is a feature of Dasein qua Dasein or is merely a feature of the 
'human' biological entity empirically associated with Dasein. In giving mortality 
ontological status, is not Heidegger ontologising an empirical biological contingency? 
Adorno writes: '[A]n elimination of death may be highly improbable; yet it can be 
thought of, and according to existential ontology that should be impossible.' 88 Adorno' s 
point may be banal, but it raises a genuine question. It is banal in that it confuses the 
empirical contingency of developments in medical science with questions of 
fundamental ontology. The genuine question it inadvertently raises is the question of 
whether Heidegger is falsely ontologising the biological. Both the terms 'mortality' and 
'finitude' are misleading in that they imply a limited measurable span of time, which 
would involve imposing a biological contingency onto what is supposed to be strictly 
ontological. However, the Heideggerian position is more convincing if 'finitude' is 
described as the openness to being deriving from the awareness of the possibility of not-
being, of the nothing within being, a possibility more suggestive of ontological necessity 
than biological contingency. 
Heidegger argues that the awareness of finitude is originary, and thus that the 
awareness of infinity is derivative. If this is the case it is possible to have the originary 
experience prior to, and thus independently of, the derivative one. But how is it possible 
to have an awareness of finitude without a simultaneous, or 'equiprimordial', awareness 
of infinity? Heidegger writes: '[T]he finitude of time does not become fully visible until 
we have exhibited "endless time" so that these may be contrasted.'89 'Not fully visible' 
is too vague a concept of vagueness to adequately answer objections to Heidegger' s 
assignation of primordiality. Hence Derrida writes in Aporias: '[O]ne cannot think 
originary finitude without removing it as infinity, nor can one think being-to-death 
without starting from immortality. ,90 
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'Finitude' qua 'awareness of finitude' is what gives Dasein a privileged access to 
being; it is what makes Dasein that entity for whom being is an issue. This is because the 
awareness of the non-being within being, in the form of, for example, being-to\\'ards-
death, enables Dasein to transcend mere entities, to have access to being as such, \\hich 
is that which transcends all entities, which is itself the 'transcendens'. 'Finitude' qua 
'awareness of finitude' overcomes, or transcends, 'finitude' qua "measurable 
limitedness'. However, this formulation is suggestive of Hegelian infinitism. As we have 
said, 'finitude' is an odd choice of word; would not the word 'infinity' have been just as 
appropriate? Heidegger claims that he chose the metaphysically contaminated word 
'finitude' provisionally as a means of dissociating himself from German Idealist 
infinitism, particularly that of Hegel. In Contributions to Philosophy, he writes: 
What does it mean to say: Be-ing "is" infinite [or] Being is finite[?] ... [T]he 
question of the essential swaying of be-ing lies beyond the dispute between those 
propositions; and the proposition "Be-ing is finite" is only meant to ward off, in 
crossing, any kind of "idealism." ... [I]f one operates within the dispute of those 
propositions, then we would have to say that, when be-ing is taken as infinite, 
then it is precisely determined. If be-ing is set as finite, then its ab-groundness is 
affirmed. For what is in-finite cannot be meant as what is endlessly in flux, ... 
but as the closed circle.91 
As we have discussed in the chapter on Hegel, the infinite qua infinite also cannot really 
be 'closed' and 'determined'. The Hegelian infinite, whatever its diagrammatical 
representation, is the infinite within the finite, the self-transcendence of a finite 
determinacy that returns to itself through the other. The supposed 'closure' of the circle 
of infinity is merely its actuality, its act as the restlessness of the finite, as opposed to the 
unattainable beyond of the spurious infinite. The finitude which is neither closed nor 
'precisely determined', which involves an affirmation of its ungroundedness, its 
transcendent openness to the nothing, its transcendence of itself as the very affirmation 
of itself, is an infinite finitude. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger, in his discussion of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, 
strives to dissociate himself, on the basis of finitude, from Hegelianism. The discussion 
makes use of a distinction Heidegger makes between the concepts of 'absolvence' and 
'transcendence', 'absolvence' representing Hegelian infinity and 'transcendence' 
representing Heideggerian finitude. 'Absolvence' is Heidegger's term for the process, in 
Hegel's system, of the self-overcoming of the finite in the movement of the absolute. At 
one point in the discussion Heidegger suggests that Hegelian 'absol\'ence' might not be 
entirely dissimilar to 'transcendence'. He writes: '[I]s what Hegel represents in the 
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Phenomenology of Spirit as absolvence merely transcendence in disguise, i.e. 
finitude?,92 As the 'finitude' of transcendence is an infinite finitude. it would be 
pertinent to ask whether Heideggerian finitude is not the absolute in disguise. 
Owning 
At the end of his study of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Heidegger distinguishes his 
own position on finitude from Hegelian infinitism in the following way: 'Can and should 
man as transition try to leap away from himself in order to leave behind himself as 
finite? Or is his essence not abandonment itself, in which alone what can be possessed 
becomes a possession?,93 This indicates that Heidegger regards transcendent finitude as 
the basis of self-possession, of self-ownership. Ownness or authenticity can only occur 
in an entity which is able to transcend its ontical limits in order to concernfully 
apprehend its ontological condition, its being, its possible not-being, and thus to be 
aware of its finitude. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes: '[O]nly insofar as it [Dasein] 
is essentially something which can be authentic - that is, something of its own - can it 
have lost itself and not yet won itself. ,94 Only an entity which is capable of being its 
'own' can 'abandon' or lose itself. Only the entity for whom being is an issue, one that is 
aware of its finitude, that transcends its ontical self and apprehends its being, has the 
property of ownness or mineness. Dasein, in transcending itself, is able to own itself. 
Heidegger writes: 'That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in 
each case mine. ... Dasein has in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit] ... As modes of 
Being, authenticity and inauthenticity... are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein 
whatsoever is characterized by mineness. ,95 Authenticity depends on mineness, which in 
turn depends on being being an issue of concern. The transcendence involved in 
Heidegger's notion of finitude is the precondition of the self-ownership of mineness and 
authenticity. 
Authenticity IS the state in which Dasein is genuinely itself, in its umque 
individuality, its finite mortality. Inauthenticity is the state in which Dasein has lost 
itself in the collective publicness of 'the They [das Man]', oblivious of its individual 
finitude. Heidegger writes: 
[T]he "they" constantly accommodates the particu~ar ~asein by d~:bur?,enin~ it 
of its Being ... Everyone is the other, and no one IS hImself. The the,'.'. \\ hleh 
supplies the answer to the question of the ")I'ho" of ev.eryda~ DaseIll, IS the 
"nobody" to whom every Dasein has already surrendered Itself III BC111g-among-
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?ne-other. [ynterein~ndersein]. ... In [this mode] one's way of Being is that of 
mauthentlclty and faIlure to stand by one's Self. 96 
The 'disburdening' of Dasein's being by 'the They' amounts to Dasein's disowning of 
itself through its surrender to a public relationality that is ontologically oblivious in its 
non-finitude and non-transcendence. Authenticity involves the being-towards-death that 
Dasein returns to out of the oblivion of 'the They' through the mood of anxiety. 
Heidegger writes: '[TJhe state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat 
to itself arising from Dasein 's ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety. In this state-of-
mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of the possible impossibility of 
its existence. ,97 Being-towards-death is the condition of radical authentic individuality, 
as it is only the individual that can die, not 'the They'. 
This is a radical individuality in the sense that it is non-relational. Heidegger 
writes: 'The ownmost possibility is non-relational. '" The non-relational character of 
death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This 
individualizing is a way in which the "there" is disclosed for existence. ,98 Adorno argues 
that this non-relationality of Heideggerian authenticity involves a reifying 
objectification. Adorno writes: 'Authenticity, which according to doctrine is absolutely 
unobjective, is made into an object. The reason for this is that authenticity is a manner of 
behavior that is ascribed to the being-a-subject of the subject, not to the subject as a 
relational factor. ,99 However, Heidegger claims that the non-relational individualisation 
that authenticity involves enables Dasein to appreciate the irreducible authentic 
individuality of others. He writes: 'As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes 
- but only in such a manner that... it makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some 
understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others.' 100 This is, though, a brief claim 
that is not elaborated upon (the very next sentence involves an abrupt change of subject). 
The authentic non-relationality is here a paradoxical precondition of a kind of deeper 
relationality, that of an empathic 'understanding', a vague, untheorised (by Heidegger), 
ontologically unclarified, pre-Heideggerian (Diltheyan), humanistic notion that is swiftly 
dispensed with. 
For Heidegger, the authentic, the proper, and the ownmost, name a condition 
wherein Dasein is concerned with its being through an anticipatory awareness of its not-
being, its 'possible impossibility'. Derrida argues that the Heideggerian proper is not the 
'proper' of traditional metaphysics, of the essential attributes of something. but is rather 
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the proper of an ontological concern, a proximity to being. In his essay, 'The Ends of 
Man', Derrida writes: 
The near is the prop~r; the pr~~er is the nearest (prope, proprius) . ... Being is the 
proper of.man ... ThIs propOSItIon of the proper, certainly, is not to be taken in a 
metaphysIcal sense: the proper of man, here, is not an essential attribute the 
predicate of a substance, a characteristic among others, however fundament~l of 
~ being, .o?je~,t ?r subject, called man .... The proper of man, his Eigenheif, 'his 
authentIcIty, IS to be related to the meaning of Being; he is to hear and to 
question (jragen) it in ek-sistence, to stand straight in the proximity of its light. 101 
Derrida asserts, however, that this notion of proximity 'is in consonance with the motif 
of presence as self-presence' and thus that the Heideggerian proper remains within the 
economy of a metaphysics of presence. 102 While this passage specifically comments on 
Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism', the 'standing straight' in the 'light' of being is still 
essentially the anticipatory resoluteness in the face of possible non-being referred to in 
the earlier Being and Time, despite the shift of metaphorical nuance. In fact, the next 
paragraph of Derrida's essay brings up the relation between the proper and the finite, 
between ownmost authenticity and death. He writes: 'Man ... is his proper end, that is, 
the end of his proper.' 103 The term 'end' involves the 'equivocality' of a 'play of fe/os 
and death'. The fact that the Heideggerian proper involves the lived finitude of the 
experience of the nothingness within being, that the transcendent finitude of being-
towards-death is the basis of what is most authentic, the lived awareness of one's own 
being, means that what is most proper to Dasein intrinsically involves what is most 
radically improper, his very own non-being. This is the aporia of the Heideggerian 
proper. As we have seen, Adorno describes death as the ultimate alienating reification. 
For Derrida, the Heideggerian unreified, unalienated authenticity itself involves what is 
most alien, a disowning expropriation at the heart of the ownmost proper. In his later 
work, Aporias, Derrida writes: 
If death, the most proper possibility of Dasein, is the possibility of its 
impossibility, death becomes the most improper possibili~ ~nd t~e ~ost e~­
propriating, the most inauthenticating one. From the most ongl?ary mSlde o.f Its 
possibility, the proper of Dasein becomes from then on. contammated, ~a~aslt~d, 
and divided by the most improper. ... Heidegger. .. cruCially needs the dlst.mctlOn 
between the authentic and the inauthentic, as well as that among the dIfferent 
forms of ending: dying properly speaking, perishing. ~nd demising. These 
distinctions are threatened in their very principle. and. m truth, they remam 
impracticable as soon as one admits that an ultimate poss~bil~ty is noth~ng o~her 
than the possibility of an impossibility and that the Enfelg11lS always mhablted 
Eigenflichkeif[.] 1 04 
165 
For Derrida, the mineness [Jemeinigkeit] of authenticity is 'impracticable', because it 
depends on the awareness of and appropriation of death, the mineness of death, an 
aporetic inappropriate appropriation, as death is the abolition of mineness. "My death'. 
as the death of mineness, is not really mine. 
As we have seen, Heidegger states that 'death is in each case mine', and also that 
'Dasein is in each case mine'. This ownmost mineness is dependent on transcendent 
finitude, the concern for being as such through the transcendence of mere entities. Of all 
entities, only Dasein has ownness and mineness, because only Dasein can transcend the 
ontical and be aware of its own being. Dasein's finitude as the transcendence of entities 
is an ontologically fundamental description of 'consciousness', a word avoided in order 
to dissociate Dasein from the metaphysical Cartesian heritage of the thinking thing [res 
cogitans]. 'Consciousness' is a non-thing, a nothingness that goes beyond the 
limitedness of mere entities, going beyond the limitedness of Dasein qua entity itself in 
its ability to 'conceive' such limits, and thus 'conceive' of 'my death'. It is the 
'conscious' projection of future death that is appropriable as 'mine', not death itself. 
Finitude is transcendence in that it is the 'consciousness' that goes beyond death in order 
to be aware of death. As we argued earlier, this 'conscious' finitude that transcends 
death as a limit by being aware of it is an 'infinite finitude', the infinite within the finite 
of the Hegelian infinite, of Hegelian transcendent 'absolvence'. The point here is that 
this 'nothingness' of a transcendent 'consciousness', as evinced in the works of, among 
others, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, and discussed in previous chapters, constitutes an 
infinite determinability predicated upon a substanceless universality and inherent social 
relationality. That is to say, 'consciousness' as transcendent finitude can only occur in a 
social being. Awareness of one's own finitude depends on a prior awareness of others, as 
in Hegel's dialectical tale of the struggle for recognition, which is the basis of the social 
relationality he calls 'spirit'. Only a social being can separate itself from itself, or 
transcend itself, in order to appropriate itself. Only a social being can be 'authentic'. The 
social generic being is conceived by Heidegger as the no-one in particular of 'the They', 
an inauthenticity that constitutes a 'fall' from a primordial and originary individuality. 
However, authentic individuality is hardly 'originary', as it involves a self-transcendence 
that depends on social generality. For Heidegger, the social qua "the They' is neither 
finite nor mortal ('the They never dies '), and thus constitutes an obliyion of being. But is 
'the social' reducible to 'the They' and its ontological oblivion? Not necessarily, if 'the 
. 1 t't b t as the transcendence of social' is not considered as a substantIa mass en 1 y, U 
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immediate particularity. This form of the social is itself a transcendence of entities. It is 
thus generic consciousness and 'spirit' (in the Hegelian sense). It may itselfbe non-finite 
and non-mortal, but it is nothing more than the self-overcoming relationality of finite 
and mortal individuals, and finitude is inscribed within it. It is thus not a positive entity. 
nor is it an abstract unlimitedness; it is the self-transcendence within the finite itself. the 
self-overcoming of the 'limited', the 'truth' of the finite that is the Hegelian infinite. The 
abstract one that is no-one of 'the They' is merely one aspect of the social, its 
inauthentic and alienated aspect. Thus the solipsistic non-relationality of Heidegger's 
notion of authentic finitude is incoherent. This understanding of authenticity does not 
overcome the metaphysics of the Cartesian subject. On the contrary, the solipsism of 
Heideggerian authenticity is a consequence of the Cartesianism inherent in the 
phenomenological approach. 
While the transcendent awareness of being and death may depend on sociality, it 
is still the irreducible, 'non-relational', singularity of the individual Dasein that ends up 
not-being. The notion of authenticity is an attempt at theorising the awareness of 
singularity, and any such awareness will take a paradoxical or aporetic fonn, due to the 
universality and iterability inherent in 'conscious' awareness. Heideggerian finitude is 
the transcendent awareness of irreducible singularity, of the singularity that being 'is', 
but it is not identical to it. However paradoxical it is, 'authenticity' names the 
'conscious' manifestation of singularity and uniterability. 
Heidegger's language often equates authenticity with singularity. Although, as 
we have already pointed out, the self-ownership of authenticity depends on the self-
separation of a 'conscious' transcendence, the phenomenological idiom discourages any 
distinction between 'consciousness' of being and singular being itself. As we have seen, 
the Heideggerian authentic proper does not refer to essential properties, to the 
generalised essence of traditional metaphysics, but to the singularity of being. Heidegger 
maintains a Stirnerian equation of ownness and uniqueness, and a concomitant Stimerian 
contradistinction between ownness and essence. He writes: 'What is ownmost is not 
what is generaL .. All essential swaying is determined according to what is ownmost in 
the sense of what is originary and unique.' 105 In fact, according to Heideggec being 
itself, which has traditionally been seen as what is most general, a feature belonging to 
all entities, is, when conceived properly, what is most singular. He writes: 'Simplene~~ 
k f · It does not at all need any of be-ing carries within itself the mar 0 uniqueness. -
d" . h' d'f:C: t the dl'f:C:erence from beinos For thi~ di fference IS IstmgUls mg or 1 lerences, no even 11 C' . 
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required only if being itself is branded as a kind of being and the b· d re y ne\ er preser\"-: as 
the unique but generalized into what is most general' 106 The.co tt· f h . • 11 rge mg 0 t e onttco-
ontological difference renders being as the most general of entities, a rendering \\·hich is, 
for Heidegger, the principal Platonic, onto-theological, metaphysical gesture. Being qua 
being, properly thought in its distinction from entities, is nothing but radical, irreducible 
singularity. In Mindfulness, Heidegger writes: 'Be-ing's singularity and uniqueness are 
not qualities attributed to be-ing ... Rather, be-ing itself is uniqueness, is singularity' .107 
It is not so much that being is singular, but that being is singularity, the two terms being 
identical. 
As we have seen in the introductory chapter, singularity is a major theme of the 
later works of Derrida. This is because he regards the movement of dif/firance as 
enacting a dislocating disjuncture within the field of presence, within the closed system 
and restricted economy of the logos, a disjuncture that constitutes an opening onto the 
irreducible singularity of otherness, death, and the event. This contrasts with Derrida's 
earlier works where the same differance is said to dislocate the singular itself in a chain 
of substitutability, and where Heidegger's assertion of the uniqueness of being is 
criticised on that very basis. 1 08 
If being is to be identified with radical singularity, it must itself involve a 
disjuncture within the field of presence, within the realm of present entities. Whi Ie in 
Being and Time, 'Being is the transcendens pure and simple', the transcendence of 
entities, this 'transcendence' could be redescribed as a 'disjuncture'. The ontico-
ontological difference names the differance of the disjuncture within being, of being as 
disjuncture. 'Disjuncture' may not strictly be a Heideggerian tenn, but nor are terms like 
'transcendence' and 'finitude'; the latter are metaphysical tenns that Heidegger IS 
turning against metaphysics. Much of Heidegger's work after Being and Time IS 
concerned with finding a less metaphysically tainted idiom. The disjuncture within the 
present that the singularity of being 'is', this opening onto the unassimilable radical 
alterity of an irreducible uniqueness, is, in Derridian tenns, an irruption within the 
logocentric enclosure of the present, an irruption of undetermined incalculable 
singularity, the irreducibility of the unique moment, the "'now" of the untimely', 109 the 
event as such. An event in this sense is not a predictable or predicable occurrence within 
the sphere of meaningfulness, within the present as the economy of the logos, but is the 
irruption of a unique happening. Heidegger himself uses the tenn EreiRnis (usually 
translated as 'event') to describe the unique momentariness of being. In COl1frihllfiol1S t() 
Philosophy, he writes: 'Be-ing holds sway as . [E' enownzng relgnis]. To enowning 
[Ereignis] belongs the uniqueness and strangeness which inhere in the momentariness of 
the unexpectedly befalling ... Therefore "being" can never be made comn10n as h-
, muc a~ 
the word sounds common to everything.'IIO The German word for 'event', Ereignis. is 
suggestive of owning and ownness [Eigenheit]. However, as Richard Polt points out, 
translating it into English as 'enowning' (or, for that matter, 'propriation' and 
'appropriation') is misleading, as it does not convey the sense that the German word has 
of a unique happening. I I I The word 'Ereignis' combines ownness [Eigenheit] qua 
uniqueness with the undetermined irruption of a fundamental momentariness. 
Being as Ereignis is the always singular happening from which springs the 
irreducibly new; it is the inception, the radical beginning. Heidegger writes: 'The 
beginning is be-ing itself as en owning [Ereignis]' .112 To use Derridian tenns, Ereignis is 
the uniterable beginning of any domain of iterability, the an-economic inception of any 
economy, the meaningless inception of any system of meaningfulness. Polt \\Tites: 
'Enowning [Ereignis] is marked by its uniqueness. Moments of enowning happen only 
once, for the first and last time. They can never be reproduced or represented, although 
they may serve as "beginnings" that initiate a domain of reproducibility and 
representability.,I13 These 'domains' constitute the constancy, stasis, and ontical 
givenness of that which is present, a givenness and positivity involving a disowning 
[Enteignis] of being as enowning [Ereignis] , replacing and effacing the fundamental 
surprise of a genuine 'happening [Ereignis] , with the neutralising familiarity of an 
everyday occurrence. 
As Ereignis is singular alterity that takes the form of a dislocation of, and 
irruption of 'negative' indeterminateness within, the positive givenness of the present, it 
names a fundamental and radical praxis. This links it with the German Idealist tradition 
and its Marxian inflection, in that the dissolution of given positivity constitutes a de-
reification. As the givenness of the realm of presence is also called 'objectivity'. Hegel 
chooses to use the word 'subject' to refer to the living praxis of its dissolution. As 
Heidegger restricts this word 'subject' to its substantialist Cartesian aspect it is for him 
taboo. Whatever the shifts in vocabulary from 'Idealism' to 'the thinking of being', 
Ereignis, in its dislocation of the present, the present-at-hand, the 'objecti\'e', constitutes 
. d l' . In 'Th \\'ay to Lanou'lge' a de-objectification, de-reificatlOn, and e-a lenatlOn. e ~ L • 
Heidegger asks: 'What if propriation [Ereignis] by its entry withdrew every present 
.' 'J' 111 I 
being that is subject to sheer orderability and brought that being back mto Its l)\Vn. 11 
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Mindfulness he puts it more stridently: 'As en-ownment, be-ing itself destroys the pre-
eminence of Aoyor; [logos]; tears away beings as such from power and thus from 
machination, and en-sways them unto "ownhood".,) 15 Being as Ereignis is the 
disjuncture in the presence of logocentric alienation. 
This means that Ereignis is, in Derridian tenns, a disjuncture in the economy of 
the proper. Is not the happening of 'propriation' [Ereignis], then, the improper inception 
of the proper? Derrida suggests as much, when in Spurs he writes: '[PJropriation is 
named as exactly that which is proper to nothing and no one. '" [N]o being [etant] , 
nothing, happens except Ereignis' unfathomable process. The proper-ty of the abyss 
(das Eigentum des Ab-grundes) is necessarily the abyss of proper-ty, the violence of an 
event which befalls without Being [etre].' 116 As Heidegger identifies 'being [Sein 
(etre)]' with such an 'event [Ereignis (evenement)]', Derrida must be referring to a non-
Heideggerian determination of being, presumably a metaphysical one. Likewise, 
'propriation' as the non-proper is only an apparent paradox, because the Heideggerlan 
and Derridian notions of the 'proper' have different meanings. For Derrida, the proper, 
including not only its metaphysical detennination, but also the Heideggerian tenns 
associated with it (Eigentlichkeit, Ereignis), refers to an exclusionary identity, a closed 
economy. For Heidegger, however, the 'proper' refers to the irreducible uniqueness and 
singularity of being, a singularity that, for Derrida, would constitute a rupture in the 
economy of the logocentric 'proper'. 
The de-alienating overcoming of the structures of ontological expropriation 
requires a deconstructive dismantling of those structures. Derridian deconstruction is a 
furthering of the Heideggerian destruction [DestruktionJ of metaphysics. However, 
Heidegger aims to dismantle the structures of the oblivion and disowning of being, 
whereas Derrida regards the ownness of being as itself metaphysical, and asserts the 
infinite substitutability of differance as a dislocating force within the structures of 
metaphysics, which include the economy of the proper. Heideggerian deconstruction is 
an ontological deepening of the critique of alienation and reification. The ob1i\'ion of 
being manifests itself as a falling from an authentic ownness to an uprooted 
'homelessness' and 'alienation'. Alienation is characterized by a 'fixation with the 
present', and a consequent 'never-dwelling-anywhere'. Presence is the principle fonn of 
the oblivion of being and the ontological uprootedness of alienation. This includes the 
objectification of entities, such that they are rendered 'present-at-hand [Vorhanden r, 
which involves abstracting them from the 'world' of hying intendatedness. This 
l70 
objectification also involves an externalisation of the primordial authentic finite 
temporality of Dasein into 'vulgar' public time, an unending sequence of present-at-
hand 'nows', quantifiably measurable. The loss of qualitative ownness to quantitative 
calculability is also a characteristic of the reign of modem technology, which inyolyes a 
reduction of things and people to the orderability of a 'standing-reserve', a reification 
that Heidegger calls 'enframing'. For Heidegger, authentic ownness involves the lived 
finitude, the anticipatory futurity, of being-towards-death, the concemful awareness of 
the possibility of not-being. Heidegger chooses the word 'finitude' to contrast his 
position with Hegelian infinitism, but it names the transcendence of entities that makes 
possible the' awareness' of being and eventual non-being, a transcendence that indicates 
that such 'awareness' has the form of the self-transcendence of finitude characterising 
the Hegelian infinite. The same argument applies to the ultimately incoherent 'non-
relational' radical individualism of Heideggerian authenticity - which contrasts with the 
post-Hegelian notion of an unalienated social 'generic-being' - because authenticity 
depends on the self-transcendent 'awareness' of finitude that itself depends on a 'social' 
and 'generic' overcoming of immediate particularity. Whatever the incoherencies of 
such non-relationality, Heidegger, throughout his work, identifies ownness, in all its 
facets, with the uniqueness and singularity of being. This is particularly the case with his 
concept of Ereignis, 'enowning' as the unique happening of being. Although Derrida 
misreads Heideggerian ownness as a metaphysical exclusionary identity, this always 
irreducibly singular event actually constitutes a disjuncture in the logocentric enclosure 
of the present. It is itself the singular praxis and differance that undermines the positive 
givenness of the present. 
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Chapter 5 
Deconstructive De-alienation 
The viewpoint, held by, among others, Derrida himself, that the notion of difFirance 
irremediably undermines the concept of a surmountable alienation, has been put under 
critical scrutiny. Our readings of Hegel and Marx have indicated that the oYercoming of 
alienation is not necessarily implicated in a metaphysics of presence, while Heidegger' s 
proto-deconstruction has been demonstrated to be an ontological inflection of the 
critique of alienation itself. Now Derrida's work needs to be re-engaged directly. in the 
light of those readings, as regards the relation between differance and de-alienation. 
For a theory of de-alienation to be put forward in the light of the deconstruction 
of the metaphysics of presence a number of issues remain to be addressed. For one, there 
is the relationship between the notions of differance and praxis. The idea of a free, de-
alienating, trans formative praxis bears with it the problematic relations between the 
notions of subject, force, act, and event, notions whose relationships to Derridian 
differance need clarifying. There is also the question of how an overcoming of alienation 
would avoid the narcissistic suppression of otherness, of that which is alien. This can be 
addressed by investigating the relationship between Derrida and Levinas, their 
differences and similarities and how these are relevant to the theme of alienation. 
Another related problem is the extent to which de-alienation has been conceived as an 
overcoming of the political, and thus as a reduction of the undecideability that needs to 
be the basis of any genuinely responsible decision. Ultimately, the form of a 
deconstructively de-alienated social condition will have to be expounded. 
Differance and Praxis 
Prior to the later Derrida's purported 'tum' to issues of an explicitly ethical and political 
nature it was not uncommon for 'deconstruction' to be described as an apolitical form , 
of playful textual exegesis. One example of this is Rorty's contention that Derrida \; 
work constitutes an apolitical 'private ironism'. An analogous interpretation. from a \ ery 
different context and perspective, can be found in Julia Kristeva's Revolution in Poetic 
Language, published in 1974, which contains a brief critique of Derrida and 
'grammatology'. Kristeva argues that grammatology is politically 'neutral" and 
'peaceful', because its abandonment of the 'subject' disables the dislocations and 
b ·· . d 'b ~ . t . g I'n any socI'al and silTnifyin~ practice "";he su shtutlOns It escn es lrom III ervemn e ~ 
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writes: '[T]he grammatological deluge of meaning gives up on the subject and must 
remain ignorant of ... his functioning as social practice ... Neutral in the face of all 
positions, theses, and structures, grammatology is, as a consequence, equally restrained 
when they break, burst, or rupture' . 1 This is asserted despite Derrida' s earlier expression 
of adherence to Kristeva's notion of 'signifying practice' in a 1971 interyiew published 
in Positions. Derrida says: 'In order to define ... differance ... I have always insisted on 
the value practice. Consequently, everywhere, from this point of view, that. .. a general 
theoretical-practice of the "signifying practices" is elaborated, I have always subscribed 
to the task thus defined. I suppose that you are referring to the works of Julia Kristeva. ,2 
This indicates that Derrida himself does not concur with an interpretation of dtfferance 
as a non-intervening, inactive neutrality. By claiming that 'practice' is intrinsic to the 
very 'definition' of differance, Derrida is suggesting that the dislocations and 
disjunctions that differance enacts within theory constitute an opening onto practice. 
In the discussion that followed Derrida's reading of the paper 'Differance' at the 
Sorbonne in 1968, Lucien Goldmann goes so far as to equate differance with praxis. He 
says: 
[T]he words difference and differance . .. seem to me to correspond fairly closely 
to Marxist concepts of theory and praxis... [T]o say that all theory is 
connected ... to praxis and derives from it, or indeed, to say that difference 
presupposes differance, do not appear to me to be ... entirely different claims. For 
Marx, all knowledge ... derives from praxis, which is a detour, an action in time, 
and implicitly ... differance. 3 
Constituted and established differences are an effect of the generative movement of 
differentiation and deferral, of differance. However, as no subject does the differing, this 
movement is a praxis without a subject, a notion that Goldmann ultimately finds 
incoherent.4 It must be noted that the 'subject' that is supposed to have been abandoned 
by grammatology is the substantial and present-to-itself autonomous individual agent, 
which, as we have demonstrated in, among other places, our discussion of Hegel's 
notion of 'subject', is far from being the only conception of the subject in the history of 
philosophy. We will come back to the relationship between the notions of subject and 
praxis later. 
Derrida himself, in his later work The Politics of Friendship, identifies the word 
. . . . . ' h d t tive conceptual disiunctur~ He 
'praxIs', speCIfically pohtIcs as praXIS, WIt a econs rue . 
writes: 
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[N]o politics has ever been adequate to its concept [T]h" d " 
. . '" . ... IS ma equatIOn IS not 
accIdental, smce polItIcs IS essentially a prax~ l'S Thi' . d . f h 
. " . . . s ma equatIOn 0 t e 
concept to Itself mamfests Itself pre-eminently in the order of th 1" 1 
1·· 1" e po Itlca or po ItIca practIce, unless thIS order... would situate the very 1 f 
. d . f pace. " 0 an 
ma equatIOn .0 any concept to itself: the concept of disjunction qua the 
conceptual bemg of the concept. 5 
Thus, that which is essentially praxis cannot be adequate to its own concept, and this just 
exemplifies conceptuality as such, which constitutes merely an effacement of the 
inadequation of all concepts to themselves, an effacement of praxis. Political practice is 
paradigmatic of the self-inadequacy of conceptuality in general. Praxis manifests itself 
as a deconstructive intervention and disjuncture within theory. Differance is this 
productive disjuncture. 
A genuine praxis, a praxis that affects and changes things as opposed to a mere 
functioning within the enclosure of presence, is necessarily an intervening manifestation 
of the productive disjuncture of differance. Differance is both a disjuncture within the 
ossified positivity of a reified consciousness and the opening of praxis and history. 
During 'The Original Discussion of "Differance" (1968)' Derrida says: 'DijJerance is 
the "productive" movement of differences, the "history" ... of constituted differences ... 
From this point of view, I'm not unaware of what, in a most classical idiom, is called 
again today the creative or generative activity of man... Translated into classical 
idiom ... differance would ... implicate this generative activity. Let us say that d~fJerance 
marks it.,6 Dijferance refers to 'history' in the sense of the generative acts that constitute 
and reconstitute synchronic structures of differences, economies of presence. 
Just as presence effaces its differential generation, the already constituted 
configuration of objectivity effaces the act of its constitution. The 'history' that is here 
effaced is history as dijferance, a 'constitutive history' that involves irreducibly singular 
acts, meaningless acts that found new configurations of meaningfulness. It is not to be 
confused with 'history' as a development within the restricted economy of such a 
configuration. In his Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry, Derrida discusses 
'constitutive history' in terms of Husserl 's project of searching for the constitutive acts. 
or 'origins', that found particular sciences. Derrida states that the idea of such a search 
implies the need for a 'constitutive history, a history in which the consideration of facts 
themselves would become indispensable, because for the first time, as singular historical 
origin, the instituting fact would be irreplaceable,.7 Here Derrida refers to Tnln-Duc-
Thao's assertion that Husserl is, in the Origin of Geometry, trying 'to ground 
geometrical truth on human pra\" is , ,8 rather than on internal subjective constitutive' acts. 
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Tran-Duc-Thao, in his book Phenomenology and Dialectical M t . I· h a ena 15m, argues t at 
phenomenology needs to be supplemented with a Marxist prax· h·l h b IS P 1 osop y, ecause 
subjective constitutive acts are not foundational but derive or are t d fr 
' , ranspose, om acts 
in the more primordial realm of the world of material production. Husserl's Origin of 
Geometry is thus said to hint at a way out of the solipsism of earlier phenomenology. 
Radical institutive and constitutive historicity involves a history of irreducibly 
singular events. The singular alterity of such events is futural as a disjuncti\"e opening 
within the present; it is thus a precondition of any genuine historical change and 
therefore of history itself. In his later essay, 'Force of Law' (1989), Derrida writes: 
'[T]he experience of absolute alterity ... is the chance of the event and the condition of 
history.,9 The present is the effacement of history; history only really occurs as the 
dissolution of the identity of the present. 
In the earlier Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry (1962), Derrida 
similarly argues that history depends on an inherent disjuncture within presence. He 
writes: '[T]he Living Present. .. is only the maintenance of what indeed must be called 
the dialectic of protention and retention, despite Husser! 's repugnance for that word .... 
Without this extraordinary absolute alteration of... an absolute Present, without this 
always renewed originality of an absolute primordiality... no history would be 
possible.,IO This historical dialectic that simultaneously constitutes and deconstitutes the 
present is identified with differance on the last page of the essay. Derrida writes: 'The 
impossibility of resting in the simple maintenance [nowness] of a Living Present. .. ; the 
inability to live enclosed in the innocent undividedness [indivision] of the primordial 
Absolute, because the Absolute is present only in being deferred-delayed [difj£irant] 
without respite, this impotence and this impossibility are given in a primordial and pure 
consciousness of Difference.' 11 Just as the movement of differance generates and 
includes its own effacement, this dialectic of temporality is also a dialectic between the 
dialectical and the non-dialectical. Derrida writes: 'We have seen ... that the movement 
of primordial temporalization (the ultimate ground of all constitution) was dialectical 
through and through; and that (as every authentic dialecticity wants) this movement was 
only the dialectic between the dialectical (the indefinite mutual and irreducible 
implication of protentions and retentions) and the nondialectical (the absolute and 
concrete identity of the Living Present. .. ),.12 Derrida will soon dc\elop his own 
repugnance for the word 'dialectic', insisting that it only refer to an appropriative 
restricted economy, and prohibiting it from referring, as it does in the Introduction to 
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Husserl's Origin of Geometry, to the relationship between at' t d res nc e economy of 
presence and a general economy of differance. This is already the case in the 1967 t?5say, 
'From Restricted to General Economy', wherein the dialectic is the principle exampk of 
a restricted economy, and where Georges Bataille is reprimanded for explaining the 
transgression of the restricted economy in dialectical terms. 13 
The term 'dialectical' is used by the Derrida of the Introduction to Husser! 's 
Origin of Geometry to refer to cases of a mutual dependence of irreconcilable opposites. 
He refers, in his reading of Husserl, to 'the unity of the noncoincidence and of the 
indefinite coimplication of the constituted and constituting moments in the absolute 
identity of a Living Present that dialectically projects and maintains itself,14 A concern 
with the paradoxical and undecideable (dis )unity (,noncoincidence' and' coimplication') 
of the constituting act and what it constitutes is maintained throughout Derrida's oell\'/'l'. 
An example of this is the non-legal foundation of legality discussed in 'Force of Law'. 
This non-legal foundation is expressed using the terms 'force' and 'violence', terms that 
are used in the same way, i.e. to refer to instituting acts, in Derrida's earlier works of the 
1960s. In his essay, 'Force and Signification' (1963), 'force', the constituting act, founds 
'form', the constituted structure. The non-coinciding co-implication of force and form 
are here put forward as the basis of a genuine historicity. Derrida writes: 'The 
divergence, the difference between Dionysus and Apollo, between ardor and structure, 
cannot be erased in history, because it is not in history. It. .. is an original structure: the 
opening of history, historicity itself. Difference does not simply belong either to history 
or to structure.' 15 The productive difference between the ardour of Dionysian force and 
the structure of Apollonian form is the precondition of history. The term 'difference' is 
here used to refer to what will later be called difjerance, and it is this dif[lirance itself 
that does not belong to history, because it is historicity. In his later essay, 'Force of 
Law', Derrida also refers to the relationship between force and form that constitutes 
historicity. He writes that force, for him, is not substantial: '[I]t is always a matter of 
differential force of difference as difference of force, of force as differance or force of , 
difjerance . .. ; it is always a matter of the relation between force and form, between force 
and signification ... And that is the whole story, the whole of history.' 16 DU/,-;"ance i~ 
implicated in the force, acts, and praxis that are the basis of history. 
As we have mentioned, a constitutive history, a history of genuine acts and 
events that institute new configurations, must be distinguished from the u~e of the word 
histoire ('history') to refer to a description of the empirically observable immanent 
ISO 
developments functioning teleologically within an already con t'tut d fi . S 1 e con 19uratlon. 
That is why from the late 1960s onwards Derrida's use of the word' . d b IS accompallIe \" 
disclaimers and quotation marks which had been absent from his use of the word 
hitherto. This already constituted configuration, characteristic of the reified 
consciousness of both ideology and theory, is what Levinas calls totalite ('totality'), and, 
for Levinas, 'history' only exists as totality. Levinas reserves the tenn eschato/(wie 
b 
('eschatology') for that which breaches the enclosure of totality and goes beyond 
'history'. He writes: 'Eschatology institutes a relation with being beyond the totality or 
beyond history,.l7 Derrida, in his early essay on Levinas, 'Violence and Metaphysics' 
(1964), makes it clear that his own use of the word histoire (,history'). in 
contradistinction to that of Levinas, itself names the breach of totality. Derrida writes 
that 'history' for him 'is not history in the sense given it by Levinas (totality), but is the 
history of the departures from totality, history as the very movement of transcendence. 
of the excess over the totality without which no totality would appear as such. History is 
not the totality transcended by eschatology, metaphysics, or speech. It is transcendence 
itself.,18 This Derridian history, history as dijJerance, is the condition of possibility and 
impossibility of totality, the movement of non-totalisable acts that both found and breach 
totalities. Such transcendence is history in its most authentically historical form. a 
radical historicity that itself breaches and goes beyond 'history' in the weak, not 
fundamentally historical, sense of the word. Derrida writes: 'Is not the beyond-history of 
eschatology the other name of the transition to a more profound history, to History 
itself? But to a history which, unable any longer to be itself in any original or final 
presence, would have to change its name?,19 History, to be genuinely itself, genuinely 
historical, must be the differential praxis that makes it impossible for anything to be 
genuinely itself, a praxis without any teleological reference to an ultimate presence. 
Instituting acts and events, irreducibly singular and uniterable, are characterised 
by 'force' and 'violence', in that they can only occur within a totality as inuptions, not 
yet appropriated within the totality as anything meaningful and therefore iterable. Such 
activity is dijJerance as praxis, a praxis without teleological reference to presence. and 
also a praxis without a reference to presence in the form of a substantial and active 
subject. As we have seen, Goldmann, for one, finds the notion of praxis \\ithout a 
subject to be incoherent. Without a subject there can be movement and happening, but 
. ., k' d f t b t the institutin lJ acts and e\t?nts of not praXIS. PraXIS mvolves some m 0 agen, u c ' 
Derridian radical historicity seem to come from nowhere. 
IXl 
While praxis to be praxis may require a 'sub1ect' of some kind 't' I . 
J ,1 IS on y a certam 
understanding of the term 'subject' i e a substantl'al present to't It' . 
, " ,- -1 se . conscIOUS 
autonomous agent, that is precluded by the events of a Derridian historicity. We ha\"e 
demonstrated in an earlier chapter how Hegel's notion of 'subject" refers to an irruption 
of negativity within substance. We have also mentioned Balibar's dictum that 'the 
subject is praxis', a dictum that avoids the question of what kind of subject praxis is. The 
Levinasian subject is itself a breach of totality. Levinas refers to it as 'a subjectivity born 
from the eschatological vision. ,20 Subjectivity is here identified with radical historicity, 
which makes it closer to differance than to a substantial presence. The subject is not an 
enclosed narcissistic identity suppressive of otherness, it is the opening within the 
totality and the exposure to otherness itself. Levinas writes: 'It is in order that alterity be 
produced in being that a "thought" is needed and that an I is needed. . .. "Thought'" and 
"interiority" are the very break-up of being and the production ... of transcendence. ,2] 
This subjective breach within the totality of positive objectivity and 'history', the 
exposure to alterity, includes the act of speech, or speech as act, in the radically irruptive 
sense of the word 'act'. Levinas writes: 'Form ... alienates the exteriority of the other. 
... The life of expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent, exposed as a 
theme, is thereby dissimulated. The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already 
discourse. He who manifests himself. .. at each instant undoes the form he presents. ,22 
The speaking subject that breaches totality by exposing itself to the other in the face-to-
face relation is alienated by its form, objectified and reified as a 'theme [theme]', a 
phenomenal and theoretical object within totality. To use the terminology of Emile 
Benveniste, the subject of the act of uttering [enonciation] is alienated by the subject of 
the uttered statement [enance]. Only the subj ect as an act of speech is exposed to the 
other and is thus able to breach totality. Levinas's emphasis on the act of speech is 
problematic for Derrida, because, while the 'act' constitutes an irruption in the restricted 
economy of totality, the 'speech' is a case of the phonocentrism of the metaphysics of 
presence. The relationship between Derrida and Levinas will be discussed in the next 
section. What is important here is that Levinas understands the term 'subject' as 
referring to the breach of totality and its opening onto alterity through an irreducibly 
singular and irruptive act. 
As has been said, what Derrida calls sujet ('subject'), throughout his \\ork, is 
. . 'd' t f b,iect and an obiect subject to strIctly a self-present substantIal 1 entIty, a ype 0 0 J ' J' 
. h t th ' biectless' e\ents and act-; of deconstruction. However, thIS does not mean t a e su J L L 
what we have termed Derridian radical historicity come from some fatalistic 
Heideggerian 'sending', in other words, from nowhere. On the contrary. in his later 
work, The Politics of Friendship, Derrida claims that behind an event there often lies a 
decision, albeit a radical and irreducibly singular decision. He writes: 'There is no 
event. .. that is not as unique, singular and irreplaceable as the decision with which it is 
frequently associated, notably in politics. '" Certainly the decision makes the event'.23 
For a decision to be genuinely a decision, to be sovereign and free, it must itself be an 
irruption in the givenness of positive objectivity, and not merely a functional moment in 
the operativity of the latter. The manifestation of dif!erance, the experience of the 
undecideability of an aporia, is the precondition of a genuine decision. Derrida \\Tltes: 
The crucial experience of the perhaps imposed by the undecidable - that is to 
say, the condition of decision - is not a moment to be ... suppressed. It continues 
to constitute the decision as such; '" it produces it qua decision in and through 
the undecidable; there is no other decision than this: decision in the matter and 
form of the undecidable .... [T]he instant of decision must remain heterogeneous 
to all knowledge as such, to all theoretical or reportive determination, even if it 
may and must be preceded by all possible science and conscience. The latter are 
unable to determine the leap of decision without transforming it into the 
irresponsible application of a programme, hence without depriving it of what 
makes it a sovereign and free decision ... At this point, practical performativity is 
irreducible to any theorem[.]24 
The decision, or at least the 'instant' of decision, cannot, by definition, be conditioned 
by any programmatic functionality or determined by any theoretical knowledge. The 
irreducibility of decision is nothing other than the irreducibility of praxis, or 'practical 
performativity', to theory. 
This Derridian praxis does without a subject only if 'subject' is defined as a 
substantial decision-maker. There is nothing substantial behind a decision; a decision is 
itself a rupture of the closed identity of substance. As we have discussed, the 'subject' 
can be defined otherwise, otherwise than a substantial closed identity. Examples of this 
other 'subject' include Hegel's subject that is in contradistinction to substance ('spirit' is 
the unity of the subject and substance opposition), and Levinas's subject that is the 
. l' d h t the other If the word 'subJ'ect' can bc opemng of the closed tota Ity an t e exposure 0 . 
. . . h h d refer to the point of an acti\'e legItImately used m these senses t en t e wor can 
. . ..' d th . nness of positi\c objectivity, It is dISjUncture withm totalIty, substance, an e gIVe " . 
'active' because it decides. 'It' is a being that becomes 'subject' through the irruptive 
. , . t' t f substance but of di fferential force of its own decision. The subject conSIS s no 0 
. d' 't'~ '. its force is nothin~ hut the force. The subject is inherently relatIOnal, an so IS 1 sorce, ' ~ 
\:-13 
rupturing of the given. As Derridian praxis requires decI'sI'ons d th' b . 
, an e msu stantlal but 
forceful decision-maker can legitimately be called a 'subject', then Lucien Goldmann 
need not have fretted about the incoherencies of a Derridian subiectles . 
J S praXIS. 
Nevertheless, as Derrida insists throughout his work that the term slijer 
('subject') can only legitimately name a substantial presence-to-itself the word ~ h' 
, ,lor lIn, 
is taboo. In 'Force of Law' Derrida writes: '[A] subject can never decide anything: a 
subject is even that to which a decision cannot come or happen ... [or] ... affect the 
essential identity and the substantial presence-to-self that make a subject what it is' .25 
This is a mere terminological argument, as, for Derrida, the decision comes from a 
passive exposure to the other, a state that Levinas terms subjectivite ('subjectivity'). In 
The Politics of Friendship Derrida writes: 
[T]he subjectivity of a subject. .. never decides anything; its identity in itself and 
its calculable permanence make every decision an accident which leaves the 
subject unchanged and indifferent. A theory of the subject is incapable (~l 
accounting for the slightest decision . ... [S]hould one imagine ... a "passive" 
decision ... ? ... The passive decision, condition of the event, is always in me, 
structurally, another event, a rending decision as the decision of the other. 2(, 
A genuine decision, one that is not just a programmed functioning within the economy 
of the same, comes from the call of the other. It thus involves a passive receptivity. As it 
is the 'condition of the event', this passivity is the basis of any genuine act, of any 
rupture within the closure of the present. The only genuine acts are passive acts. Such 
'acts' involve either a loss of the self, a suspension of the ego, a loss of the subject as the 
condition of its non-functional sovereignty, or a suspension of the identity of the ego and 
the receptive opening to the other as the condition of the subject that acts, depending on 
one's terminological preferences. 
This passive receptivity is a condition of genuine activity. This loss of the unified 
subject of theoretical contemplation standing over and against the world as object is a 
condition of the subject as act, as praxis. It is the performativity of praxis that is at the 
basis of the passive, i.e. exposed to alterity, moment of decision. Derrida writes in 
'Force of Law': 
The instant of decision is a madness ... because such decision i.s both hyper-active 
and suffered [sur-active et subie], it preserves somethmg pa,SSI\e'"e\en 
. . . . fr ly by letting himselt be afkcted unconscIOUS, as If the decIdmg one was ee on ... 
by his own decision and as if it came to him from the other[,] ... a decIsIon ... 
acting in the night of nonknowledge and nonrule. Not of th.e absence of rules and 
knowledge but of a reinstitution of rules that by definition IS not preceded by any 
knowledge or by any guarantee as such. If one were to trust' . " 
d .. d" . III a maSSl\ e and eClSlVe IstIllctlOn between performative and const t' I 
'b h' 'nh . a Ive ... one wou d have to 
attn ute t IS... 1 erent Irreducibility of thoughtless d " 
. . . ness an unconSCIOusness 
however IntellIgent It may be to the performative structu f" h .. -. 
. 27' re 0 speec acts and 
acts III general[.] 
This 'performative structure', this inherent praxis, this 'subiect' of the decisi\)c 
J act. 
involves a dissolution of the 'subject' as a self-present closed identity. 
Difjfirance is praxis as the dissolution of the reified positivity of a gi\"en 
objectivity. It is the infinite determinability of an instituting activity that constitutes and 
deconstitutes configurations of objectivity, economies of the proper, preventing the latter 
from coagulating into the static permanence of absolute presence. It thus effects a de-
alienating deconstruction of the givenness of presence, demonstrating that the latter is 
not a 'givenness' at all, but the effect of acts and decisions. 
The Other's Other: The Alienation of Alterity 
Praxis as the deconstruction of givenness involves an openmg to the event of the 
irreducibly other. Alienation is the effacement of this instituting activity, of dif.!erance, 
through the latter's objectification into the ossified stasis of the closed totality of 
presence, a presence that always presents itself as given and not as instituted. This is an 
alienation of subjectivity insofar as subjectivity is the opening to the other. Thus 
alienation is a suppression of otherness, and de-alienation is then an opening to and 
welcoming of the other. This may seem paradoxical, as it means that alienation 
suppresses alienness and de-alienation welcomes the alien. This alienation refers to the 
alienation of alterity itself, where the always other singularity is alienated into 'the 
same', the realm of general equivalence. The use of the term 'alienation' here is only as 
paradoxical as the use of the term 'welcoming' in the phrase 'welcoming the other as 
other', whereby the term 'welcoming' is compelled to refer to a de-estrangement that 
does not involve the 'de-othering' of a domesticating appropriation. 
However, Adorno, in Negative Dialectics, claims that de-alienation involves a 
suppression of otherness. He writes: '[TJhe theory of alienation ... confuses the need to 
approach the heteronomous and thus irrational world - "to be at home everywhere," a~ 
Novalis put it - with the archaic barbarism that the longing subject cannot love \\hat is 
alien and different, with the craving for incorporation and persecution. If the alien were 
no longer ostracized, there hardly would be any more alienation. ,28 For Adorno. 
alienation [EntfremdungJ is merely a symptom of an a\ersion to othLmL~s and 
difference, and would disappear with the overcoming of thl'S a\'e' Ad h' I rSlOn. orno lmse f 
seems to be confusing 'the theory of alienation' with the im I' t' f I pIca IOns 0 a popu ar 
'psychological' usage of the word 'alienation', a usage that is entirely detached from the 
specificities of the Hegelian and Marxian 'theory'. 
Levinas, in contrast, uses the word alienation ('alienation') in the Hegelian sense 
~ . 
Levinas is the thinker who most explicitly develops the notion of a non-appropriative 
relation to alterity. Yet, as we have seen, he writes of the 'form' that 'alienates the 
exteriority of the other.' 'Form' is the reified objectification of the living, 'expressive'. 
singularity of the other, the rendering of the latter as a 'theme', a phenomenal object of 
observation. It is the other that is alienated. As we have discussed in our readings of 
Hegel and Marx, alienation is this objectification of an always other singularity into the 
closed totality of a positive phenomenality. Levinas uses the term 'alienation' in this 
sense, one that is derived from Hegel's notion of 'Entauj3erung' but that Levinas, 
nevertheless, uses to convey his own ideas regarding the suppression of otherness. 
For Levinas, theoretical knowledge involves such a reification of the other. He 
writes: 'Philosophy itself is identified with the substitution of ideas for persons, the 
theme for the interlocutor, the interiority of the logical relation for the exteriority of 
interpellation. ,29 Such knowledge enacts a reifying de-personalisation of the other 
through the phenomenalising effacement of the face-to-face relation, a relation inherent 
to the speech act. Thus it is the person, the other as a person, that can rupture and 
undermine the closed totality of the phenomenal world of objects, a world of general 
equivalence and typological classifications, one that suppresses irreducible singularity. 
Levinas writes: '[I]t is only man who could be absolutely foreign to me - refractory to 
every typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every classification - and 
consequently the term of a "knowledge" finally penetrating beyond the object.,3O The 
alienated objectivity effaces the person, who is not an object and is essentially non-
phenomenal. 
This non-phenomenality of the other gives it a paradoxical relationship to the 
notion of 'presence'. Derrida writes in 'Violence and Metaphysics' regarding Lc\'inas' s 
concept of the other: '[T]he other ... must present himself as absence, and must appear as 
nonphenomenal. ,31 However, such a presentation remains a presentation, and such a 
non-phenomenal appearance remains an appearance. Levinas refers to this non-
phenomenal actuality of the other as 'the face'. For Derrida. the Levl11asian face is 
embroiled in the metaphysics of presence. Derrida writes: 'The face is presence. 
ousia.,32 Certainly, Levinas puts forward his notion of the face and the speech act that 
opens the face-to-face relation in tenns of presence. Levinas writes: 'The face is a living 
presence; it is expression. ... The face speaks. '" [T]o present oneself as other is to 
signify. " To present oneself by signifying is to speak. This presence, affirmed in the 
presence of the image as the focus of the gaze that is fixed on you, is said. '" It is 
preeminently the presence of exteriority. ,33 The linking of presence and speech is 
suggestive of what Derrida calls the phonocentrism of the metaphysics of presence. 
However, the phrase 'presence of exteriority' indicates that this 'presence' is something 
other than the presence of a closed totality, of a restricted economy, something other 
than presence in the Derridian sense. In Derridian tenns 'exteriority' and alterity 
constitute ruptures and openings within presence. In contrast, for Levinas, the term 
presence ('presence') itself refers to precisely those ruptures that undermine a closed 
totality. Levinas writes: 'The object of knowledge is always a fact, already happened and 
passed through. The interpellated one is called upon to speak; his speech consists ... in 
being present . .. , The present is produced in this struggle against the past. .. The unique 
actuality of speech tears it from the situation in which it appears'. 34 'Presence', in the 
Levinasian sense, is the irreducibly unique act of speech which transcends the given 
situation, which transcends 'presence' in the Derridian sense. The reified objectivity of 
the already there is referred to by Levinas as 'the past', and the rupturing and 
transcendence of this totality is referred to as 'the present'. In Derridian terms, the 
fonner is the closed economy of 'presence', and the latter is the rupture in this 
'presence' that Derrida refers to as 'futural'. Thus what Levinas calls 'the past', Derrida 
calls the 'present', and what Levinas calls 'the present', Derrida calls 'the future'. 
The 'presence' involved in the Levinasian speech act is not a case of 
phonocentrism qua logocentrism. It is the actuality of the act, not the univocity of the 
voice. While, for Derrida, phonocentrism as the privileging of speech [parole] is a 
privileging of the voice [voix] as the unifying and anchoring principle of meaning. as the 
logos, for Levinas, in contrast, the privileging of speech is the privileging of the acl that 
opens the relationship with alterity. The voice is not the act; the voice is that which 
functions within a written text to restrict the play of meaning and suppress alterity. The 
voice is an effacement of the act. In the later Derrida's terms, the act is the 'hcrc-and-
. I d th Th' 'here-and-now' is what Le\inas now' rupturmg the presence of the a rea y ere. IS 
calls 'presence', and the already-there of the Derridian 'present' is identical to the 
already-there of the Levinasian 'past'. The act of institution is effaced and repre~~l?d by 
187 
the instituted economy, because this act is a force that is extraneo t h 
us 0 suc an economv 
and thus can only appear within the economy as a rupture or dislocation. The act is the 
condition of possibility and impossibility of the presence and propriety of the economy it 
institutes. The speech act is the condition of possibility and impossibility of the \oice. of 
the restricted economy and closed totality of the logos, of the voice as logos. In the terms 
set out in Levinas's later book, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. the 'Saying' 
[Ie Dire], the act of speech, makes possible and undermines the 'Said' [Ie Dit]. the 
utterance objectified, reified, and 'thematised', into the 'past' of a given statement. 35 
The Levinasian speech act and face-to-face relation are thus not a case of the 
metaphysics of presence, despite Derrida suggesting as such in 'Violence and 
Metaphysics', but are an effect of the active differance of the irreducible 'here-and-
now'. Nevertheless, Derrida, in 'Violence and Metaphysics', objects to Levinas's 
privileging of speech and the face. This is despite Derrida's voicing of adherence to 
Levinas's proto-deconstructive undermining of the logocentric closure of identitv. 
Derrida writes: '[Levinas's] thought summons us to a dislocation of the Greek logos. to 
a dislocation of our identity, and perhaps of identity in general'. 36 Derrida argues that as 
the face-to-face relation of the Levinasian speech act is embroiled in a metaphysical 
notion of presence it cannot genuinely breach the closed totality that is itself founded on 
such a notion. The dislocation of identity must be approached formally, and not merely 
on the empirical basis of an act of face-to- face communication. Derrida writes: 
[T]he attempt to achieve an opening toward the beyond of philosophical 
discourse, by means of philosophical discourse, " . cannot possibly succeed 
within language . .. except by formally and thematically posing the question of the 
relations between belonging and the opening, the question of closure. Formally -
... not in a logic... but in an inscribed description, in an inscription of the 
relations between the philosophical and nonphilosophical, in a kind of unheard of 
graphics, within which philosophical conceptuality would be no more than a 
fi . 37 unctlOn. 
Totality can be most effectively ruptured and dislocated by a grammatological and 
deconstructive 'formalism', whereby the inscribed 'form' is demonstrated to formally 
dislodge and overflow the univocity and closure of the form of presence. 
The 'unheard of graphics' that situates philosophical conceptuality within a field 
it cannot master, i.e. the movement of differance, is a formulation and formalisation. in 
grammatological terminology, of the Levinasian notion of the transcendence of totality 
through the encounter with the other, through the act that opens the relation to radical 
alterity. The praxis of this unassimilable act takes an aporetic and disjuncti\l~ fonn 
l~~ 
within that conceptuality. As the Levinasian transcendent I t' I" re a IOn to a tenty 15 
constituted by the face-to-face relation of the speech act l't l'S d' I 'I ' 
, a la oglca notIOn of 
transcendence. But what would the fonnalisation of dialogism be? \\'ould it not be 
dialectics? As we have seen, the Derrida of 'From Restricted to General Economy' 
(1967) regards dialectics as being entirely within philosophical conceptuality, whereas 
the Derrida of the Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry (1962) regards true 
dialectics as involving the dialectic between the dialectical and the non-dialectical. 
between philosophical conceptuality and the heterology of non-conceptuality. 'Violence 
and Metaphysics' (1964) is a thoroughly Hegelian critique of Leyinas, and formalises 
Levinasian dialogical transcendence into the immanent-transcendence of a 'dialectical" 
disjuncture. 
What Derrida objects to in Levinas is the notion of the absolutely other, the other 
as entirely separate from the same. Levinas writes: 
The metaphysical other is other with an alterity that is not formal, is not the 
simple reverse of identity, and is not fonned out of resistance to the same, but is 
prior to every initiative, to every imperialism of the same. It is other with an 
alterity constitutive of the very content of the other. Other with an alterity that 
does not limit the same, for in limiting the same the other would not be 
rigorously other: by virtue of the common frontier the other, within the system, 
would yet be the same. 38 
This non-formal alterity that IS constitutive of its very content and rigorously 
independent is a substantialist notion of the other. But if the other is itself in itself, in 
what way is it 'other' at all? Alterity is relational, not substantial. Derrida frames this 
objection in explicitly Hegelian terms. He writes: 
What authorizes him [Levinas] to say "infinitely other" if the infinitely oth~r 
does not appear as such in the zone he calls the same ... ? '" The other, for me, IS 
an ego which I know to be in relation to me as to an other. Where ha,Ye these 
movements been better described than in The Phenomenology of the Mind! The 
movement of transcendence toward the other, as invoked by Levinas, would have 
no meaning if it did not bear within it, as one of its essential meanings. that in my 
ipseity I know myself to be other for the other. .. , [T]he other cannot be 
absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be other; ... conse,~uently .. the 
same is not a totality closed in upon itself. .. How could there be a pl,ay ~t the 
Same" if alterity itself was not already in the Same ... ? Without ~lten~ ~n the 
same how could the "play of the Same" occur, in the sense of playtul actl\lty. or 
of di~location, in a machine or organic totality which plays or lH)/"ks'! ",' The 
Stranger in the Sophist knows that alterity can be thought only as ncgJtl\lty . 
. . . [and that] the other is always relative[. ]39 
Ixq 
The other is the selfs other and the self is the other's other and thO . th d' . -
, IS IS e con Ihon ot 
both the self and the otherness of, and within the self itself As we ha\'e d' - d' h 
' . . Iscu~se III t e 
chapter on Hegel, the appropriation of the other in the dialectic of recognition is more of 
an assertion of the otherness within identity than an 'imperialism of the same'. which is 
to say, more formally, the genuine infinite is the infinite within the finite and not 
separate from it. The other is the condition of possibility and impossibility of the self; 
the self s own disjuncture. 
Nevertheless, the other is not reducible to being a moment in the constitution of 
the same, however 'playful' and open the same may be as a result of its own othering 
'-' 
through the other. While the encounter with the other is always an encounter of the other 
with its other, in both directions, a paradoxical symmetry of mutual asymmetry, the 
other is not reducible to this relation or to relationality as such. Levinas writes: 
[L ]anguage accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limitrophe within 
this relation, such that the other, despite the relationship with the same, remains 
transcendent to the same. The relation between the same and the other, 
metaphysics, is primordially enacted as conversation [discours], where the same, 
gathered up in its ipseity as an "I," as a particular existent unique and 
autochthonous, leaves itself. 40 
However, if the other 'remains transcendent to the same', and transcendent to its 
relationship with the same, it remains not as 'other', but as a residue of bare singularity, 
a singularity that is always other when exposed to any relation. It is only this singularity 
that makes the other genuinely other when encountering the same, but the singular only 
becomes an 'other' in this encounter. 
There is certainly a tension in Levinas's work between substantial and relational 
portrayals of alterity. The following passage indicates that the other's transcendence of 
the same does not involve a non-relational conception of alterity: 
A relation whose terms do not form a totality can ... be produced within the 
general economy of being only as proceeding fr~m th~ I. to the other, as a fac~ to 
face, ... irreducible to the distance the synt~etIc actIVIty of the understand~ng 
establishes between the diverse terms, other wIth respect to one anot~er, that k.nd 
themselves to its synoptic operation. The I is not a conting.ent form~ttOn b~ .\\·hlch 
the same and the other, as logical determinations of bemg. can .Ill a~dlttOn be 
reflected H'ithin a thought. It is in order that al~erity be pro1~ced 111 bemg ... that 
an 1 is needed ... , Alterity is possible only startmg from me. 
The c: c: I' d t ~orm a totality because it is a non-phenomenal lace-tO-lace re at tOn oes no 11 - • 
relation. It is not a relation between objects in an economy of objects. It is a relation that 
lL)U 
cannot be compared to a relation in the fonn of the 'along sl·de of 42 I· b 
, a re atIOn etween 
juxtaposed objects presented to an observing consciousness, a consciousness that is itself 
separate from that relation. For this reason Levinas would object to any formulation of 
the face-to-face relation as a relation between two others. The other is just as noumenal 
qua non-phenomenal as the'!, which is the Kantian moral (practical) subject. This 
means that the relation between the'!, and the other is a practical one, in the sense of the 
radical praxis that we have already discussed, the praxis that dissolves and transcends 
the givenness of an observable phenomenality. The other is alienated by its phenomenal 
fonn, and this alienation is overcome in the dissolutive and transcending praxis of the 
face-to-face speech act. Alterity is only possible 'starting from' the subject of praxis that 
dissolves phenomenality, and such a subject is only possible as a movement towards 
alterity. Thus alterity is only possible in a relation, albeit a practical relation that 
transcends totality. 
A relation that rends totality is different to a relation within a relational totality. 
The non-phenomenal face-to-face relation is radically different to any relation within a 
phenomenal totality. This relation with the other is a relation with something that 
remains non-relational within the relation. It is thus a non-relational relation. The other 
retains its absolute autonomy within the face-to-face relation with the subject. 
Nevertheless, it is the subject, the 'I', that makes possible the production of alterity 
'within being'. Thus totality would never be breached and there would be no alterity 
within 'being' without the event of the face-to-face encounter, and thus without the non-
phenomenal 'subjectivity' that opens the relation to the other, a 'relation' and an opening 
that rupture the proprietary economy of the same. Hence, for Levinas, the supposed 
absolute autonomy of the other depends on the subject as act in the face-to-face relation. 
Despite this, Derrida, at the end of 'Violence and Metaphysics', reduces the 
Levinasian position to an assertion of the absolute autonomy of the other in itself. 
Derrida writes of there being a choice between 'the form of the absolute, speculative 
logic of Hegel, the living logic which reconciles formal tautology and empirical 
heterology' and 'the form of infinite separation and of the unthinkable, unsayable 
transcendence of the other,43. However, the similarity between Le\inas' s notion of 
subjectivity as the condition of the production of alterity in 'being' and Heger s notion of 
the reconciliation of subject and substance wherein the subject constitutes an irruption of 
negativity within substance that prevents substance from being a totality identical to 
itself indicates that Derrida overplays the distinction between Le\inas and Hegel. 
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It is alterity that is alienated in the reified obiectified and ph I' . . 
'J , enomena pOSltlYlty 
of the closed totality of the same, and this alienation is overcome in the non-phenomenal 
praxis of the face-to-face communicative encounter. Such a de-alienation involyes an 
activity wherein alterity can be produced within the totality. Derrida' s reduction of this 
Levinasian breach of totality to the formalism of a grammatological graphics does not in 
itself account for the 'subjective' non-phenomenality required for a genuine encounter 
with alterity. The latter is, however, not incompatible with Derrida's notion of differance 
as the praxis of institutive acts that make possible and ultimately impossible any 
economy of the same. 
Irreducibility of the Political 
Such a praxis is political insofar as the political is understood as involving the rupture of 
the closed homogeneous economy of the neutral. The absolute suppression of alterity in 
what Derrida calls a 'totalitarianism of the neutral,44 would be an absolute de-
politicisation. In its de constructive, denaturalising, undermining of objectified, positive 
and present givenness, the political involves irreducible and foundationless acts and 
decisions, irreducible to any programmatic functionality. The political is polemical and 
is not just a functioning within the given. For there to be alterity 'in being' there must be 
such a 'political' breach of the given, and for there to be 'the political' in this sense there 
must be a 'relation' to unassimilable alterity that prevents the totality from ossifying into 
an apolitical functionality. 
Levinas does not use the word political in this sense; instead he uses the word 
'war'. He writes: 'War. .. presuppose[s] the face and the transcendence of the being 
appearing in the face .... Only beings capable of war can rise to peace. War like peace 
presupposes beings structured otherwise than as parts of a totality .... War presupposes 
the transcendence of the antagonist; it is waged against man. ,45 What Levinas says about 
'war' can equally be said about political antagonism, or the antagonism inherent to the 
notion of the political. Both war and political antagonism involve what Levinas calls a 
'refus de la totalite' ('refusal of totality,).46 The analogy between war and political 
antagonism is used by Carl Schmitt, who regards the notion of the enemy as the 
condition of the political. Derrida discusses Schmitt's concept of the political in The 
Politics of Friendship. He writes: 'Schmittian decisionism ... is a theory of the enemy . 
... [T]he fIgure of the enemy [is the] condition of the political as such' .-17 Th~ political 
1l)2 
rests on the irreducibility of antagonism and polemical decision a d 
, n any attempt to 
circumvent antagonism and decision constitutes a de-politicisation. 
Derrida regards such a de-politicising overcoming of antagonism as undesirable 
and dangerous. The loss of the 'enemy' would mean the final closure of totality in an 
absolute present suppressive of all alterity. He writes: '[L ]osing the enemy would not 
necessarily be progress, reconciliation, or the opening of an era of peace and human 
fraternity. It would be ... an unheard-ofviolence,.48 It is the potential for antagonism, not 
necessarily antagonism itself, which must be maintained in order to prevent the final and 
absolute victory of the metaphysics of presence. Interpreting and appropriating Schmitt, 
Derrida writes: '[H]ostility is required by method and by definition - the very definition 
of the definition. By the dialecticity or diacriticity, by the necessity of the topic as \\"ell, 
which cannot function without the possibility of war. There is no space, nor is there any 
place - ... for a definition or for a distinction - without the real possibility ofwar.,49 For 
there to be difference there must be the possibility of antagonism. 
For Derrida, the apolitical neutrality of the closed totality of phenomenal 
objectivity amounts to a kind of reification that must be resisted. He writes: '[The] 
subjection of the who to the what will call for a question on our part ... The question will 
bring with it a protestation ... It will signify ... the principle of a possible resistance to the 
reduction of the political, even the ethical, to the ontophenomenological. ,50 The rupture 
of totality that the irreducibly political and ethical enact, the transcendent opening to 
alterity, requires a de-reifying re-subjectivisation, an awakening of the "It'ho within the 
what. What Derrida is here asserting is not dissimilar to Levinas' s notion of non-
phenomenal subjectivity as the opening to the other. 
The assertion of the irreducibility of antagonism involves an opposition to any 
political ideology that aims to overcome the political in a final teleological realisation of 
peace and consensus. Simon Critchley claims that Derrida's politically inclined later 
work involves an attempt to reassert the political against the de-politic ising tendencies 
within emancipatory politics. Critchley writes: '[W]hat Derrida is attempting in his 
recent work is nothing less than a repoliticization of Marxism; that is ... a repoliticization 
waged against both the subordination of the political to the socio-economic in classical 
Marxism, but most of all against the gnawing cynicism of neo-liberalism and its 
d · "d 1 of "globalization" ,51 Although this passage in itself sugge~h Isempowenng 1 eo ogy . ~ 
. ~ f L "" m Derrida's as...;crtion nf the that Derrida is merely puttmg forward a lorm 0 entl11S, ' 
. ..' f rtain fom1 of \lar:\ism. The latter political is also aimed agamst the IrentC alms 0 a ce ' 
involve the realisation of peace and consensus In a communI'st totality of absolute 
presence bereft of antagonism and alterity. 
As we have seen in the chapter on Marx, Derrida regards Marx's notion of the 
overcoming of alienation and the commodity form as indicating a desire to e:\orcise the 
spectrality of differance in a realisation of total presence. We also discussed hO\\ 
Marxian de-alienation can be interpreted differently, as a freeing of the infinite 
determinability of 'generic-being' [Gattungswesen] in a general an-economy of non-
appropriable ends, one which awakens rather than suppresses alterity. The de-alienated 
condition is not an overcoming of the political. On the contrary, alienation itself 
constitutes a de-politicisation, involving the reification and neutralisation of 'subjective' 
acts and decisions in the positivity and givenness of a closed phenomenal objectivity. 
De-alienation is a re-subjectivising rupture of that objectivity, an assertion of the who in 
the what, and an opening of the non-objective relation to alterity. 
Irreconcilable De-alienation 
This notion of the political as inherently polemical and antagonistic is only a specific, 
and even non-traditional, conception of the political. As we have seen, Derrida claims to 
be resisting 'the reduction of the political to the ontophenomenological'. Derrida writes 
that this is 'a powerful reduction - powerful enough ... to have perhaps constructed the 
dominant concept of the political'. 52 Levinas uses the word 'political' in this' dominant' 
traditional sense. He writes: 
[T]he attention to the Other as unicity and face (which the visibleness of the 
political leaves invisible) ... can be produced only in the unicity of an 1. ... It is 
not to purely subjective events... that we appeal to in insisting on the 
irreducibility of the personal to the universality of the State; w~ app~al to a 
dimension and perspective of transcendence as real as the dImenS10n and 
perspective of the political and more true than it, because in it the apology of the 
ipseity does not disappear.53 
Here the political is precisely the realm of a phenomenal totality that elides and effaces 
the singularity of the other and the'!,. However, the transcendent relation to alterity is 
not merely 'subjective', and is as 'real' as the political, because it itself constitutes the 
basis of a notion of sociality where the non-phenomenal 'ipseity' of the irreducibly 
singular is maintained in a paradoxical polity of the non-totalisable. 
Derrida, in 'Violence and Metaphysics', describes this polity as that l)f a 
~ f h menalit\' ,Sol .\s \\ith Levina..;· ... 
'community of nonpresence, and therelore 0 nonp eno . . . 
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notion of the relation to alterity wherein the related are at the same time absolved from 
the relation in their very otherness, a non-relational relation, this 'community' is a 
communality wherein the related singularities are separated and absoh-ed from the 
communal relationality, a community without community. This 'community' is one 
where the solitary singularity of each of its members is maintained and not abstracted 
into being a part of a phenomenal totality of symmetrical relations and equivalences. It is 
a 'community' of dif.!erance, in that it effectuates the undecideable simultaneity of 
separation and relation. In the 'Original Discussion of Differance', Derrida says: 
'Differance marks the separation and the relation to the entirely other. .. and is never 
found without solitude. ,55 A community of differance involves a common assertion of 
having nothing in common. It is not a community of equals, but a community of 
incommensurables. In The Politics of Friendships, Derrida writes regarding such a non-
relational relationality: 'This is ... a social bond, a contemporaneity, but in the common 
affirmation of being unbonded, an untimely being-alone and, simultaneously, in joint 
acquiescence to disjunction. How can you be together to bear witness to secrecy, 
separation, singularity? ... How can a politics of separation be founded?,56 An answer to 
these questions is not expected; their function is to announce the unanswerable 
undecideability within which a Derridian politics must 'operate' (a praxis that 'operates' 
a productive inoperability). For Derrida, the undecideability demonstrated by 
paradoxical and contradictory statements, such as 'non-relational relation', is not an 
irrationalist abdication of philosophical responsibility; on the contrary, it is precisely 
such undecideability that demands responsible thought. Derrida writes: 
[T]o speak this community without community ... and thereby ... to form or to 
forge it. And to do so in the language of madness that we must us~, force? .. by 
the most profound and rigorous necessity, to say things as c~ntradictory, I~sane, 
absurd, impossible, undecidable as 'X without X', 'commumty of th?s~ wIthout 
community', 'inoperative community', 'unavo~able commumty: these 
untenable syntagms and arguments ... these inc~nceI~able. concepts exposed to 
the disdain of philosophical good conscience, WhICh thmks It p~ssible to ho~d out 
in the shade of the Enlightenment; where the light of the ~nlIght~nment IS not 
thought where a heritage is misappropriated. For us there IS no EnlIghtenment 
, 57 
other than the one to be thought. 
The disjuncture within totality, community, identity, relationality, necessary for 
singularity and alterity not to be effaced, is a disjuncture \vithin meaning itself. hence the 
need for undecideable assertions. 
The non-totalisable community of incommensurables is a community \\"ithout 
unity, without any organising principle of unity, whether that of a generic identity or that 
of a general equivalence of individual rights. In The Politics of Friendship, where the 
term amitie (,friendship') is used to refer to such a non-unified community, Derrida 
writes (interpreting and appropriating Montaigne' s notion of friendship): 'The law of 
friendship ... would be heterogeneous to genericity, to all law - indeed, to all concepts 
that would not form the genus of the non-genus, the genus of the unique. The unique 
must be, every time, as is said of genius, a genus: in its own unique respect its o\\TI 
genus. ,58 What is said here about friendship can equally be said about the non-unified 
community. Jean-Luc Nancy addresses these issues in his book, The Inoperative 
Community. Nancy writes: '[I]t is precisely the immanence of man to man ... that 
constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking of community. A community presupposed 
as having to be one of human beings presupposes that it effect. .. its own essence. ,59 An 
'inoperative' community of incommensurable singularities by definition cannot 
organically 'effect' any essence, whether that essence be the human genus or any other 
identifying feature. It also cannot be based on the abstract 'rights' of the isolated 
individual. Nancy writes: 'The individual is merely the residue of the experience of the 
dissolution of community ... It is another, and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the 
absolutely detached for itself, taken as origin and certainty. ,60 The inoperatin~ 
community cannot have the genus or the individual as its organising principle; nor can it 
have any organising principle at all. 
Irreducible singularity is as indifferent to individual particularity as it is to 
collective generality. Derrida refers to 'anonymous and irreducible singularities, 
infinitely different and thereby indifferent to particular difference, to the raging quest for 
identity' .61 Identity, whether individual or collective, effaces the radical singulari ty 
which is always other. The community of singularities is not a collectivity that exists 
beyond the sum of its parts. It is not even the sum of its parts, as irreducible singularity 
is non-numerical, uniterable, and non-serialisable. Nancy writes: 'Community does nol 
sublate the finitude it exposes. Community itself, in sum, is nothing but this exposition. ·1>2 
This so-called ex-position of 'finitude' is a Derridian formalisation of the Levinasian 
face-to-face relation that breaches and transcends totality. What Nancy is here calling 
'finitude' is singularity, which is what Derrida calls 'infinite singularity' when sp~aking 
in a Levinasian rather than Heideggerian idiom. If singularity can be ex-posed this 
implies that it must be initially posed; but such a positing \\ould be its obJectification 
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into a phenomenal totality, and thus the loss of singularity as such. It is not that 
singularity is ex-posed, but rather that singularity occurs within totality as disjunctive 
ex-position. The posited or posed is within the economy of phenomenality; ex-position 
or exposure is a disjuncture of that phenomenality. It may seem contradictory to state 
that exposure is non-phenomenal, but it must be recalled that, for Levinas, it is the non-
phenomenal face of the other that transcends totality, a non-phenomenality that 'undoes 
the form it presents'. The noumenal dislodges the order of the phenomenal. 
As singularity only occurs within totality as ex-position. as the disjuncture 
involved in a non-relational relation to alterity, singularity as ex-position can be said to 
be the basis of a genuine community. Community is not the unity of a phenomenal 
totality; the absolute atomisation of an absolute non-community would still be within the 
unity of such a totality. Singularity does not refer to an isolated substantiality; it is 
radically meaningless and unidentifiable. It thus occurs as disjuncture within meaning, 
identity, phenomenality, and totality. It occurs as the ex-pository disjuncture that is the 
non-relational relation to infinite and transcendent alterity. This opening to otherness 
within identity is thus the precondition of a genuine communality, a communality which 
is not abstracted from this opening to become another form of closed totality. 
To this extent Nancy is right to assert that such a community is nothing other 
than this opening, this ex-position. However, Nancy, in his book, Being Singular Plural, 
puts forward a notion of the inherent plurality of singularity as the basis of community. 
He writes: ' [A] singularity is indissociable from a plurality... The concept of the 
singular implies its singularisation and, therefore, its distinction from other 
singularities ... The singular is primarily each one and, therefore, also H'ith and among 
all the others. The singular is a plura1. ,63 This argument is based on the assertion that the 
'concept' of singularity is diacritical, meaning that singularity is nothing but its 
distinction from other singularities. Such a singularity is not the irreducible infinite 
singularity that Derrida and Levinas refer to. This Nancian singularity is not irreducible: 
it is reduced to the notion of distinction. The problem is that there is no 'concept' of 
singularity, unless it is the concept of that which cannot be conceptualised. Singularity is 
not a distinction or a determinacy; it is pure uniterable uniqueness absohed from all 
determinations and distinctions, determinations that can only ser\'e to generalise, 
'd th t . gularit\ is indifferent pluralise, and serialise it. As we have seen, Dem a argues a SIll . 
to particularity and identity; it is just as indifferent to determinacy and distinction. \\' e 
. . I' f It 't' far from being 'indissociable have also seen that, for Levmas, the smgu anty 0 a en), 
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from a plurality', is absolutely dissociable from what it is related to and from its 
relations. The notions of distinction and determinacy belong in the realm of 
phenomenality and totality, and constitute an elision of singularity. This Nancian 
singularity is thus a phenomenal particularity and individuality that is inherently 
relational and plural in the sense of the 'being-with-one-another' of the restricted 
economy of totality. It is not the radical irreducible singularity of infinite alterity. 
Levinas emphasises the importance of absolute separation, even within the 
relation to alterity. He writes: 'The same and the other at the same time maintain 
themselves in relationship and absolve themselves from this relation, remain absolutely 
separated. ,64 Separation is essential for there to be any relation to that which transcends 
totality, a non-relational relation of the radically separate. He writes: 
Separation, effected in the concrete as habitation and economy, makes possible 
the relation with the detached, absolute exteriority. . .. Separation opens up 
between terms that are absolute and yet in relation, that absolve themselves from 
the relation they maintain ... Thus the metaphysical relation realizes a multiple 
existing [un exister multiple] - a pluralism. But this relation would not realize 
pluralism if the formal structure of relationship exhausted the essence of 
relationship. '" The dimension of height. .. indicates a sort of non-homogeneity 
of space, such that a radical multiplicity, distinct from numerical multiplicity, can 
here be produced. Numerical multiplicity remains defenseless against 
totalization. . .. Multiplicity ... implies an objectivi7s posited m... the 
impossibility of conjoining the I and the non-I in a whole. 5 
A genume multiplicity, an infinite non-totalisable multiplicity of uniterable non-
serialisable irreducible singularities, one thus radically distinct from a homogeneous 
numerical multiplicity, one that does not coagulate into the abstract and objective unity 
of a closed totality, requires the non-relational relation of the absolutely separate, a non-
objective and transcendent relation that is inherently asymmetrical, where the infinite 
excess of the other dominates the subj ect. Separation makes possible the 'relation' with 
the other that breaches the objective observable totality, a totality characterised by the 
homogeneous space of symmetrical relations and general equivalence. Separation is 
necessary for there to be the genuine heterogeneous and qualitative multiplicity or 
plurality of a community of alterity. 
However, Derrida expresses doubt as to whether 'community' is an appropriate 
term to refer to such a non-totalisable plurality. Derrida writes: 
. . . . tr l' t'on of one predicate bv another [T]he aporIa reqUIrmg the unceasmg neu a lza 1 . . - .' 
(relation without relation, community without commul11ty. shanng. \\ Ithout 
sharing, etc.) calls on significations altogether different from those ot the part 
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shared or held in common ... This desire which en ' h ' 
" h" h' d . . '" gages me WIt a smgular 
. w 0 , ... t IS eSlre of the call to bndge the distance (necessarily unbrid2~able) 
IS (perhaps) no longer of the order of the common or the community.66 ~ 
Derrida here equates community with commonality as such But th h b 
. e l \\'0 concepts can e 
rigorously differentiated. Commonality IS objective whereas community is 
intersubjective. Intersubjective relations, radically thought, are non-phenomenal. non-
objectifiable communicative acts that open up to infinite alterity. Commonality. the 
notion of the in common, refers to relations between phenomenally objective entities 
within a closed totality. 
Derrida, however, wishes to drop the term 'community' and retain the term 
'friendship', albeit a 'friendship' without anything being in common. Derrida writes: 
'[I]f ph ilia cannot function without oikei6tes, then little would stand in the way of saying 
that the central question of this essay ... would be that. .. of a philia without oikei6tes. 
Ultimately, a friendship without presence, without resemblance, without affinity, 
without analogy. . . .Is an aneconomic friendship possible? Can there be any other 
friendship?,67 Friendship, properly thought, must be an-economic. The same can be said 
of community, if community is thought of as an immanently infinitised community of 
singular alterity whose relationality is each time a totality-breaching praxis. Genuine 
community can only be intersubjective, and thus non-phenomenal, rather than an 
objectively phenomenal commonality. Such a non-phenomenal intersubjective 
community, properly thought, can only be an-economic. 
Nevertheless, Derrida is suspicious of the very intersubjectivity of such a 
communality. Regarding his notion of a 'community' of friends, he refers to '[t]he 
incalculable equality of these friends of solitude, of the incommensurable subjects, of 
these subjects without subject and without intersubjectivity. ,68 As Derrida always 
regards the subject as a substantial object, he regards intersubjectivity as a relationality 
among such phenomenal objects. In this passage, Derrida is referring to 
incommensurable subjects without phenomenal objectivity and thus without objecti\'e 
relationality, an incommensurability that is inherently non-totalisable. 
However, intersubjectivity qua intersubjectivity, intersubjectivity properly 
thought, is non-objectifiable. Levinasian intersubjectivity is the asymmetrical relation to 
absolute alterity. While the term' asymmetry' is used to convey a dominance of the other 
over the same in the face-to-face relation, it is actually an attempt to think through the 
bl I t ' It re~ers to the active paradoxical notion of an incommensura e re a IOn. 11 -
incommensurability in which infinite alterity breaches the closed totality of the 
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commensurable. The relation between irreducible singula 't' . I . . n Ies IS a ways a relatIOn 
between the other and the same which is itself a relatI'on bet th' fi' d h 
' ween e m mIte an t e 
finite, an asymmetrical and incommensurable relation. 
Levinasian non-objectifiable intersubjectivity is based on the irreducibility of the 
face-to-face relation, a relation that is established through the speech act, through an act 
of communication. A theoretical 'scientific' consciousness that deals with abstract 
universalities can only observe phenomenal objectivity, and thus cannot accept the 
irreducibility of communication. Levinas writes: 'A universal thought dispenses with 
communication. ,69 However, it is Levinas's view that the irreducible act of 
communication, addressed to the other, is itself the basis of universality. He writes: 
[L]anguage... is a primordial dispossession ... The generality of the word 
institutes a common world. The ethical event at the basis of generalization is the 
underlying intention of language. The relation with the Other... is this 
generalization itself. Generalization is a universalization - but universalization is 
not the entry of a sensible thing into a no man's land of the ideal. .. but is the 
offering of the world to the Other. 70 
Language is primarily an act of communication that opens or establishes the relation to 
alterity. It is this communicative activity that constitutes its universality, not its 
denotative reference to objects in their idealisable iterability. Levinas also writes: 
'Language is universal because it is the very passage from the individual to the general, 
because it offers things which are mine to the Other. To speak is to make the world 
common, to create commonplaces. Language does not refer to the generality of 
concepts, but lays the foundations for a possession in common.' 71 The generality of 
concepts is a reification of the communicative communist praxis inherent to language as 
act. 
Non-objectified intersubjective communicative praxis is also fundamental to the 
philosophy of Habennas, and contrasting his portrayal of such praxis with that of 
Levinas is necessary in order to clarify the distinctiveness of a 'deconstructive' theory of 
de-alienation. Such praxis is put forward by Habennas as a way out of what he regards 
as the objectifying alienation inherent in the philosophy of the subject, the philosophy 
centred on a subject's observational knowledge of objects. Habennas writes: 
[In] the model of action oriented to reaching u.nderstan~ing ... the o.bjectifying 
attitude in which the knowing subject regards Itself as It would .entIt1C~ ill the 
external world is no longer privileged. Fundamental to ~h.e para~Ig.m ot ~utual 
understanding is, rather, the perfonnative attitude of partICIpants m 1I1teract10n ... 
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When ego c~rries ou~ a spee~h act and alter takes up a position with regard to it. 
the two partIes enter Into an Interpersonal relationship. 72 
As with Levinasian intersubjectivity, Habermas's notion of intersubjectivity is an 
attempt to replace the reified phenomenal objectivity of positive givenness with a non-
objectifiable interpersonal communicative praxis. However, unlike the Le\inasian 
intersubjective asymmetrical relation of transcendence whereby totality is breached by 
infinite alterity, Habermasian intersubjectivity is characterised by symmetry. 
equivalence, and mutual understanding. However, it would be inaccurate to identify 
Habermasian intersubjectivity with an objective relationality suppressive of singularity. 
because the former is itself put forward as a way of avoiding the reduction of 
incommensurable subjects to commensurable objects. 
For Habermas, the singular incommensurable subjects must mutually understand 
each other through an empathic substitution. Habermas writes: 'As soon as linguistically 
generated intersubjectivity gains primacy... ego stands within an interpersonal 
relationship that allows him to relate to himself as a participant in an interaction from the 
perspective of alter.,73 Habermas's notion of intersubjective mutual understanding is 
based on a kind of empathic Diltheyan 'verstehen'. The substitutability involved in the 
phrase 'from the perspective of alter' implies that alterity is itself a particular 
perspective, a mere placeholder, the shoes of the other in which anyone can stand. The 
formal substitutability of 'the perspective of alter' enables intersubjective relations to be 
symmetrically reciprocal. 
Levinas, however, asserts the incomprehensibility of singular alterity. This 
incomprehensibility of alterity disables the symmetrical reciprocity of intersubjective 
relations, but it makes possible an intersubjective 'relation' that transcends and breaches 
the phenomenal totality in that it is a relation to infinite singular alterity, a relation that is 
necessarily asymmetrical. Levinasian intersubjective relations do not aim at the 
transparency of mutual understanding, which is the te/os of all intersubjecti\·e 
communication according to Habermas. This transparency is in marked contrast to 
Levinasian transcendent relations, which enable infinite alterity to breach totality and 
which are characterised not by transparent straightforwardness, but by disjuncture and 
distortion. Levinas writes: 
The truth of being is not the image of being, the idea of its na~re: it is the being 
situated in a subjective field which deforms vision. but ~rec?sely thus. allow..; 
exteriority to state itself. .. This curvature of th,~ in.tersubJcc~lve .. spacc l~t:~Ct~ 
distance into elevation ... One cannot "allow for thIS refractIOn producl:d b) 
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the subjective field, so as to thus "correct" it· I't constI'tut th d . 
. .... ' es e yery mo e m 
whIch the extenonty ofbemg IS effectuated in its truth Th'" ,." f h 
. .. '. . ... IS CUf\ ature 0 t e 
mtersubJecttve space m whIch exteriority is effectuated (we do not ' .. ' rho h 
. ") . . sa\ m \\ IC 
It appears as supenonty must be distinguished from the arbitrarines~ of "poinr-
of view" taken upon objects that appear. 74 ~ 
Habermas's symmetrical and straightforward (not 'curved') intersubjectiye space is 
entirely bound up within a phenomenal totality, with its 'perspectives' of alter and ego, 
which are 'points of view' on phenomenal objects. Although Habermas's theory of 
communicative action is an attempt to conceive of a non-objectifiable intersubjectiyity. 
its emphasis on the transparency of mutual understanding prevents it from succeeding in 
this attempt, as the relating subjects relate phenomenally to each other and are thus 
rendered commensurable and objectifiable elements of a functional totality, a totality in 
which infinite alterity is effaced and thus where genuinely intersubjective relations are 
elided. For Habermas the aim of so-called intersubjective communication is the 
transparency of mutual understanding, whereas for Levinas the point is not to 
understand, which is merely to conceptually appropriate and domesticate, but to be 
affected by the otherness of the other, an otherness that is thus 'effectuated', that 
intervenes and disrupts the economy of the same. Transcendent effectuation, unlike 
transparent understanding, constitutes a relationality that maintains singular alterity. 
Although, as we have discussed, Levinas argues that the transcendent relation to 
alterity constitutes the basis of communality and sociality, he is unconcerned with the 
calculatively practical issues of politics and social organisation. Critchley writes: '[M]y 
ethical relation to the Other is an unequal, asymmetrical relation to a height that cannot 
be comprehended, but which, at the same time, opens onto a relation to the third and to 
humanity as a whole - that is, to a symmetrical community of equals.'75 The Levinasian 
asymmetrical relation to alterity makes possible the Habermasian symmetrical 
community that elides that very alterity. They supplement and complement each other 
heteronomously. The alterity suppressing dangers of Habermasian transparency can be 
circumvented by such a heteronomous complementarity. 
Derrida asserts the 'democratic' necessity of the maintenance of this 
simultaneous complementarity of these incommensurable orders. Derrida writes: 'There 
is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity. but there is no 
democracy without the "community of friends" (koina fa phi/on), without the calculation 
of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects. all equal. These 
two laws are irreducible one to the other. Tragically irreconcilable and forever 
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d· ,76 Th . woun mg. e mamtenance of two incommensurable 'orders' 1 b d ·b can on y e escn ed 
as 'tragic' and 'wounding' from the standpoint of a closed totality. Derrida claims that a 
negotiation between these two 'orders' is essential to his politics. He says: '[A] 
perpetually indispensable negotiation between the singular opening to the impossible 
which must be safeguarded and the method, the right, the technique, the democratic 
calculation ... [t]his is perhaps what politics is!,77 As the two incommensurable 'orders' 
that must be maintained are 'irreconcilable', Derrida prefers to refer to a 'negotiation' 
rather than a 'reconciliation' between them. 
However, it is here worth recalling that Hegel's notion of 'spirit' is put forward 
as a 'reconciliation' of 'subject' and 'substance', a reconciliation where the singular 
'subjectivity' which can only manifest itself as a disjuncture within the closed totality of 
'substance' is reconciled with that totality itself, a reconciliation that makes possible the 
living unity-in-diversity of 'spirit'. The word 'living' here refers to the non-reified state 
of perpetual transcendence. The living totality ('spirit') comes about through the 
perpetual breach of the reified closed totality (,substance') by the effectivity of 
subjectivity, a subjectivity which is nothing but the praxis of relating to irreducible 
alterity, the infinite within the finite, the infinite as the self-transcendence of the finite. 
This perpetual transcendence is what Derrida calls a perpetual 'negotiation' between 
incalculable singularity and the closed totality of calculable meaningfulness. Such a 
negotiation does not only describe a 'politics', it describes the 'living' itself, non-reified 
and unalienated life. 
This perpetual transcendence involves the perpetual separation that makes it 
possible. It may seem odd that separation is an intrinsic aspect of such a de-alienation, as 
the word 'separation' ostensibly implies something closer to the word 'alienation' itself. 
However, as we have discussed, for Levinas, separation makes possible not only the 
transcendent relation to alterity, but also 'habitation' and 'dwelling'. Levinas writes: 'To 
be separated is to dwell somewhere'. 78 Thus separation is an overcoming of the subject's 
alienation in the homelessness of the objectified totality. In Othen1·ise than Being, 
Levinas writes: 'Paradoxically, it is qua alienus - foreigner and other - that man is not 
alienated. ,79 As we have discussed, it is alterity itself that is alienated in the objectitYing 
phenomenal totality. We have also mentioned that Derrida characterises diffth'ance a~ 
marking separation and the relation to alterity; thus differance is itself de-alienation. 
Alienation is the objectification of the non-phenomenal singular alterity of the 
subject into the realm of presence and identity, a phenomenal objectivity that pre~cnts 
itself as a positive givenness. De-alienation is a Derridian perpetu I . " a negotIatIOn as a 
political manifestation of difjl~rance in a 'politics of separat' . \ T/ •. , Ion. ,'"\.s ~ erso mung 
(translated as 'reconciliation') is the Hegelian word for de-alienation, could not such a 
perpetual negotiation be termed a type of reconciliation? But as this is a 'negotiation' 
between irreconcilables, reconciliation would appear to be an inappropriate word for 
such a de-alienation, unless the paradox of a reconciliation of irreconcilables can be 
admitted, rather like the Levinasian non-relational relation. As we have discussed. 
Adorno objects to the term 'alienation', because the notion of its overcoming implies the 
suppression of alterity. However, he does not have any objection to the term Versohnung 
('reconciliation'), which he uses to refer to the freeing of the non-identical, the aim of 
his philosophy. Adorno writes: 'Reconcilement would release the nonidentical would , 
rid it of coercion ... it would open the road to the multiplicity of different things and strip 
dialectics of its power over them. Reconcilement would be the thought of the many as no 
longer inimical'. 80 Thus Adorno's notion of 'reconciliation' refers to a genuine 
qualitative pluralism based on the separation and transcendence of non-identical singular 
alterity, the very non-totalisable community without commonality that Levinas and 
Derrida are advocating. Adorno also writes: 'The reconciled condition would not be the 
philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien. Instead, its happiness would lie in the 
fact that the alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains what is distant and different, 
beyond the heterogeneous and beyond that which is one's own.'81 If this IS a 
'reconciliation' at all, it is a reconciliation between incommensurables wherein their 
irreconcilability is maintained in their very reconciliation. What for Adorno IS a 
reconciliation without de-alienation is for us a de-alienation without reconciliation, but 
the distinction between the two is merely lexical. 
Rather than necessarily involving the claim that alienation is essential and 
insurmountable, deconstruction is itself a development of the critique of alienation and 
reification. The latter refer to the very givenness and positivity of what Derrida calls the 
metaphysics of presence, the target of deconstruction. Differance is then, when freed 
from its effacement by presence, the infinite productive determinability of the 
unalienated condition. Differance is praxis in that it enacts a dissolution of the giyenness 
of presence; hence it involves the irruptive and constitutive force of irreducibly singular 
acts, events, and decisions. Such praxis is de-alienating in itself. rather being a mer\? 
means to a de-alienated end. The praxis of the encounter with alterity undo\?s and 
b h h '.c.: d b' t' 'ty of the closed totality of presenc\? and the same. TI1US. reac es t e rel1Ie 0 ~ec IVl 
despite the etymology, it is this alienation that suppresses alterity, whereas de-alienation 
makes possible the effectuation and welcoming of the other in its singular otherness. 
Rather than overcoming all political antagonism in a peaceful de-politicised 
'reconciliation', this de-alienation involves the de-totalising praxis of institutive acts and 
decisions that in dissolving the neutral positivity of the givenness of the closed totality of 
presence - a totality which in effacing alterity effaces the potentiality of antagonism -
constitutes a re-politicisation. The de-alienated social condition is a community without 
commonality, a community of absolvable strangers, an intersubjective field where 
singular alterity is maintained and effectuated in the transcendent praxis of 
communicative encounters. Differance is the praxis of perpetual othering and separation, 
a praxis that thus dissolves the singular-alterity suppressing realm of the same, a praxis 
that deconstructs the reified, objectified, and alienated phenomenal totality of given 
presence. 
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Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that not only does the concept of de-alienation not depend on a 
'pre-deconstructive' metaphysics of presence, but also that a certain form of this yen 
~ 
concept lies at the heart of the ethos of deconstruction itself. Deconstruction does not 
constitute a debunking of the possibility of de-alienation through a demonstration of the 
constitutive nature of the always-already alienated. On the contrary, it is itself a critique 
of the phenomenon of alienation in the latter's most metaphysically fundamental 
insistence, and in this regard deconstruction opens up the conceptual possibility of a 
genuine de-alienation. This claim may run directly counter to Derrida' s own assertions 
regarding the relationship between deconstruction and de-alienation, but it is a claim that 
rests on an argument that is immanently developed through critical analyses of relevant 
texts within the traditions of both deconstruction and the critique of alienation. 
For Derrida, the notion of de-alienation indeed depends on an ontology of 
presence and 'myth of origins' that involve the elision of fundamental difference. 
Deconstruction reveals what he calls a fundamental 'ex-appropriation' or 'inalienable 
alienation', meaning that any 'appropriate', or authentic, unalienated condition is 
demonstrated to be always already expropriated and alienated. He claims that writing 
has been traditionally conceived as an externalisation, or alienation, of the logos as 
speech, of the full presence of meaning in the voice, and that grammatology reveals the 
latter as the effect of a generalised and originary writing, or 'arche-writing', an assertion 
of the always already written nature of meaning. The notion of presence is a myth, one 
that effaces its nature as a trace and an effect of the movement of differentiation or 
differance. According to Derrida, presence is the basis not only of the notions of 
substance and identity, but also of consciousness and subjectivity. This is despite the fact 
that for Kant subjectivity is non-phenomenal and non-substantial. What Derrida calls 
'the proper' involves all the trappings of presence, and it is identified with the notions of 
identity and essence. He rigorously distinguishes the proper from singularity, which he 
conceives on the basis of alterity and not ownness. This contrasts with Stirner and 
Heidegger who conceive of ownness, or the proper, on the basis of singularity. Derrida 
protests against the reduction of the singular 'who' to the general 'what", the latter being 
the form of identity and propriety. In this way the deconstruction of presence inyolvcs a 
critique of reification, a critique of the reification of the unpresentable non-
phenomenalisable singularity of the 'who' into the identifiable form of presence. 
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In tracing the history of the concept of alienation, we haye demonstrated that the 
conceptualisation of de-alienation has largely involved a reference to something other 
than the restoration of the fullness of presence. While onto-theological and logocentric 
references to the latter can be discerned in Christian thought and in forms of Platonism. 
Derrida himself concedes that the Plotinian 'One' can be read otherwise. For Derrida, 
Rousseau's appropriation of the fall myth provides a paradigmatic example of a modem 
logocentric reference to a lost natural uncorrupted purity. However, the concept of 
alienation only really comes into its own, as something distinguishable from the notion 
of 'the fall', in post-Kantian German philosophy, and it is here that the notion of de-
alienation takes on an aspect that is closer to Derridian differance than to presence. The 
non-phenomenal nature of the Kantian subject means that it is not a type of object. 
which is to say that its phenomenalisation, its presentation, would be its objectifying 
reification, its alienation. Schiller's notion of an unalienated wholeness of personality is 
founded on the subject's infinite determinability, on not being bound to a particular 
determination, rather than on the determinate integration and closure of a present 
identity. Novalis's notion of a return to a oneness with nature and being involves the 
suspension of the presence and identity of the ego as a 'posited' object. Schelling's 
notion of the overcoming of alienation in a non-reflective 'wisdom' does not describe a 
oneness with being as a fullness of presence, but involves apprehending the non-
objectifiable absolute subject in a state of objectless 'indifference', a state that in its very 
indeterminacy is itself the 'eternal freedom' of a productive determinability. Hegel's 
'absolute knowing' is not the 'parousia' of an all-encompassing closure of presence, but 
is rather the comprehension of the dislocation and overcoming of any positive 
determination. Feuerbach's unalienated 'human essence' is no unified identity. but is a 
generic universality as an absence of specific determination, allowing for a free 
determinability. Stirner regards any identifying determination as an alienation of the 
unique singularity of the individual. Marx's conceptualisation of de-alienation does not 
involve the closure of a reintegrated presence, but it involves an appropriation of 
capitalism's openly generic and generative determinability by the individual from whom 
it had been alienated. Lukacs's notion of the overcoming of reified consciousness 
includes the appropriation of the movement of time, transforming time from the 
passivity and givenness of presence into the praxis of becoming. In the history of the 
concept of alienation, contrary to what Derrida claims, presence is more often a 
characteristic of alienation itself than of de-alienation. 
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Hegel's notions of alienation and reconciliation are expressions of a system of 
thought that Derrida himself concedes to be infinitesimally close to his philosophy of 
difference and deconstruction. This proximity enables an interpretation of Hegelian de-
alienation that differs from Derrida's usual reading of it as the 'parousia' and return of 
the logos to itself in its full presence. The term alienation translates two Hegelian 
concepts, externalisation and estrangement, the latter referring to the conscious 
experience of the former, while the former is in itself a purely logical concept. The 
details of Hegel's depictions of the experience of alienation, for example the 'unhappy 
consciousness' and the realm of 'self-alienated spirit', prefigure many of Derrida' s 
portrayals of the effects of differance. However, Hegel's unalienated 'absolute knowing' 
involves accounting for the philosophical standpoint and consciousness that 
comprehends the ultimate dislocation and overcoming of all positive determinacies and 
given identities, a self-theorising of the possibility of his own deconstructive discourse 
that is absent from Derrida's work. Hegelianism is a post-Kantian 'critical' philosophy 
and is thus not the philosophy of origins and expressive organicism that Derrida, his 
contemporaries, and some of Hegel's commentators largely regard it as. It does not 
involve the notion of the loss of the immediacy of a plenitude of presence that is 
regained at a higher level through the immanence of a necessary teleological 
development, because the 'originary' immediacy is demonstrated to be itself an alienated 
abstraction, and the dialectical process of the reconfigurations of forms of consciousness 
takes on the aspect of teleological necessity retroactively, interpreted in this way from 
the philosophical standpoint that is brought about when the mind overcomes the limits of 
figuration. The de-alienated condition of spirit occurs when substance becomes at the 
same time 'subject'. The subject acts as the non-identity-of-substance-with-itself, as 
negativity. This makes possible the unity-in-diversity of spirit, its 'community of 
negativity', to use Nancy's term. The Hegelian appropriation of the negativity of 
otherness is not a violent assimilation, but the othering of the self through its own 
exposure to alterity. Hegel's system is not the exclusionary totality that Derrida claims it 
to be, because it itself already involves an understanding of the actuality of infinity 
whereby any excluded remainder immanently affects any closed configuration. The 
Hegelian infinite is not the parousia of an all-inclusive presence, but is the sclf-
overcoming of the finite, the infinite within the finite, which is the opening of identity to 
infinite alterity. Hegel's system theorises itself as the unalienated mind in the forn1 of the 
actuality of infinity, the consciousness of the immanent o\crcoming of all finite 
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determination, which is absolute spirit that knows itself as absolute spirit throughout all 
its manifestations. If Hegel's insistence on the infinite is taken seriously, his 
conceptualisation of de-alienation cannot be interpreted as involving the plenitude of 
presence as an exclusionary enclosure, for the act of infinity produces the freedom that is 
the opening to otherness. 
Derrida characterises Marx's conception of de-alienation as inyolving the desire 
to 'exorcise' the 'spectral' differance of capitalism, of exchange yalue and the 
commodity form, and to re-establish the narcissistic enclosure of a real presence. \\" e 
have demonstrated that, in contrast to Derrida's view, Marx's notion of de-alienation is 
actually the generation of free determinability within the life of the individual. Universal 
determinability is realised by capitalism at the general societal level, but this universality 
is alienated from the individual. In this alienation the universal determinability becomes 
exchange value and money. Marx's notion of 'generic-being [GattllngswesenJ' is not a 
metaphysical essence, but an unessential determinability, unbounded by any specificity. 
Capitalist social relations and the division of labour alienate the individual from this 
universal' generic-being' and restrict her to specific determinacy. Exchange value and 
capitalist social generality are an objectification of the generality of abstract 
homogeneous labour, labour as quantitatively measurable labour-time. If this 
objectification were reappropriated by labour, it would make possible the generation of 
the unrestricted substitutability and determinability of the individual. Marx's conception 
of an unalienated form of objectification as the actualisation of the individual's free 
determinability is compatible with the Hegelian notion of the actualising subjectification 
of absolute spirit. Marx's conception of de-alienation as involving a 'humanisation of 
nature' does not necessarily entail a narcissistic anthropomorphism. On the contrary, it 
can be interpreted as involving a freeing of nature from the restricted economy of a 
utilitarian instrumentality. Unalienated free activity is a liberation from the 'economic' 
interpretation of labour and production, because it is an end in itself and not a mere 
means to an end. Thus the Marxian de-alienated condition does not involve, as Derrida 
claims, a narcissistically enclosed restricted economy, but rather im·oh·es, to use 
Derrida's own term, a general an-economy. 
Derridian deconstruction derives from the Heideggerian deconstruction 
[Destruktion] of metaphysics, which itself takes the critique of alienation and reification 
to an ontological level. Heidegger's deconstruction invohes the notion of dismantling 
the metaphysical structures of thought that effectively fommlate the abandonment and 
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oblivion of being. The oblivion of being manifests itself phe l' 11' h nomeno oglca y III \\" at 
Heidegger refers to as 'homelessness' 'inauthenticity' and' l' t' 'P . 
, ,a lena IOn. resence IS put 
forward as a principal characteristic of alienation and the oblivion of being . \1' t' 
v' ,""" lena IOn 
[EntfremdungJ' involves a 'fixation with the present' that causes a 'nevcr-dwdling-
anywhere'. The oblivion of being also takes the form of a reifying objectification of 
entities, which Heidegger refers to as making entities 'present-at-hand [Vorhanden r. 
This objectification involves abstracting entities from the totality of li\in~ 
interrelatedness that Heidegger calls 'the world'. It also involves the externalisation of 
Dasein's finite primordial temporality into 'vulgar' public time, a quantifiably 
measurable endless sequence of present-at-hand moments. For Heidegger, modem 
technological thinking also manifests the reduction of qualitative uniqueness to 
quantitative calculability, a reduction of people and things to the orderability of a 
'standing-reserve', involving a form of reification that he calls 'enframing'. The 
authentic relationship to being, for Heidegger, involves a conscious and lived 'finitude', 
which is the anticipatory futurity of 'being-towards-death'. However, for Heidegger, 
'finitude' refers to Dasein's transcendence of entities that makes possible its 
consciousness of being and non-being, a consciousness that thus takes the form of the 
self-transcendence of finitude, a self-transcendence that Hegel refers to as 'infinite'. 
Heidegger's individualistic notion of an unalienated 'authenticity' depends on that same 
transcendent consciousness of finitude, a consciousness that can be demonstrated to 
depend on a non-individualistic generic and social overcoming of particular immediacy, 
an overcoming that is most clearly conceptualised by the post-Hegelian notion of 
'generic-being'. The 'non-relational' individualism of Heideggerian authenticity is thus 
ultimately incoherent. Heidegger identifies 'ownness' (what Derrida calls 'the proper') 
with the singularity of being, and his concept of Ereignis refers to an appropriation that 
is the singular event of being. Derrida interprets all forms of Heideggerian 'ownness' as 
involving an exclusionary identity, yet the irreducibly singular event of being really 
amounts to, in its very singularity, a disjuncture of the present in its logocentric 
enclosure. Thus Heideggerian ownness, freed from the various forms of its 
objectification and alienation, is closer to Derridian differance than Derrida emisaged. 
Contrary to Derrida's claim that alienation is essential and insurmountable. 
deconstruction, in its Derridian and Heideggerian forms, is itself a development of the 
critique of reification and alienation. The target of deconstruction, the metaphysics of 
presence, is itself the alienated condition of givenness and positivity. The unalienated 
condition, in its generative detenninability, is itself differance, differance freed from the 
presence that is its own effacement. Differance involves the constitutive and irrupti\e 
force of singular acts, decisions, and events. In this way it is the de-alienating praxis that 
dissolves the givenness of presence. This dissolution of phenomenal gi\"enness is the 
basis of Levinas' s theorisation of the 'intersubj ective' encounter with the other. 
Derridian deconstruction involves a fonnalisation of Levinasian ethics, one that is 
largely due to Derrida's rejection of the concept of 'subject', a rejection that deriyes 
from his Heideggerian misunderstanding of the 'subj ect' as a kind of obj ect. The 
encounter with alterity is a praxis that undoes the reified objectivity of the closed 
phenomenal totality of presence. Thus, as it is the other that is alienated, in that 
alienation qua phenomenalising objectification suppresses alterity, de-alienation 
involves an opening to otherness. As de-alienation involves the dissolution of the closed 
phenomenal totality, a 'neutral' totality which suppresses alterity and thus the possibility 
of antagonism, it effectively re-politicises. Thus it does not constitute a de-politicising 
reconciliation that neutralises all antagonism. A deconstructively de-alienated social 
condition would be a paradoxical 'community' without commonality wherein singularity 
and alterity would be maintained in an intersubjective praxis characterised by a perpetual 
transcendence of phenomenality. This de-alienating praxis of perpetual othering and 
separation that deconstructs the homogeneous enclosure of presence is differance. 
The Hegelian and Marxian theory of alienation is a post-Kantian philosophical 
conception that has been misread by many, including Derrida, as if it is the bearer of a 
pre-critical metaphysics. The latter is the metaphysical odyssey of the departure of the 
logos from its originary identity and plenitude into the fallenness of a world of 
difference and division, followed by its eventual redemptive return to that originary 
unity through a teleological and eschatological movement. The German Idealist 
conception of alienation (from which the Marxian one derives), while employing some 
of the rhetoric of the fall-redemption model, contains a conceptual content that derives 
from Kant's notion of practical subjectivity, one which bears no reference to plenitude or 
identity. The subject of practical reason, in its freedom from mechanistic causality, is 
noumenal and non-phenomenal, meaning not only that it is unknowable. but also that it 
is unrepresentable and unidentifiable. It ceases to be what it is, a subject, a free practical 
agent, if it is phenomenalised, objectified, or presented III any way. 'Alienation' is 
Hegel's term for such a phenomenalising objectification. 
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Levinas also uses the term 'alienates' to refer to the realm of phenomenality 
when he claims that 'form ... alienates the exterion'ty of the othe' Th '1' .. . r . us a lenatlOn IS 
when non-phenomenal alterity is 'thematised' and formalised into the phenomenal 
objectivity that Levinas calls 'totality'. Singular alterity ceases to be singular alterity 
when it is presented as something with a phenomenal form. It is 'thematised' and 
objectified. Alterity is only encountered through 'intersubjective' communicative praxis 
where the 'face ... undoes the form he presents', a non-objective, non-phenomenal 
'relation' that transcends the alienated phenomenal totality. 
The rejection of the concept of alienation by Derrida and his contemporaries is an 
aspect of their critique of the philosophy of the subject, the latter constituting a paradigm 
that they regard themselves as overcoming. However, their critique of the 'subject' 
involves a misunderstanding of the use of this term in post-Kantian German philosophy. 
As we have seen, for Kant and his 'Idealist' successors, the subject is not phenomenal, is 
not an object. Yet Derrida regards the subject as a substantial and present entity, as a 
type of object. This mistake stems from Heidegger's understanding of the philosophy of 
the subject as treating Dasein inappropriately as a present-at-hand entity. Thus for 
Heidegger, Dasein's subjectification is the same as its objectification. But the non-
objectifiable and non-phenomenal subject of German Idealism is neither substantial nor 
present-at-hand. For example, for Hegel, the subject resists figuration and acts as 
negativity within the totality of 'substance', preventing the latter from ossifying into a 
fully present-to-itself identity. 
Levinas uses the term 'subjectivity' to refer to the exposure to alterity, an 
exposure that enacts an 'intersubjective' encounter that breaches and transcends the 
phenomenal totality. This usage ultimately derives from the non-phenomenality of the 
Kantian practical subject. The subject is every bit as transcendent as Heideggerian 
Dasein. 
The non-phenomenal subject is the subject of practical activity, of praxis. Marx, 
in his 'First Thesis on Feuerbach', identifies praxis with the notion of subjectivity as 
developed by the German Idealists. The subject is the singular act that breaches the 
positive givenness of the determined totality of presence. In this way, to use Derridian 
terms, the subject as praxis is the singular irruption of differance within the present. Dc-
alienation is a re-subjectification, a de-objectification that brings the subject back to its 
non-phenomenal, non-present, undetermined basis. 
The subject as praxis IS not present and determined; it is futural and 
determinable. For Heidegger Dasein is 'futural' and the ' ,. h.c ~ . 
, present IS t e lorm ot Its 
'alienation'. The presence of the subject's determined objectification constitutes an 
alienation of its freely determinable becoming. The notion of free determinability is a 
recurrent feature of traditional characterisations of the unalienated condition, from 
Schiller to Marx. For example, Marx's notion of generic-being involves a freedom from 
specific determinacy that makes possible both the universality of consciousness and a 
limitless determinability where the subject can freely adopt a form, all determinations 
being provisional and substitutable. 
The undetermined determinability of the subject is the condition of its conscious 
universality. This is a negative and contentless universality, the overcoming of all 
specific determinacy; thus it is not the universalisation of any determination. The 
overcoming of the isolated immediacy of particular determination is also the condition 
of the subject's sociality and relationality, a sociality that is itself this self-overcoming 
and not an overarching identification. The generic awareness of the limits of 
determination is already their overcoming. The negative universality of consciousness 
involves sociality and vice versa. The alienation of the subject's generic determinability 
reduces the subject to a rigidly determined specificity while that very determinability 
becomes a feature of an alien realm of commodities, exchange values, and money. In 
this way the subject's inherent negative universality and sociality is separated from it 
and projected onto a fetishised phenomenality. 
The indetermination of the subject is not only the condition of its universality, 
but also of its singularity. The irreducible and unconceptualisable uniqueness is alienated 
by being identified through generally applicable attributes and determinations. As 
Derrida himself asserts, the singular alterity of the 'who' becomes, when identified and 
determined, the generality of the 'what'. This reification is a fundamental expropriating 
alienation, provided that the 'proper' in question is irreducible singularity and not the 
'properties' and determinations of an identifiable phenomenality. 
The overcoming of all alienated forms, the forms of phenomenal figuration and 
finite determination, is what Hegel terms the genuine infinite. The latter is the 'form' of 
the absolute, a non-phenomenalisable non-objectifiable absolute which cannot be 
represented in any finite figuration, which acts as negativity within all limited 
conceptions, revealing them to be self-contradictory. and preventing any of them from 
being absolutised. The genuine infinite is not opposed to and separated from the finite, 
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but is the infinite within the finite the self-transcendence of fi 'tud H'd th , tnl e. el egger use e 
term 'finitude' itself to refer to the transcendence of entities l'n the" 't- b . a\\ areness 0 etng 
and eventual death, but it is precisely such transcendence, conceiyed in tenns of 
effectively being the consciousness of finitude, that Hegel tenns the 'infinite'. the 
infinite whereby consciousness of a limit is already its transcendence. Leyinas uses the 
term 'infinity' to refer to the transcendence of finite identity in the opening to irreducible 
alterity. The Hegelian infinite is not an all-encompassing totality that suppresses and 
excludes alterity, as it is itself the overcoming of finite identity through the exposure to 
the other, the absolute manifesting itself only as the self-dissolution of 'the same'. as 
always other. De-alienation is the actuality of infinity as the manifestation of a universal 
'social' relationality and determinability through the self-transcendence of phenomenal 
identity. 
For such a 'sociality' to avoid itself becoming the alienation of singular alterity 
in an overarching identification it needs to be conceived in tenns of an intersubjectiyc 
communality without the commonality and unity of an objective and phenomenal 
totality. Hegel's notion of absolute spirit as a unity-in-diversity which is both substance 
and subject can be read radically as such a 'community of negativity', but the latter can 
be clarified through a recourse to certain Levinasian conceptions. Such a community 
without objective commonality would be an intersubjective field of transcendent 
communicative 'relations' III which the subjects are absolvable, involving 
communications that transcend the fonns of phenomenal objectivity in a non-transparent 
'curvature of social space' wherein the singular 'who' of alterity is not reduced to the 
identifiable 'what' of phenomenality. This 'curvature' is to be contrasted with the 
Habermasian transparency of intersubjective communicativity, which, while similarly 
emphasising intersubjective rather than objective relations, fails to conceive of 
intersubjectivity radically, in terms of noumenal non-phenomenal and therefore non-
transparent subjects. 
Instead of 'totality' and 'infinity', Derrida uses the Bataillean tenns 'restricted 
economy' and 'general economy' to refer to the closure of presence and its 
transcendence respectively. In his later writings the tenn 'general economy' is replaced 
by the term 'an-economy'. The system of objects of the phenomenal totality of the 
present is an economy where meaningfulness and productiye purposefulness arc 
maintained through a calculable circulation of references, and thus where c\crything is a 
means to an end. That which is an end in itself is meaningless and unprnductiYe and thus 
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an-economic. That which is conceived radically as an end in itself is a transcendence and 
breach of the restricted economy and finite totality of presence. For Marx, the subject 
manifests its unalienated universal and infinitely detenninable 'generic being' through 
'free conscious activity', activity done for its own sake. Generic being is alienated by 
being determined as a means to an end. For Derrida, irreducibly singular acts. decisions, 
and events, transcend the given economy of means and meaning. The overcoming of the 
alienated economy of the present makes possible the exposure to the incomparable 
singularity of the other, whereby the other can be treated as an irreducibly unique end in 
itself. Derrida himself identifies his notion of an-economy with the utopian 'kingdom of 
ends' in Kant's moral philosophy. 
Interpreting traditional theories of alienation in the light of Derrida's critique of 
the metaphysics of presence has led us to the conclusion that de-alienation is closer to 
differance than to presence. This discovery has enabled an interpretation of 
deconstruction itself as a process of de-alienation. 
21X 
Bibliography 
Adorno, T.W., The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Tarnowski K. and W·lI F (L d . 
Routledge, 2003). ,1 . ., on on. 
Adorno, T.W., Negative Dialectics, trans. Ashton, E.B., (London: Routledge, 1973). 
Althuss.er, L., For Marx, trans. Brewster, B., (London: Verso, 1996). 
August~ne, St., The C~nfessions, trans. Pine-Coffin, R.S., (London: Penguin. 1961). 
Augustme, St., The Czty of God, trans. Dyson, R.W., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
Au~ustin~, St., De Civitate Dei, (Leipzig: Caroli Tavchnitii, 1825). 
Bah~ar, E., The Philosophy of Marx, trans. Turner, C., (London: Verso, 1995). 
Batmlle, G., 'The Notion of Expenditure', trans. Stoekl, A., in Stoekl, A. (ed.). Visions ol 
Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, (Minneapolis: University of . 
Minnesota Press, 1985). 
Batail~e, G., Inner Experience, trans. Boldt, L.A., (Albany: SUNY Press. 1988). 
Baudnllard, J., The Mirror of Production, trans. Poster, M., (Saint Louis: Telos Press, 
1975). 
Critchley, S., The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 
Critchley, S., Ethics-Polities-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and 
Contemporary French Thought, (London: Verso, 1999). 
De Man, P., Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 
(London: Routledge, 1989). 
Derrida, J., Edmund Husserl 's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. Leavey Jr., 
J.P., (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). 
Derrida, J., 0fGrammatology, trans. Spivak, G.C., (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1976). 
Derrida, J., Writing and Difference, trans. Bass, A., (London: Routledge, 2001). 
Derrida, J., Margins of Philosophy, trans. Bass, A., (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1982). 
Derrida, J., Positions, trans. Bass, A., (London: The Athlone Press, 1987). 
Derrida, 1., Glas, trans. Leavey Jr., J.P. and Rand, R., (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1986). 
Derrida, 1., Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, trans. Harlow, B., (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979). 
Derrida, J., Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. Bennington, G. and Bowlby, 
R., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
Derrida, J., Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Kamuf, P., (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992). 
Derrida, 1., 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority"', trans. Quaintance. 
M., in Derrida, J., Acts of Religion, (London: Routledge, 2002). 
Derrida, J., Aporias: Dying - Awaiting (One Another at) the "Limits of Truth ". trans. 
Dutoit, T., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
Derrida, J., Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work 0/ Mourning, and the St>H· 
International, trans. Kamuf, P., (London: Routledge, 1994). 
Derrida, J., The Politics of Friendship, trans. Collins, G., (London: Verso, 2005). 
Derrida, J., Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis o/Origin. trans. Mensah. 
P., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). . ' . 
Derrida, 1., '1 Have a Taste for the Secret', trans. Donis, G., III Dernda, 1. and Ferrans. 
M., A Taste for the Secret, (Cambridge: Polity. 2001). 
Derrida, J. et ai, 'The Original Discussion of "Differance" (1968)' t \l.T d D R' h d . rans, 00. .. 
IC ~on, ' S. and Bernard, M., in Wood, D. and Bernasconi. R. (eds.). Den'ida 
and Dlff~rance, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
Descartes, R.,.Dzscourse on Method and the Meditations, trans. Sutcliffe. F.E., (London: 
PenguIn, 1968). 
Dreyfus, H., 'Heide~ger's History of the Being of Equipment', in Dreyfus, H. and Hall, 
H. (eds.), Hezdegger: A Critical Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 
Feuerbach, L., The Essence of Christianity, trans. Evans, M., (New York: Calvin 
Blanchard, 1855). 
Feuerbach, L., Das Wesen des Christentums, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1971). 
Feuerbach, L., 'Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy', trans. 
Dahlstrom, D.O., in Stepelevich, L.S. (ed.), The Young Hegelians: An Anthology. 
(New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1997). 
Foucault, M., The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. 
Sheridan, A., (London: Routledge, 1990). 
Frank, M., 'Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism', trans. Zoller, G., in 
Ameriks, A. and Sturma, D. (eds.), The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Setf 
in Classical German Philosophy, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). 
Gasche, R., The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
Gasche, R., Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida, (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994). 
Goethe, 1.W., The Auto-biography of Goethe: Truth and Poetry: from My Own Life, 
trans. Oxenford, 1., (London: Bell and Daldy, 1867). 
Goldmann, L., Lukacs and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy, trans. Boelhower, 
W.Q., (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). 
Habermas, J., The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Lawrence, F., 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
Hegel, G.W.F., 'The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of 
Philosophy', trans. Cerf, W. and Harris, H.S., in Bubner, R. (ed.), German 
Idealist Philosophy, (London: Penguin, 1997). 
Hegel, G.W.F., 'On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, on its Place in 
Practical Philosophy, and its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Right', trans. 
Nisbet, H.B., in Dickey, L. and Nisbet, H.B. (eds.), Hegel: Political Writings, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). . 
Hegel, G.W.F., System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. HarrIS, H.S. 
and Knox, T.M., (Albany: SUNY Press, 1979). 
Hegel, G.W.F., Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Miller, A.V., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977). 
Hegel, G.W.F., Phanomenologie des Geistes, (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1?~8). 
Hegel, G.W.F., Science of Logic, trans. Miller, A.V., (New Jersey: Humamttes Press 
International, 1989). 
Hegel, G.W.F., Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Objektive Logik. Die Lehre vom Seyn. 
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841). ., . 
Hegel, G.W.F., Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Subjektive LOglk. Die Lehre vom Begriff. 
(Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2003). . . . , 
Hegel, G.W.F., The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the En(l'c!0l-!aedza of Ph~losoph~(~l 
Sciences., trans. Geraets, T.F., Suchting, W.A., and HarrIS, H.S .. (IndIanapolIs. 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1991). . . 
Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Mind, trans. Wallace, W., (Oxford: Oxford Um\,erstty 
Press, 1971). 
Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Right, trans. Dyde S W (A h t· P h B k-1996). ' . ., m ers. romet eus oo~. 
Hegel, G.~.~., Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume III: The Consummate 
Rel!glO~, trans. B~ow~, R.F., Hodgson, P.C., and Stewart, 1.:V1., (Berkeh': 
. Umversity of CalIfornIa Press, 1985). . 
Heidegger, M., Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie, 1. and Robinson, E., (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962). 
He~degger M., Sein und Zeit, (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967). 
Heidegger, M.,.Hegel's P~enomenology of Spirit, trans. Emad, P. and Maly. K .. 
. (Bloommgton: IndIana University Press, 1994). 
Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Fried, G. and Polt, R .. (:..ie\\ Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000). 
Heidegger, M., Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning), trans. Emad, P. and Malv. 
K., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). . 
Heidegger, M., Mindfulness, trans. Emad, P. and Kalary, T., (London: Continuum, 
2006). 
Heidegger, M., 'Letter on Humanism', trans. Capuzzi, F.A., in Krell, D.F. (ed.). Basic 
Writings: Martin Heidegger, (London: Routledge, 1993). 
Heidegger, M., Wegmarken, (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004). 
Heidegger, M., 'The Thing', trans. Hofstadter, A., in Heidegger, M., Poetry. Language. 
Thought, (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001). 
Heidegger, M., 'The Question Concerning Technology', trans. Lovitt, W., in Krell, D.F. 
(ed.), Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger, (London: Routledge, 1993). 
Heidegger, M., 'The Way to Language', trans. Krell, D.F., in Krell, D.F. (ed.), Basic 
Writings: Martin Heidegger, (London: Routledge, 1993). 
H6lderlin, F., 'Being Judgement Possibility', trans. Bird-Pollan, S., in Bernstein, 1.M. 
(ed.), Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
H6lderlin, F., 'On the Difference of Poetic Modes', trans. Pfau, T., in Pfau, T. (ed.), 
Friedrich H6lderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory, (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1988). 
H6lderlin, F., 'The Significance of Tragedy', trans. Bird-Pollan, S., in Bernstein, 1.M. 
(ed.), Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
Kant, 1., Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Meiklejohn, 1.M.D. and Politis, Y., (London: 
Everyman, 1993). 
Kant, 1., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Gregor, MJ., (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Kant, 1., Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Abbot, T.K., (Mineola NY: Dover 
Publications, 2004). . 
Kristeva, 1., Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Walter, M., (New York: ColumbIa 
University Press, 1984). ., . 
Levinas, E., Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Lmgls. A .. (PIttsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969). . . 
Levinas, E., Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. LmgIs, A., (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). . 
Lukacs, G., History and Class Consciousness, trans. Livingstone. R., (London: Merlm 
Press, 1971). 
Lukacs, G., The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations be~ween Dialec!ics and 
Economics, trans. Livingstone, R., (London: MerlIn Press, 197":». 
221 
Marx, K., Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. ~1illi an, \1 (Mo~cow: Progress Publishers, 1977). g ... 
Marx, K., 'Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844' . \ ( .. E I TXT k . m .. )(1/.\ n~e s rr er .e: Ergiinzungsband, Erster Tei!, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968). 
Marx, K., Concernmg. ~euerbach', trans. Livingstone, R. and Benton, G .. in Colleti. L. 
(ed.), Early Wrztzngs, (London: Penguin, 1992). 
Marx, K.~ 'Thesen tiber Feuerbach', in Marx, K. and Engels, F., Werke: Band 3. (Berlin: 
DIetz Verlag, 1978). 
Marx, K., Grun.drisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Drajf), 
trans. NIcolaus, M., (London: Penguin, 1993). 
Marx, K., Theories of Surplus Value, trans. Bonner, G.A. and Bums, E .. (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1951). 
Marx, K., Resultate des Unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses, (Frankfurt: Neue Kritik. 
1969). 
Marx, K., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume 1, trans. Fowkes, B., 
(London: Penguin, 1990). 
Marx, K., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume 3, trans. Fernbach, D .. 
(New York: Random House, 1981). 
Marx, K. and Engels, F., The German Ideology: Parts I and III, trans. Lough, W. and 
Magill, C.P., (New York: International Publishers, 1947). 
Meszaros, 1., Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London: Merlin, 1975). 
Nancy, J-L., The Inoperative Community, trans. Connor, P., Garbus, L., Holland, M., 
and Sawhney, S., (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1991). 
Nancy, J-L., Being Singular Plural, trans. Richardson, R.D. and Q'Byrne, A.E., 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
Nancy, J-L., Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Smith, J. and Miller, S., 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). 
Novalis, Fichte Studies, trans. Kneller, J., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
Novalis, Novalis Schriften: Zweiter Band, (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1929). 
Novalis, 'Miscellaneous Remarks', trans. Crick, J.P., in Bernstein, J.M. (ed.), Classic 
and Romantic German Aesthetics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
Novalis, 'Pollen', trans. Beiser, F.C., in Beiser, F.C. (ed.), The Early Political Writings 
of the German Romantics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
Novalis, 'Fragments from the Notebooks', trans. Beiser, F.C., in Beiser, F.e. (ed.). The 
Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
Paul, St., 'Galations' and 'Ephesians', in The New Testament: Revised Standard Edition, 
(New York: Collins, 1971). 
Paul, St., 'rrpo~ raAaTa~' and 'rrpo~ E<pE(Jiou~', in Scrivener, F.H.A .. (ed), The Nev. 
Testament in the Original Greek, (Cambridge: Cambridge UmversIty Press, 
1894). 
Pizer, J., Toward a Theory of Radical Origin: Essays on Modern German Thought, 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). . 
Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. MacKenna, S., (London: Pengum, 1991). 
P16tinos, Enneades, (Paris: Editore A. Firmin Dido!, 1855). 
Polt R. 'The Event of Enthinking the Event', in Scott, C.E .. Schoenbohm, S.\1.. 
, Vallega-Neu, D. and Vall ega, A. (eds:), Compa~ion to ~eide~ger's _ ') 
Contributions to Philosophy, (Bloommgton: IndIana UmversIt) Press. _00 1). 
Rockmore, T., Marx After Marxism: The Philosophy oifKarl Marx (Ox~ d' Bl k· 11 2002). . , lor. ac \\ e . 
Rorty, R., Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1989). . ' 
Rose, G., Hegel: Contra Sociology, (London: The Athlone Press. 1981). 
Rosen, S., G. U:F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom, (South Bend: St. 
Augustme's Press, 2000). 
Rousseau, 1-1., The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. Cole, G.D.H .. (London: 
Everyman, 1993). 
Rousseau, 1-1., Du Contrat Social; ou Principes du Droit Politique, (Amsterdam: Marc 
MichelRey, 1762). 
Rousseau, 1-1., Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques, Dialogues, trans. Masters. R.D., 
Kelly, C., and Bush, 1.R., (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1990). 
Ryan, M., Marxism and Deconstruction: a Critical Articulation, (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1982). 
Schelling, F.W.J., Ideasfor a Philosophy of Nature, trans. Harris, E.E. and Heath, P., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
Schelling, F.W.J., System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Heath, P., (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1993). 
Schelling, F.W.J., The Ages of the World, trans. Wirth, 1.M., (Albany: SUNY Press. 
2000). 
Schelling, F.W.J., 'On the Nature of Philosophy as Science', trans. Weigelt, M., in 
Bubner, R. (ed.), German Idealist Philosophy, (London: Penguin, 1997). 
Schelling, F.W.J., Schellings Sammtliche Werke: Neunter Band, (Stuttgart: J.G. Gotta, 
1861 ). 
Schiller, F., 'Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man', trans. Wilkinson, E.M. and 
Willoughby, L.A., in Hinderer, W. and Dahlstrom, D.O. (eds.), Friedrich 
Schiller: Essays, (New York: Continuum, 1993). 
Schiller, F., 'On Naive and Sentimental Poetry', trans. Dahlstrom, D.O., in Friedrich 
Schiller: Essays, (New York: Continuum, 1993). 
Schiller, F., Schillers Sammtliche Werke: Zwolfier Band, (Stuttgart: J.G. Gotta, 1833). 
Schlegel, F., 'Ideas', trans. Firchow, P., in Bernstein, 1.M. (ed.), Classic and Romantic 
German Aesthetics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
Schlegel, F., 'On Incomprehensibility', trans. Firchow, P., in Bernstein, 1.M. (ed.), 
Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
Steuart, 1., An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, (London: A. Millar and 
T. Cadell, 1767). 
Stirner, M., The Ego and Its Own, trans. Byington, S., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
Stirner, M., Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum, (Munich: Hanser, 1968). 
Sussman, H., 'Hegel, Glas, and the Broader Modernity', in Barnett, S. (ed.), Hegel After 
Derrida, (London: Routledge, 1998). ." 
Taylor, C., Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: Ca~b~dge UmversIty Press. 1979). 
Tnln-Duc-Thao, Phenomenology and Dialectical Materza/rsm, trans. Herman, OJ. and 
Morano, D.V., (Boston: Reidel, 1986). 
Wood, A.W., Karl Marx, (London: Routledge, 2004). 
Zizek, S., For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Politcal Factor, (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
